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7Introduction
Dear Colleagues and Friends,
The present volume contains the research ﬁndings of the successfully
implemented international project “The Implication of EU Membership on 
Immigration Trends and Immigrant Integration Policies for the Bulgarian 
Labor Market”. The transatlantic initiative of the Economic Policy Institute 
(EPI) was conducted within the period June 2007 – May 2008 thanks to the 
kind ﬁnancial support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
(Washington) within the frameworks of the GMF Key Institutions Program 
on Immigration and Integration (Berlin). The project was conducted in close 
cooperation with partnering organizations from Hungary and the United 
States of America. The consortium involved the Council on Social Work 
Education, Alexandria, VA; Katherine A. Kendall Institute; the Institute 
for World Economics to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest and 
the Institution for Hungarians in Neighboring Countries, Budapest.
In general, the transatlantic concept sought to examine the most topical 
and complex issues related to immigration and integration of immigrants 
into the labor market in Bulgaria. The speciﬁc goals of the action were to:
▪ Analyze the recent developments/changes of the immigrant 
ﬂows, as a direct consequence of the Bulgarian accession to the
European Union;
▪ Address the important issue of ensuring higher levels of migrant 
employment in the Bulgarian labor market;
▪ Examine what role can immigration play in ﬁlling labor short-
ages/gaps, caused by emigration; 
▪ Elaborate and publicly discuss advocating policies towards the 
Bulgarian Government. 
The international project aimed at laying down the groundwork for 
profound public debate and society’s engagement in the speciﬁc ﬁeld of
integration of immigrants and refugees in the Bulgarian society. The spe-
cial focus of the conducted research was on the adjustment of immigrants 
to the host country’s living conditions and their integration into the lo-
cal labor market. Applied and successfully-working Hungarian and U.S. 
migrant models and policies were shared in an effort to assist the process 
8of developing the existing governmental policies in Bulgaria towards im-
migrants and thus to ensure higher levels of migrant employment, profes-
sional and language training, re-qualiﬁcation of immigrant workers, etc.
As part of the project and within the time period June 2007 – March 
2008 were implemented the following research and public activities: 
▪ Two transatlantic expert meetings in Soﬁa (organized on De-
cember 10 and December 13, 2007);
▪ One day study trip around the Soﬁa municipality – the expert
team conducted meetings at the Temporary Detention Centre 
for Foreigners in Busmantzi and the State Agency for Refugees 
(December, 11 2007);
▪ One day study trip to Svilengrad - Border Check-point with Tur-
key (December 12, 2007);
▪ Publishing of a research edition on immigration trends and foreign 
citizen’s integration into the Bulgarian labor market (March 2008).
We are aware of the limits of the current edition to make you a part 
of the transatlantic project “The Implication of EU Membership on Im-
migration Trends and Immigrant Integration Policies for the Bulgarian 
Labor Market”. Nonetheless, it is in EPI’s major goals proﬁle and line of
activity to publish and disseminate project’s ﬁndings and thus to actively
contribute to widening the beneﬁciaries’ circles. EPI believes this is the
proper strategy to provoke higher networking and international coopera-
tion and we would like to thank the colleagues, friends and actors who 
have inspired, trusted and supported us throughout the years. We thank 
once again our donor - the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Last but not least, herewith the team of the Economic Policy Institute also 
would like to express its enormous gratitude to Mr. Danail Dimov, Director 
of the Temporary Detention Centre for Foreigners in Busmantzi; Ms. Ivelina 
Novakova, Work and Labour Ofﬁce Expert, Integration Centre for Refugees
of the State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers and Mr. Niko-
lay Chilingirov, Head of Border Police Station in Svilengrad for their excel-
lent cooperation within the whole duration of the transatlantic project.
Ivanka Petkova    Plamena Spassova
Chairperson & Programme Director  Executive Director  
Economic Policy Institute      Economic Policy Institute
9Immigration to Bulgaria 
– Preconditions and Possible 
Developments
Yasen Georgiev
Director “International Projects and Programmes”, 
Economic Policy Institute
Introduction
By acquiring the status of an EU member-state country (on January 
1, 2007), it is expected that in the next years and decades, Bulgaria will 
undergo a transition from a country of traditional net-emigration through 
the state of a transit country and ﬁnally to one of net-immigration. At
present, the Bulgarian accession continues to play an important role for a 
lot of people of Bulgarian origin from Southeastern and Eastern Europe 
(especially from Macedonia, Ukraine, and Moldova) to apply for Bul-
garian citizenship. However, Bulgaria, as a full-ﬂedged member of the
European Union, is attractive to people, not only from these regions, but 
also from different countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
Besides, despite the stable economic development in the past few 
years, some key economic indicators of Bulgaria still remain the lowest 
in the European Union. As a result, brain-drain and emigration of labour 
force - even though not with previous grave dimensions - are further 
observed. These recent trends cause serious shortages on the domestic 
labour market that could be partially ﬁlled with third-countries’ nation-
als. Furthermore, due to the fact, that an integral state policy towards 
attraction of immigrants is still in progress, the current process of ﬁlling
labour gaps is predominantly privately managed by several big Bulgar-
ian companies employing foreigners in their industries.
Taking into consideration the above mentioned and following its long-
term objectives to explore and analyse most up-to-date issues and to en-
courage pro-active dialogue and public discussions, the Economic Policy 
Institute, Soﬁa, held a four-day transatlantic workshop on December 2007 
in Soﬁa as a part of its project “The Implication of EU Membership on 
10
Immigration Trends and Immigrant Integration Policies for the Bulgarian 
Labor Market”. The initiative was organised with the kind support of the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States, Washington within the frame-
work of its Key Institution’s Program on Immigration and Integration.
In this regard, the paper aims at revealing the developments de-
scribed above on the base of the ﬁndings during the two transatlantic
expert meetings and two study-trips within the four-day long event in 
December. Furthermore, it prioritize also the revealing of economic pre-
conditions speaking in favour or against possible immigration to Bul-
garia and its role in solving problems on the country’s labour market. 
Migration in Bulgaria – Overview 
At the risk of stating the obvious, demographic development of each 
country is a key national, social and security priority. For this reason, 
its main patters as birth, mortality, and population growth rates are of 
enormous signiﬁcance for each country’s future development not only
in terms of population number as whole but also if labour market, pro-
ductivity and social insurance systems are considered. Nevertheless, 
nowadays, effects of even deteriorating demographic situation could be 
more or less alleviated through implementation of balanced immigra-
tion policy. However, it is proved that such kind of short-term solutions 
have long-term implications that can not be ignored. It is beyond any 
doubt that “importing” of skilled and well educated labour force is a pri-
mary aim of almost every developed country in the world and since the 
competition between them is particularly high such “importing” is not a 
working option for less attractive countries. When it comes to Bulgaria, 
possible solutions may include attraction of Bulgarian emigrants and/or 
foreign citizens of Bulgarian origin to return/come to the country.
First and foremost, before dealing with immigration to Bulgaria in 
detail, a brief overview of country’s migration trends and demographic 
development and is to be provided. 
The Balkans and South East Europe as a whole are said to be a 
migrant area. Traditionally, for economic and political reasons, outward 
migration is an option for most people in this region. Similarly after the 
collapse of the socialist system and the fall of the Iron curtain, outward 
migration has become quite important. In this regard Bulgaria does not 
make an exception. 
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Moreover, migration is a crucial issue for Bulgaria in the framework 
of the existing demographic condition of the Bulgarian population which 
is outcome of a prolonged inﬂuence of variety of factors. Some of these
factors are related to the general demographic trends of the European 
countries while others are connected with Bulgaria’s speciﬁc historic,
economic and cultural development.
The demographic development is inﬂuenced by the demographic
processes that are typical for developed countries – low marriage and 
birth rates and increased urbanization –and by the processes speciﬁc to
developing countries in transition – increased mortality rate and inten-
sive emigration. The overall result of these processes is the severe demo-
graphic crisis that Bulgaria is facing in the recent years. 
Taking this into consideration, the current paper aims at focusing on 
the effects of migration within the aforementioned developments, their role 
so far and future opportunities migration might provide in facing current 
challenges both in demographic point of view and on the labour market. 
Present implications of migration for Bulgaria have started some 20 
years ago. After several decades of free movement restrictions, the demo-
cratic changes in Bulgaria after 1989 resulted also in opening up of the 
borders. Understandably, this led to waves of large-scale emigration. 
Firstly, the outward migration was on a political and ethnical basis while 
in the following years emigration has been predominantly determined by 
economic circumstances and factors.
However, exact data on the volume of emigration is not available 
since the less complicated border and other related procedures are, the 
more difﬁcult is to keep track of the people who leave the country, the
aim and length of their stay abroad and last but not least their personal 
perceptions and motivation to leave the country. 
Neverthelss, in order to have more or less a general picture of the ap-
proximate numbers it is appropriate to summarize the available data on 
external migration. It is necessary to apply some statistics from reliable 
sources like the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS) and the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Policy. According to BAS the negative migration 
balance for the whole period 1989-2001 amounts to 670 000. More com-
prehensive but more serious records as well are provided by Emilia 
Maslarova, Minister of Labour and Social Policy. “For the last 14 years 
country’s population decreased by more than 1.2 million people, 868 000 
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of them have left the country mainly due to economic and social rea-
sons”, said Maslarova on January 9, 2006 during a presentation of a re-
port within a meeting of the Consultative Council for National Security to 
the President of Republic of Bulgaria, entitled “Elaborating of a strategy 
for demographic development of Republic of Bulgaria”. Furthermore, if 
estimates of the Bulgarian Industrial Association are considered, as of 
2008 Bulgarian emigration numbers more than 900 000 people.
To a big extent, this more or less ofﬁcial statistic is evaluated by 
approximate estimates. At the same time the number of emigrants from 
Bulgaria for the same period is indeﬁnable, which let to be concluded 
that the real number of Bulgarians outside the country is higher. 
As of December 31, 2007 the number of people who resided in Bul-
garia on a permanent basis was 7 640 240 prople1. Compared to data for 
1990, when country’s population amounted to 8 669 269, its number had 
decreased by 1 029 029 people. According to the same statistics for 2007, 
2 960 peole have declared ofﬁcially change of their places of residence
from Bulgaria to a foreign country, while the number of foreigners settled 
in Bulgaria is 1 560. The ofﬁcial statistic deﬁnes the former as emigrants
and the latter as immigrants. Logically, the migration saldo for the men-
tioned period is negative and amounts to 1 400 people. Presumambly, the 
number of these legal immigrants is to be considered as relatively precise, 
whereas the number of the emigrated people is quite questionable due to 
the nature and the length of the people’s residence abroad as for instance 
seasonal employment or obtaining education in a foreign country.  
Immigration to Bulgaria 
As a country suffering form severe emigration, analyses in Bulgaria 
have predominantly emphasized on outwards migration ﬂows and their 
economic, social and demographic impacts. This can be also explained 
with the scale of immigration to Bulgaria in the last decades which is 
comparatively low. On the one hand it is due to free movement restric-
tions posed during the communist regime, on the other hand it results 
from the economic problems Bulgaria faced in the 90s which made the 
country far from being attractive end-destination for immigrants.  
However, despite the mentioned restrictions before 1989, Bulgaria 
was not absolutely isolated towards the rest of the world in terms of peo-
1 National Statistical Institute
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ple’s movement. Following a long-term policy higher education were pro-
vided to left-wing students and intellectuals from third world countries 
who were thought at Bulgarian universities
Furthermore, in the 1980s the need for labour force in certain economic 
sectors like construction had as a result Vietnamese immigration to the 
country. Following the purpose of the paper the controlled immigration 
of Vietnamese workers was the only one example of labour migration as 
such in Bulgarian history while for its geographical location Bulgaria has 
always played more or less an important role as a transit country particu-
larly for refugees from Middle East and North Africa. Their number has 
been varying during the years but in generall it remains at a low level.
Graphic 1. Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees - Number of applications sub-
mitted (01.01.1993 – 31.03.2008)
Source: State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers
As it can be seen from the graphic above, an increase in submitted ap-
plications is to be observed in 2007 compared to the year before and the 
prospects for 2008 envisage also at least a slight increase of this fugure. It is 
assumed that to a big extent this development is due to country’s accession to 
EU which facilitated many travel procedures and at the same time is consid-
ered as an easier option for (il)legal refugees to enter the older EU members 
states or at least these with better economic indicators than Bulgaria.
14
The same trend of increase has been also observed by the experts 
involved in the project of the Economic Policy Institute on “The Impli-
cation of EU Membership on Immigration Trends and Immigrant Inte-
gration Policies for the Bulgarian Labor Market”. 12 December 2007 
the participants travelled to the border city of Svilengrad. The agenda 
included both meetings in and visits to immigrant facilities. It began 
with a visit to the Border Police Station in Svilengrad where the current 
challenges before the authorities in the border region were presented. 
According to the up-to-date statistics of the Border Police, the number 
of illegal immigrants, caught in this border region, experienced a signiﬁ-
cant increase from 97 in 2006 to 767 as of 12 December 2007. 
This statistic supports once again the assumption that Bulgaria is 
getting more and more attractive if not as an immigrant country but as a 
transit one moreover that the country is a kind of a gateway to Europe and 
for this reason it has often been a favourite channel for smuggled drugs, 
goods and people. What is more, joining the Schengen Agreement, prob-
ably in 2011, along with abolitishing of systematic border controls be-
tween participating countries, will make Bulagria even more attractive 
especially for trafﬁcers since once enetered the country they will have
an unlimited access to other member countries. Of course, such kind of 
development is to be predicted and according to ofﬁcial statements cur-
rently border security technologies undergo steady modernisation. 
Graphic 2. Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees - Top 10 Refugee Countries of 
Origin (01.01.1993 – 31.03.2008)
Source: State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers
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As shown in both grapﬁcs most of the refugees coming to Bulgaria
are from war regions as Afghanistan and Iraq and their numbers where 
particularly high in the years when the military operations against both 
countries began. Although it is too early to generalize, 2007 marks a 
change in refugees’ number in Bulgaria which is to increase in the years 
to come which will not be result from a serious external events or factors 
but rather than from  country’s EU member status.
Demograpﬁc Implications
After concentrating on migration from and to Bulgaria in its both 
directions, this section is concerned with their demographic dimensions. 
Several demographic indicators are also provided since they are essential 
not only as a precondition and/or result from emigration but also play a 
crucial role in the arising public debate in Bulgaria concerning possible 
immigration to the country.  
Table 1. Population in Bulgaria as 31 December of the following years
Year Total
1990 8 669 269
1995 8 384 715
2001 7 891 095
2005 7 718 750
2006 7 679 290
2007 7 640 240
Source: National Statistical Institute
Although countrys’ population continues to decline, some positive 
tendencies were observed in the recent year which is mainly due to the 
economic stabilization and the (See Table 1). These trends ﬁnd their ex-
pression in higher birth rates and life expectancy which determinates over-
all population decline at slower pace (by 39 000 people or 0.5% compared 
to 2006). However, external migration is further negative and average age 
of population is going upwards from 39.9 in 2000 to 41.5 in 2006. 
According another demographic indicator as of 31 December the pop-
ulation in Bulgaria at working age amounts to 4 817 000 (63.0%) which 
marks a slight drop as well. It is alarming that this percentage remains 
almost the same during the last few years while the number of younger 
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population decreases rapidly. Compared to the respective previous year in 
2007 it droped by 14 000 peope and in 2006 by 23 000 (Table 2.)
Table 2. Population by working-age status
Year Total
Age Groups
under working 
age  - % at working age - %
over working age - 
%
1990 100 21.6 55.5 22.9
1995 100 19.1 56.6 24.3
2001 100 16.3 59.2 24.5
2005 100 14.8 62.4 22.8
2006 100 14.6 62.8 22.6
2007 100 14.5 63.0 22.5
Source: National Statistical Institute
As a conclusion from the data above it might be pointed out that it is 
2007 when population growth rate marks the lowest decline since 1995 
– 37 655 or -5.0%.
Main Indicators
The below outlined indicators seek to reveal to what extent immi-
gration is a possible solution to the challenges Bulgaria faces at present 
in terms of shortage of labour force. In general, these key indicator can 
be devided into two groups – the ﬁrst one supports the idea of immigra-
tion whereas the second one emphasis rather on the human resources 
within the country and their possible optimizing. 
Table 3. Main macroeconomic indicators (%)
Main macroeconomic 
indicators (%)
Years
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Real GDP growth on annual 
basis 5.0 6.6 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.0*
Inﬂation - annual average rate 2.3 6.1 6.0 7.4 7.6 N/A
Employment rate – total % 52.5 54.2 55.8 58.6 N/A N/A
Unemployment rate – total % 13.7 12.0 10.1 9.0 6.9 N/A
Source: Eurostat       *Forecast
Analysing the ﬁgures in Table 3 it is obvious that Bulgaria is experi-
encing a positive economic development in the last few years with steady 
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growth rates and declining unemployment. The latter trend is particu-
larly notable in sectors like contruction and tourism where labour force 
is even more lacking. For this reason, in order to keep this economic 
development at the same pace as so far, more and more business sectors 
call for facilitating the process of “importing” foreign workers. 
The average exit age from the labour market is another indicator which 
calls for ﬁlling of labour market insufﬁciencies by immigrants. According
to this indicator, that gives the average age at which active persons withdraw 
from the labour market, Bulgaria, together with Romania, is holding the 
leading position in the EU. The average exit age for 2005 and 2006 in Bul-
garia (60.2 and 64.1) and Romania (63.0 and 64.3) exeed the estimates for 
EU (27 countries) which respectively are 61.0 for 2005 and 61.2 for 2006. 
Thus, it si evident that it will be difﬁcult to include more people into the
labour market since a relatively high level has been already reached.  
See Graphic 3!
Taking into consideration the data revaled above, it is to be under-
lined; however, there is another group of indicators that are rather scepti-
cal about the demand of foreign labour force. They include ﬁgures about
labour productivity and life-long learning.
See Graphic 4!
This graphic consideres GDP in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) 
per person employed relative to EU-27 where EU-27 is equal to 100 since 
the Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure for the economic activity. It 
is deﬁned as the value of all goods and services produced less the value of
any goods or services used in their creation. GDP per person employed is 
intended to give an overall impression of the productivity of national econo-
mies expressed in relation to the European Union (EU-27) average. If the 
index of a country is higher than 100, this country's level of GDP per person 
employed is higher than the EU average and vice versa. Basic ﬁgures are
expressed in PPS, i.e. a common currency that eliminates the differences in 
price levels between countries allowing meaningful volume comparisons 
of GDP between countries. It is to be noted that “persons employed” does 
not distinguish between full-time and part-time employment.
The statistics for Bulgaria reveals a slight increase from 35.7 % in 
2005 to 36.3% in 2006 which is still the lowest level in the Union. Next 
to the last is Romania with 41.8 % and  42.6%. 
See Graphic 5!
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Graphic 5 shows the percentage of the adult population aged 25 to 64 
participated in education and training in four-week time before the survey. 
The information collected relates to all education or training whether or 
not relevant to the respondent's current or possible future job.
As lifelong learning concept is set to be the core of the ambitious EU 
Lisbon 2010 process, in which the whole of the European Union should 
become a learning area, it si quite important to compare the data for 
Bulgaria to these of other EU countries. Again Bulgaria holds the last 
position with 1.3% of the whole population for both eyars. The overall 
estimates for EU (27 countries) show 9.7- 9 .6%, while Sweden, Den-
mark and UK head the ranking with about 30% of their population.  
The last two indicatos let us conclude that before resorting to labour 
force “importing” several possibilities do exist and their proper use i.e. 
increasing labour productivity and involving of greater numbers of the 
Bulgarian population in lifelong learning programmes may contribute to 
the overall optimizing of the employed labout force and soften the need 
of implementation of immigration measures.
Migration – Effects and Implicatons
The restrictions some Western countries imposed in the 1990’s led 
to selective functions of migration. Priority was given to young and well 
educated people. Furthermore, the state has made investments in their 
educational and vocational development and they easily adapted to the 
market economy requirements. The loss of these proactive people may 
turn out as a burdern to transforming of Bulgarian economy into more 
efﬁcient and high technological one.
The emigration of young and well-educated people has been accompanied 
by emigration of low-skilled labour force in the recent years which nowadays 
has as a result shortage of labour force in labour intensive sectors as construc-
tion which by deﬁnition demands not only for well qualiﬁed employees.
Furthermore, since its accession to the EU, Bulgaria enjoys facilitated 
travel requirements and restriction towards Bulgarian traveling or living 
within the Union despite the restrictions some old member states imposed 
in regards to their labour markets. For instance, the German government 
announced in the second half of 2007 that those Bulgarians who have com-
pleted their education in Germany can remain and work in the country. This 
means leakage of intellect which Bulgaria must be able to retrieve. These 
people will be necessary for Bulgaria provided that there are investments 
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and EU funds which Bulgaria should aquire and use in the years to come.
Nowadays, it is absolutely clear that in Bulgaria there is already a 
shortage of work force – weavers, builders and people who are directly 
connected with production. It seems that unemployed people in Bulgaria 
are in deﬁciency.
It is logical that in such case Bulgaria should turn to its neighbours 
like Macedonia, Serbia and others who are not EU members. Bulgaria 
should facilitate the process of gaining Bulgarian citizenship in order to 
keep from making the mistake which Europe mad in the 1950’s of the 
last century when they workers from Eastern Europe were not imported 
because of the Iron curtain. Then the working places were occupied by 
persons from North Africa, Turkey and Asia which led to the present cri-
sis with the communities of immigrant workers. They failed to integrate 
themselves in the local communities but their children as well. This led to 
a strong social division which is turning into cultural stratiﬁcation. Bas-
ing on this experience, Bulgaria should prevent this from happening.
In 2007 Bulgaria received 12 411 applications for Bulgarian 
citizenship. Six thousand of them came from Macedonian citizens, and 
1 000 from Moldovans according to information announced by the Vice 
President Angel Marin, whose jurisdiction includes the power to grant 
and revoke citizenship. Between 2002 and 2007 applications numbered 
39 076, of these, 13 925 were from Macedonian citizens. However, 711 
applications submitted by Macedonian citizens in 2007 were based on 
false documents, claiming Bulgarian ancestry, which shows that their 
decisions are motivated more by pragmatism than by a desire to return 
to a homeland – real or imagined since having a Bulgarian citizenship 
means at least an easy access to the EU. 
For certain groups of immigrants the immigration to Bulgaria is 
temporary, and they look upon Bulgaria as a country where they will prepare 
for further emigration. In the meantime, the number of people who want to live 
in Bulgaria without having any prior connection to the country is increasing. 
In 2007 the number of immigrants – primarily from Turkey, Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Palestine – who tried to enter Bulgaria illegally rose by 64 percent in 
comparison to 2006, so data of Bulgarian Border Police authorities.  
Since massive emigration has already pushed up wages at a much higher 
level than supported by productivity increase, immigration is more often 
seen as a possible solution for ﬁlling labour gaps and “letting the steam”. In 
this regard, some related administrative procedures are to be simpliﬁed.
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At present, there are several institutions in charge of migration 
management are: a) visas are issued by the Ministry of External Affairs 
and its consular units; b) stay permits, issuance of formal identiﬁcation
documents and the exercise of compulsory administrative measures are 
in the ﬁeld of the Ministry of Interior which is also responsible for border
control; c) the Ministry of labor and social policy issues work permits 
for foreigners; d) asylum seekers are provided with support by the State 
Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers which is also in charge 
of granting of particular status; e) applications for asylum and Bulgarian 
citizenship are approved by the Ministry of Justice and President’s ofﬁce.
When access to the labour market is concerned, in general, two residence 
regimes are applied – for EU citizens and non-EU citizens. Understand-
ably, for the former legal procedures for receiving long-term residence has 
been facilitated while for the latter other regulations are in force. In this 
regard, visa "D" is required for foreigners of non-EU citizenship, including 
non-EU citizen family members of Bulgarian citizens.
Since the largest ﬂow of immigrants to Bulgaria consist of non-EU 
countries and it is expected that this will be the case also in the future, 
access to the market of larger groups of migrants will be further regulated 
by visa "D" regulations. 
If a non-EU, non-asylum seeking foreigner is to work on a labor 
contract in Bulgaria, ﬁrstly his/her Bulgarian employer should submit 
an application for a labor permit before the Ministry of labor and social 
policy. What is more, foreign employees within the respective Bulgarian 
company should not be more than 10% of the total number of employees. 
Furthermore the foreign employee should be paid a minimum salary 
signiﬁcantly disproportionate to the minimum salary received by
Bulgarian employees. Last, but not least, relatively high administra-
tive costs are necessary (about 1300 Bulgarian Lev/ 670 Euro) during 
the whole triple-level procedure, which requires it's consideration once 
before the Ministry of labor and social policy in order to receive the 
work permit; once before a diplomatic and consular mission of Bulgaria 
abroad in order to apply for receiving a visa "D," and lastly before the 
Ministry of Interior for receiving a stay permit.
Conclusion
According to ofﬁcial information,Bulgaria's green card system, giving 
right to foreigners to live and work in the country, will start functioning 
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in 2008. In spite of the fact there are about 260 000 unemployed people 
in Bulgaria and the low labour productivity, Bulgarian business faces 
workforce shortage and that is why foreign workers must be attracted. 
Although more and more companies on the market have difﬁculties in
employing personnel, this will be found very controversially by most Bul-
garians moreover that measures towards attracting Bulgarian emigrants 
are still missing. Furthermore, announcements for importing of workers 
from Viatnam or the Philippines will further cause disapproval among 
the local population, not only because their different ethnical and cultural 
background, but also due to the not very far-sighted perspective of such 
decision and the negative experience some western states gained with im-
migration and integration in their countries. For these reasons, decisions 
makers in Bulgaria should carefully examine all opportunities and threats 
immigration may provide and last but not least they should not succumb 
to the pressure of the business since its goals often proved to be with 
short-term implications, rather than with long-term effects. 
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Abstract
This part of the research poject aims to reveal the integration policies 
implemented by the ﬁve EU countries (France, Germany, Netherlands,
Spain and UK) which could be considered as the hot spots of migration 
inﬂows in the last two decades both from EU27 nationals and non-EU27
nationals. Large experience of the authorities in these countires dealing 
with the issue in the context of the aging population in Europe could 
be considered and applied in the decision-making process in Bulgaria. 
After becoming full-ﬂedged member state of the EU Bulgaria inherited
the key role to manage an important part of the external borders of the 
Union. The pressure of the migration inﬂows to the country will further
increase after entering the Shengen zone in the period 2011-2013.
We use the labor market as a point of departure to our research work 
considering that the inclusion of the foreign nationals into the local la-
bor market will on one hand contribute to fostering their integration in 
the society and ﬁlling the enlarging gaps in certain sectors of the labor
markets. In the ﬁrst part of the paper we made a brief review of the im-
migration trends and labor market statistics in the ﬁve targeted countries.
Afterwards are drawn some of the best practices in the integration of im-
migrants in the labor market. In the ﬁnal section “Recommendations for 
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Adjusting Successfully Working Immigrants’ Strategies in the Bulgarian 
Context” are made some suggestions and recommendations for the mea-
surements that could be useful in building adequate immigration policy 
in the case of Bulgaria.
I. Immigration Trends in France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Spain and United Kingdom
France
The immigrant population over 15 years of age in France during the 
year 2002 was 2,974,900. According to the results of the 2002 employment 
study, the immigrant labour force amounted to 1,623,786 people, which 
was 6.2 % of the total labour force. Out of all these 1,190,110 were employed 
on the labor market. The immigrant labour force was made up of more 
men (59%) than women. Each year, approximately 100,000 immigrants 
joined the labour force, which represented 12.5% of all new workers. This 
number has ﬂuctuated over time, between 65,000 or 9 % per year (1995 
and 1996) and 120,000 or 16 % (1992 and 1998). In 1999, the immigrant 
population accounted for 9 % of the employed labour force, excluding the 
public sector. In most of the cases immigrants have been engaged under 
ﬁxed term contracts (13%) or part-time (19%), as compared to French 
nationals. The labour force participation rate of women has increased 
signiﬁcantly over the period of 1990 to 1999 (from 41 to 57.1%).�
In 2004 according to the National Institute for Statistics and Eco-
nomic Studies (France) approximately 4.9 million immigrants were liv-
ing in France, which represented 8.1% of the total population. 40% of 
them had the French nationality that they have acquired by naturalization 
or marriage:
▪ 1.7 million immigrants, (35% of the immigrants and 2.7% of 
the total population) were originating from a European Union 
country. The progressive fall of the number of Italian, Spanish or 
Polish immigrants is compensated by the arrival of immigrants 
coming from other countries. The number of Portuguese 
immigrants remained stable compared to the year 1999. The 
immigrants coming from extra community European countries 
were in high rise – 250,000 people. 
▪ 1.5 million immigrants, (31% of the immigrants and 2.4% of 
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the total population) were originating from North Africa. The 
number was in rise of 220.000 compared to 1999. 
▪ 570,000 immigrants (12% of the immigrants and less than 1% 
of the total population), were coming from sub-Saharan Africa. 
This ﬁgure was 45% higher than in the year 1999. Every 2 
Africans out of 3 came from old French colonies. 
▪ 830,000 people, (17% of the immigrants and 1.3% of the total 
population), came from the rest of the world, mainly from Asia. 
The share of Asia (including Turkey) in the immigrant population 
was 14% in comparison to 12.7% in 1999 and only 3.6 % in 1975.
The passage from an immigration of work (primarily male), to a policy 
of family regrouping in the middle of the years 1970 involved a growth of the 
feminization of the immigrant population, within which men and women 
are today in an equal number. The immigrant population is a little older 
than the non-immigrant population, because the majority of its members 
arrived in France after the age of 15 and their children born in France are 
considered among the non-immigrant residents. The educational level of 
the immigrants is in clear progression. Today, a quarter of the immigrants 
have a diploma of higher education, (four times more than in 1982). The 
majority of the immigrants reside in Ile de France1 (40%) or in South-East. 
One inhabitant of the Paris area on six is an immigrant. 
Immigration towards France is mainly of African origin (the North 
and Black Africa). The source of the migrants changes quickly: nearly 
two thirds are coming from North Africa, in particular from Algeria 
and Morocco, as compared to a little more than half ﬁve years ago. We 
can notice a fall of the entries on family grounds, passing from 109.800 
entries in 2004 (63.1% of the total) to 102.500 in 2005 (60.8%). On the 
contrary, the entries for reason of work recently increased, passing from 
20,900 in 2004 to 22,800 in 2005, which is an increase from 12% to 
13.5%. In spite of a reduction of 16% of the requests for refuge in 2005 
(42,000 new requests), in 2006 France remained the OECD countries 
which recorded the greatest number of requests. 
France’s new immigration and integration law, adopted on July 25, 
2006, aims to overhaul France’s immigration system by giving the gov-
ernment new powers to encourage high-skilled migration, ﬁght illegal
migration more effectively, and restrict family immigration. Although 
1 Region around Paris.
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the new law is applied for just few months now (it entered into force in 
early 2007), one of its pillars has been already considered as unsuccess-
ful. The number of people deported for not having the required docu-
ments reached only 13,000 by the end of July 2006, which is half of the 
Interior Ministry’s goal for the year 2006 of 25,000, inciting protests 
from tens of thousands of French citizens. Those unrests serve as a proof 
for the fact that it will not be easy for France pass the transition to a 
selective immigration system that 1) emphasizes employment-driven im-
migration at the expense of the 113,000 immigrants who arrive in France 
annually for family-related reasons and 2) that carries out a robust cam-
paign against illegal migration.
Germany
Since the 1990s, analysts have constantly paying attention on Ger-
many’s ongoing need for immigrants in order to bolster economic de-
velopment, maintain a dynamic workforce and deal with the rapid aging 
of the country’s population. In 2003, the number of legally resident for-
eigners in Germany was 7.3 million, which comprised 8.9 % of the total 
population. Citizens of the former guest worker countries continued to 
make up the largest share of this number, which notably included 1.9 mil-
lion Turkish citizens, of whom 654,000 were born in Germany. Another 
575,000 Turks had been naturalized since 1972 and were not show up in 
statistics of the foreign population. 
In addition to the data presented above, the foreign population also 
included 1,050,000 people from the former Yugoslavia, 600,000 Italians, 
and 355,000 Greeks. Other important countries of origin included Po-
land (325,000) and Austria (190,000). About 25 % of the total foreign 
population was from EU member states, and an additional 55 % came 
from other Western and Eastern European countries like Norway, Swit-
zerland, Russia, Ukraine, and Hungary. Overall, 80 % of the foreigners 
came from Europe, while almost 12 % were Asians.
Since the asylum law was tightened in 1993, illegal immigration 
has been constantly growing. However, there were no reliable estimates 
on the number of illegal migrants staying in Germany. In contrast with 
countries like the US, Greece, or Italy, a legalization program for un-
documented immigrants has not been carried out, or even seriously dis-
cussed in political circles.
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In 2001, the government counted an estimated 1.1 million refugees 
in the legal foreign population of 7.3 million. That included 301,000 rec-
ognized asylum seekers and their family members, along with another 
164,000 refugees whose applications for asylum were still being processed. 
There were also 416,000 de facto refugees and foreigners whose deporta-
tion was suspended — those who either did not apply for asylum but en-
joyed temporary protected status, or whose application was not accepted 
but could not be returned to their home countries for a variety of reasons 
and therefore received a temporary residence permit. Another 173,000 
of the 1.1 million refugees were Jews from the former Soviet Union who 
came to Germany since reuniﬁcation. An interesting moment is the fact 
that the members of the last group were not required to prove that they, as 
individuals, have been persecuted in order to immigrate to Germany. As 
reported by the Federal Statistical Ofﬁce on the basis of provisional results,
662,000 persons immigrated to Germany in 2006 and 639,000 persons 
emigrated. This results in net inward migration of 23,000 persons. That 
was 46,000 immigrations less and 11,000 emigrations more than in 2005. 
Consequently, net inward migration decreased strongly from the previous 
year (–71%), following a decrease by just 4% from 2004 to 2005.
In 2000, a new citizenship law came into force, the ﬁrst such measure
in nearly 90 years. For the very ﬁrst time, children born to foreigners in
Germany automatically receive German citizenship, if the family could 
prove that one of the parents has been a legal resident for at least eight 
years. There is also an option that children could hold the nationality of 
their parents, but they must decide to be citizens of one country or the 
other before the age of 23. This provision became an obiligitory circum-
stance when the German conservative opposition to the ruling coalition 
did not accept “dual citizenship”. Such a citizenship has been granted 
only in exceptional cases - e.g., temporarily or if the applicant’s country 
of origin impedes the process of releasing him or her from citizenship. 
However, the latest ﬁgures on naturalization at the same time show that 
dual citizenship is still very signiﬁcant. In 2002, 43 % of those who be-
came German citizens could retain their original nationality, while in 
2001 the share was even higher, reaching 48 %.
The demographic effects of the new citizens have already become 
visible. In 2000, 41,300 children born of parents with non-German citi-
zenship became German by birth. In 2001 the ﬁgure was 38,600. Without
30
the new rule, these children would have appeared among the statistics on 
the foreign population and therefore would have increased the number of 
foreigners by at about 80,000 people.
In August 2000, Germany introduced a “green card” system to help 
satisfy the demand for highly qualiﬁed information technology experts.
In contrast with the American green card, which ensures permanent resi-
dency, the German version limits residency to a maximum of ﬁve years.
Netherlands
During the forties and ﬁfties of the last century, many people from the
country` s former colony, the Dutch East Indies, came to the Netherlands. 
At the same time, many people left the Netherlands during the ﬁfties and
sixties. Encouraged by the Dutch Government they headed for countries 
such as Australia, Canada and the United States. Thus, starting in the 
sixties, the Netherlands gradually became de facto an immigration 
country. Large groups of people from a wide range of countries came to 
the Netherlands. Three factors were the real reason for this immigration 
trend: decolonisation, economic growth and international developments.
With an ageing population, a strict immigration policy, and recent 
migration trends, the Netherlands could be facing some troubles in the 
future. While immigration into the state was on the rise, more and more 
people were emigrating from the country. In the year 2006 over 2005, net 
migration ﬂows for the Netherlands increased signiﬁcantly. A surprising
number of people emigrated from the country, which has outpaced im-
migration since 2003. However it was a fact that at that time immigration 
(while on an increase in the last few years) was not particularly high as 
compared with earlier years. The highest recent immigration trend was 
in 2001, with 133,404 people immigrating to the country that year.
The ﬁgures, released by Statistics Netherlands, show that the number
of people immigrating to the Netherlands increased by 9192 from 2005 to 
2006. In 2005 the number of immigrants who settled in the country was 
92,297. In 2006 the number was 101,489. The increase is attributed mostly 
to Dutch emigrants returning home, as well as the inﬂux ofnew EU citi-
zens coming from Eastern Europe. The second largest group of immi-
grants was from Poland. Numbers of migrants from traditional sources of 
immigration such as Turkey, Morocco and Suriname were reducing.
In 2005, the number of people who emigrated from the Netherlands 
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was 92,297. In 2006, the number was 132,682 - an increase of 40,385. 
The rising emigration numbers could possibly be attributed to lower 
housing prices and attractive mortgage taxes in neighboring countries 
such as Belgium and Germany.
Coupled with low birth rates and an ageing demographic, the popu-
lation of the Netherlands is expected to drop in the coming years if some-
thing is not done. Some possible solutions have been recently announced 
by an Advisory Board to the Dutch Government which are to implement 
a better immigration strategy to bring in skilled foreign workers and to 
reduce barriers to lesser skilled workers where possible.
Spain
During the last decade, foreign population in Spain has surged from 
0.35 million in 1991 to almost 2.7 million in 2003, that is, which rep-
resented an increase of 1 % to 6.25 % of the total population. There 
was a clear regional concentration of the foreign population in Madrid 
and the Eastern part of Spain. South America and Africa were the main 
areas of origin of the immigrants (about 30% and 20% respectively). 
About 50 % of the immigrants had secondary studies, while around 15 
% had tertia ry studies and almost 60 % of them arrived after 1995. 
Finally, the foreign population was relatively young with about 60 % of 
the immigrants in the 20-44 age group, and men of 25-34 years of age 
being overrepresented.
According to municipal rolls, foreigners living in Spain on January 
1, 2005 totalled more than 3,700,000, which was an equivalent of 8.5 % 
of the total population. If we look at country of origin, the main groups 
were Moroccans (with nearly 511,000 persons), Ecuadorians (498,000), 
Romanians (317,000), Colombians (271,000) and British (227,000). As a 
whole, these represented nearly half of all foreigners on municipal rolls. 
Given that at the end of September 2005, the number of those living in 
Spain with current residence permits (issued by the competent authorities 
apart from ﬁguring on municipal rolls) was close to 2,600,000, the total 
number of immigrants without regular status still was around one million 
persons (600,000 less than at the end of 2004), in spite of the process for 
gaining normal status which began in February 2005.
Currently, there is no doubt that the majority of immigrants come to Spain 
in search of work. According to the Labour Force Survey, in the third quarter 
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of 2005 nearly 2,267,000 immigrants were employed mainly in services (59 
%) and construction (21 %). In industry and agriculture, the proportion 
was much lower (12 % and 8 % respectively). The greater part (around 85 
%) held a job with low qualiﬁcations clearly below their educational level, 
which in 80 % of the cases stood at a medium or higher level). As may be 
expected, the increase in immigrant labour has had a favourable effect on 
total registrations with Social Security to the point where close to 45 % of 
those registering in the past four years were immigrant workers.
United Kingdom
In 2001, 4.8 million immigrants lived in the UK, which amounted to 
8.47 % of the total population, or 9.75 % of the working age population. 
Since then, Britain has experienced a further increase in its foreign born 
population, and the share of foreignersi in the working age population in 
2005 reached 11.5%.
The percentage of foreign born individuals in the working age 
population in Britain increased from 8.35 % in 1993 to 9.09 % in 1999 and 
to 11.5% in 2005. Immigrants to the UK had on average higher educational 
attainments than native born workers. In 1992, 1998, and 2005, respectively 
10, 13 and 16 % of the native born population in Britain left full time 
education after the age of 21. For the same years at about 22, 28 and 35 % 
of the immigrants were living in the UK for more than two years, and 44, 
52 and 45 % of the foreigners arrived in the UK less than two years earlier. 
On the other hand, while 69, 64, and 57 % of the native born population 
in 1992, 1998, and 2005 left full time education before the age of 16, this 
was the case for 45, 39, and 31 % of immigrants who where in the country 
for more than 2 years, and 16, 14 and 14 % of immigrants who arrived 
within the previous 2 years. All numbers refer to shares in the working age 
population. The occupational distribution of immigrants who have been in 
the UK for more than 2 years was similar to that of native born workers. 
However, recent immigrants (arrivals over the last two years) downgraded 
considerably, working in jobs that were less skilled and lower paid, with 
the exception of professionals which include engineers, scientists, medical 
doctors, professors, architects, lawyers, etc. 
An estimated 591,000 people arrived to live in the UK for at least a 
year in 2006. This was slightly more than the previous highest estimate 
of long-term immigration of 586,000 people, recored in the year 2004. Of 
33
all immigrants, 510,000 (86 %) were non-British citizens in 2006. Of all 
immigrants, 161,000 (27 %) had a ‘deﬁnite job to go to’ and 70,000 (12 
%) arrived ‘looking for work’. EU citizens were more likely to migrate to 
the UK for work related reasons than for citizens outside the EU. 61 % 
of non-British EU citizens came to the UK for ‘work related’ reasons. In 
contrast, only 32 % of citizens from outside the EU cited ‘work related’ 
reasons. London remained the most common destination for international 
migrants, with 29 % arriving there in 2006. However, this was down from 
43 % in 2000. The other English regions and UK countries either retained 
or increased their share of immigrants over the same period.
II. Labor Market Characteristics in France, Germany, Neth-
erlands, Spain and United Kingdom
The European labor market is characterized by territorial fragmen-
tation. Thus, the difference between the unemployment levels in the EU 
member states is considerable and the regional variations within these 
countries are often even greater. Although there is a certain correlation 
between the level of economic activity (measured in GDP per head) and 
the level of unemployment, the correlation is still not strict at all. In some 
of the EU countries with a high average living standards, the unemploy-
ment rate is essentially high (in the case of Germany and France). The 
EU labor market is characterized with substantial immobility of the la-
bor force. The overall ﬁgures show that less than 0.5 % of the workers in
EU move to a different region every year. Currently, there is a process 
in Europe of outsourcing the industrial activities with low added value 
from Western European countries to Central and Eastern Europe.
France
At the end of 2007 the unemployment rate in France was 10 % and has 
not been below 8 % for the past twenty years. In this regard, there is room 
for discussion on the precise quantitative effects of strict employment 
protection and the minimum wage. These effects - combined with the 
uncertainty over the cost of dismissal to the employer and the fact that the 
minimum cost of labour exceeds the potential productivity of a number 
of low skilled workers - appear to be responsible for a large part of the 
high level of structural unemployment, especially among certain groups, 
such as youth and the long-term unemployed. These policies are intended 
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to place part of the responsibility for income protection and security of 
employment on employers. Over the years the response of employers 
to these increases in labour costs has tried to reduce the demand for 
labour even though reductions over the last decade in social insurance 
contributions for low paid workers have increased employment prospects 
for the low skilled. High employers’ social insurance contributions have 
the same effect on the demand for labour at wage levels where these 
reductions no longer have an impact. On the other hand, the interaction 
of taxes, social security contributions and social beneﬁts have led to poor 
labour market performance by tending to reduce the supply of labour.
In 1999, the unemployment rate for immigrants reached 22 %, as 
compared to 13 % for the total population. The 2002 ﬁgures also showed 
that 24 % of immigrant workers were unemployed as compared to the 
overall ﬁgure of 16 %. Even more alarming was the fact that 16 % of 
immigrants with higher education degrees were unemployed, compared 
to 8 % of the general population.
Germany
In the year 2007 Germany registered strong economic performance 
and increasing export ﬁgures. The economic upturn has affected the labour
market. The unemployment ﬁgures were falling, while the number of em-
ployees liable for compulsory social insurance contributions was rising, to-
gether with the job vacancies. The average unemployment rate for the ﬁrst
ten months of 2007 was 8.6%. For 2006 it was 9.8% and for 2005 - 10.7%.
There are 42.09 million people of working age in Germany. In May 
2007, 3.806 million of them were unemployed and 26.56 million were in 
jobs subject to compulsory social insurance. Three groups of people have 
been experiencng the above-average rate of unemployment: those aged 
over 50 (26.6 %), foreigners (14.7 %) and the under-25s (10.1 %). The av-
erage employment rate for 2005 and 2006 was respectivelly 66.0 % and 
67.5 %. At the same time, policy programmes for long-term unemployed 
were targeting in particular older workers and young people to the age of 
less than 25 years. In 2006 the long-term unemployment rate (12 months 
or more) for the whole workforce was 5.5 % while for the people less 
than 25 years it was 19.5 %. Part-time employment in Germany for 2005 
and 2006 was 24.0% and 25.8%. Employees with contracts of limited 
duration for 2005 were 14.1% and for 2006 were a bit higher - 14.5 %.
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Netherlands
The unemployment rate in Netherlands in the ﬁrst 10 months of 2007
was 3.29 %. The presented rather low ﬁgure was due to the existing Dutch 
policy to make paid employment ﬁnancially attractive to citizens. One 
indicator was the increase of income by the transfer from social security 
beneﬁt to a job at minimum wage level. In order to avoid a poverty trap, 
the introduction of a new tax system in 2001 has widened the gap between 
the minimum wage and social security beneﬁt. Real wages were again 
much higher than the minimum wage level. In 2005 the average level 
of the lowest wage scales was 120.2% of the minimum wage. Moreover, 
since 2003 the employed person’s tax credit was raised annually, providing 
for a step-by-step increase into 2007. In addition, the extra allowances for 
employees aged 57 and over were increased since 2003.
In the past few years, Dutch governments have been successfully try-
ing to encourage labour market participation. Recent measures include 
the closing of early-retirement routes and greater emphasis on activating 
(long-term) unemployed, the partially disabled and social assistance re-
cipients. Nonetheless, labour supply is still restrained by comprehensive 
social entitlements for those out of work, which beneﬁt almost 17 % of
the working-age population. In addition, the tax-and-beneﬁt system and
labour-market policies continue to discourage participation of several 
groups and to incite working short hours.
Although unemployment in the state is still low, the incidence of 
long-term unemployment is relatively high in comparison to countries 
with similar low unemployment rates reﬂecting the generosity of un-
employment beneﬁts. The duration of unemployment beneﬁts has been
reduced from 5 years to a maximum of 38 months, which represented a 
welcome move. However, beneﬁt duration remained rather long in com-
parison with the international standards, especially for workers with long 
seniority. In combination with non-decreasing beneﬁts, that was likely to
dampen job-search incentives and create paths into early retirement.
Immigrants have traditionally made an important contribution to 
increasing the labour supply, as ﬁrst-generation immigrants and their
children constitute at about 19 % of the labour force. At the very begin-
ning of the 2006 the Social and Economic Council has given advice to 
the Government on the question how to promote social innovation in the 
Netherlands. In this context social innovation ment to increase labour 
36
productivity by modernising the organisation of work and utilising man-
power. Recently, on the basis of this advice a Centre for Social Innova-
tion has been established. This centre has a fund of € 2 million per year 
for the coming ﬁve years to invest in projects in this area.
The Netherlands has a special position as far as part-time work is 
concerned. Some 20 % of men and 73 % of women work fewer hours 
than the normal working week. Important factor in the promotion of 
part-time work was the introduction of three laws to encourage part-time 
work and to improve the situation of part-time workers:
▪ the Equal Treatment Act (Full-time and Part-time Workers) 
of 1996, stipulating that part-timers should not be treated less 
favourably than full-time workers;
▪ the revised Working Hours Act of 1996, which provides more 
opportunities for employers and employees to come to an 
agreement on working hours;
▪ the Working Hours (Adjustment) Act of 2000 which gives 
employees and civil servants the right to increase or reduce their 
working hours, irrespective of their reasons for doing so.
Over the last decade ﬂexible work has also become an important as-
pect of the Dutch social policy. In consultation with social partners was 
issued legislation with the intention to ﬁnd a balance between ﬂexibility for
employers and security for employees. On the basis of consensus between 
employers’ organisations and unions, the Flexibility and Security Act came 
into force on 1 January 1999. The aim of the Act was to create a balance 
between ﬂexibility and security, between the employers’ ability to man-
age their companies ﬂexibly on one hand and job and income security for
employees on the other. The Act limited the number of times an employer 
could have a consecutive temporary contract with the same employee. 
In 2002 of all employees, 11.7 % were working in jobs on ﬂexible
contracts. Of those 25 % were working through temporary employment 
agencies, almost one third were on-call workers and 43 % were working 
on a temporary basis. The Dutch practice reﬂects the concept of
ﬂexicurity, the combination of both ﬂexibility and security. According 
to a comparative research, the Netherlands are currently showing the 
highest rate of ﬂexicurity. Part-time employment in Netherlands for 2005 
and 2006 was 46.1 % and 46.2 %. Employees with contracts of limited 
duration for 2005 were 15.5 % and for 2006 were16.6 %.
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Spain
Unemployment rate in Spain for the ﬁrst 10 months of the year 2007
was 8.17 %. The Spanish economy grew steadily in 2006 with up to 
three points in comparison with the previous year. Economic growth 
and employment rates were registering better and better results. The 
strength of domestic demand was underpinned by the dynamism of pri-
vate consumption and the increased gross ﬁxed capital formation, with
a signiﬁcant recovery of investment in capital goods. Final consumption
expenditure in 2006 was moderate, owing, principally, to the decelera-
tion of ﬁnal consumption expenditure on the part of the authorities, how-
ever household consumption expenditure remained stable. There was 
a signiﬁcant increase in gross ﬁxed capital formation; in particular the
new burst of investment in capital goods, which maintained the trend 
toward recovery initiated in 2003. All these resulted in positive trend 
in employment, with slight moderation in the fourth quarter of 2005 in 
year-on-year terms, which, combined with the bigger rise in the active 
population, served to axplain the lower rate in the fall in unemployment. 
On average in the 2006 ﬁnancial year, ﬁgures show highly favourable
evolution of the labour market, reﬂected in a higher rate of generation of
employment and reduction of unemployment than in 2005.
As at December 2005, there were 2,102,937 people registered as un-
employed - a little more than in previous years. Out of them, 40.51 % 
were male and 58.35 % female. The breakdown by sector was the follow-
ing: agriculture 3.10 %, industry 14.32 %, construction 11.65 %, services 
22 %, and no previous employment 10.69 %. The Public Employment 
Service had 17,164,965 contracts registered in 2005, a 4.97 % increase in 
comparison to 2004. Of these, 1,542,838 were indeﬁnite and 15,622,127
were permanent. Part-time employment in Spain for 2005 and 2006 was 
12.4 % and 12.0 %. Employees with contracts of limited duration for 
2005 were 33.3 % and for 2006 were 34.0 %.
United Kingdom
Compared with most other OECD countries, the United Kingdom 
has relatively few distorting labour market regulations. As a result, job-
to-job mobility between similar industries is relatively high, suggesting 
that resources shift quite smoothly. The labour market is also better 
at getting the unemployed back into work than labour markets in the 
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country’s large European neighbours, although some Scandinavian 
economies have much higher unemployment outﬂow rates.
Strong economic growth over the past decade helped to reduce the 
unemployment rate from around 8 % in 1996 to a low of around 4.5 % in 
2004. Since this was the same year that the United Kingdom opened its 
labour markets to workers from the new EU member countries, an inﬂux
of migrants helped to ﬁll skill vacancies and cool inﬂationary pressures
in the labour market. Since then the unemployment rate has crept up to 
around 5.5 %, but it was unclear whether increased immigration is partly 
responsible. In general, the UK’s workforce grew at an average annual 
rate of 0.7 % between 2000 and 2005. The fastest growing region was 
Wales with an average workforce growth of 1.4 %, while expansion of the 
workforce in the East of England was the slowest at 0.4 %. 
Despite the signiﬁcance of manufacturing in the UK, the sector
and its workforce have been in decline for many years, as the economy 
restructures away from traditional industries towards service sector 
activities. Indeed, employment in the sector declined by 3.9 % on 
average per annum between 2000 and 2005 – resulting in a reduction of 
approximately 821,000 in the manufacturing workforce. Regardless of the 
decline of manufacturing employment, the UK labour market is currently 
considered as the most successful of the major European economies. 
Employment rates are markedly higher than the eurozone average, 
and dynamic job creation has encouraged signiﬁcant inward economic
migration from the new EU member states.
Approximatelly 75 % of the population of working age in the UK is 
in employment, however, at a regional level, employment rates vary from 
79 % in the South East to 69 % in Northern Ireland. The average rate of 
unemployment was 5.3 % in 2006, although this has increased from the 4.8 % 
recorded in 2005. In the ﬁrst eight months of 2007 the average unemployment
rate stayed almost unchanged at the level of 5.32 %. London, despite of its 
dynamic economy and highly paid workforce, also has the highest rate of 
unemployment - 7.7 % - as areas of extreme wealth co-exist with areas 
of relative deprivation and joblessness. This is a pattern that is repeated 
throughout the UK, with unemployment rates varying greatly between 
different local authorities districts in the same government ofﬁce region.
The number of people in employment for the three months July-
September 2007 was 29.22 million. This was the highest ﬁgure since
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comparable records began in 1971 and was up  to 69,000 over the quarter 
and up to 178,000 over the year. Total hours worked per week were 937.8 
million, up 0.3 million over the quarter and up 10.4 million over the year. 
The inactivity rate for people of working age was 21.2 % for the three 
months to September 2007, unchanged over the previous quarter, but up 
0.2 over the year. The number of economically inactive people of working 
age increased by 8,000 over the quarter and by 127,000 over the year, in 
order to reach 7.97 million. Part-time employment in United Kingdom 
for 2005 and 2006 was 25.4 % and 25.5 %. Employees with contracts of 
limited duration for 2005 were 5.7% and for 2006 were 5.8 %.
III. Immigrants Integration Strategies on the Labor Market 
in France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom
This section offers a typology of integration strategies and policies for 
immigrants in the selected EU member states: France, Germany, Spain, 
Netherlands and UK. It outlines their main trends and focuses on the scope 
(personal and material) and the nature of these programmes, as well as 
their implications (positive or negative) for the position of the immigrant. 
During the past years, migrants have seriously contributed to 
the increase in the total labour force. Between 1995 and 2005, their 
number as well as their share in the total labour force increased in 
most EU-15 member states and especially in those of Southern and 
Northern Europe. Regardless of these facts, the European Commission 
said that despite the employment growth has been impressive during 
recent years the European Union will miss employment targets set out 
in the Lisbon strategy2. Approximately 6.5 million jobs were created in 
the last two years and another ﬁve million are expected to be created
in 2009. However, for the EU to reach its Lisbon strategy targets, 20 
million jobs will have to be created by 2010. With skills shortages and 
an aging population continuing to be a problem for the 27-member 
bloc, migration from outside the EU could provide a partial solution. In 
a recent EC report on the subject of encouraging employment growth, 
immigration was cited as an important factor in continuing to encourage 
global competitiveness
2 Adopted by the EU leaders in 2000.
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France
The territorialized policies of integration characterize the French 
model, while other countries prefer antidiscrimination policies, multicul-
turalism, or the granting of local political rights. The French authorities 
have traditionally been very protective of their domestic labour force, 
and put many bureaucratic obstacles in the way of companies wishing 
to recruit foreign workers. Their attitude is changing due to an acute 
shortage of IT professionals, which is affecting the performance of many 
French companies. New procedures have recently been introduced to 
make the process faster and easier. However, despite these signiﬁcant
improvements, France remains one of the most heavily ‘protected’ labour 
markets in Europe. All French work permit applications are dealt with by 
the local Direction Departmentale du Travail, de L’Emploi et de la For-
mation Professionale (DDTEFP) on a town by town basis. It is therefore 
impossible to give absolute processing times as it varies depending on 
the workload of the local ofﬁce. There are two types of permit for France
Temporary Secondment and Full Work Permit:
▪ Temporary Secondment - This is for a non French company which 
needs to place their employees on it’s client’s site in France. This 
can be applied for by the foreign company but needs the full 
co-operation of the French client. The seconded employee must 
remain in the employ, pay, and line management of the foreign 
service provider. The maximum duration of these permit is 18 
months and may then be extended for a further 9 months.
▪ Full Work Permit - This is applied for by an established French 
company who wish to directly employ a non-EEA national. The 
candidate must be a full time employee and paid in. There is no 
time limit on this permit.
France’s new immigration and integration law, adopted on July 25, 
2006, aims to overhaul France’s immigration system by giving the gov-
ernment new powers to encourage high-skilled migration, ﬁght illegal
migration more effectively, and restrict family immigration. The new 
immigration and integration law has four main objectives: 
▪ recruiting skilled workers; 
▪ facilitating foreign students' stay; 
▪ tightening the rules on family reuniﬁcation; and
▪ limiting access to residence and citizenship.
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Recruiting skilled workers
The new law authorizes the government to identify particular professions 
and geographic zones of France that are “characterized by recruitment 
difﬁculties.”Forthoseidentiﬁedemployers, theGovernment plans to facilitate 
the recruitment of immigrant workers with needed skills or qualiﬁcations.
However, this means employers who are not on the government-selected list 
may have more difﬁculty (or may face longer waiting periods) obtaining
residence permits for migrant workers they wish to employ.
Facilitating foreign students’ stay
The new law would require foreign students to receive approval to study 
in France from their country of origin. Once in France, foreign students 
who receive a masters or higher degree would be allowed to pursue a “ﬁrst
professional experience” that contributes to the economic development of 
both France and the student’s country of origin. The student will be granted 
a six-month renewable visa to look for and take up work in France.
Tightening the rules on family reuniﬁcation
In an effort to prevent immigrant families from becoming dependent 
on France’s welfare system, the law also requires immigrants to prove 
they can independently support all family members who seek to come to 
France. More precisely, they must earn at least the French minimum wage 
and not be reliant on assistance from the French state. Access to govern-
ment assistance is also limited to European Union citizens. Those who re-
side in France longer than three months without working or studying, must 
be able to support themselves without relying on social or medical beneﬁts
from the French government. Another modiﬁcation to the family reuniﬁ-
cation policy is that spouses of French citizens must wait three years (in-
stead of two) before applying for a 10-year residence permit. Four years of 
marriage are required for the spouse of a French citizen to apply for French 
citizenship. Finally, an immigrant found to be practicing polygamy can 
have his or her visa revoked. Furthermore, an immigrant must now wait 18 
months, instead of 12, to apply to bring a family member to France.
Limiting access to residence and citizenship
Sarkozy argued that the previous (1998) law “rewarded” immigrants who 
broke the law by offering them legal status after being residents for 10 years. The 
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new law changes simplify the procedure whereby the Government can directly 
deport unauthorized migrants who are refused the right to stay in France.
Access to both citizenship and legal residence is dependent on the 
newly deﬁned requirements of integration. For the ﬁrst time in French
history, a law explicitly states the integration responsibilities of immi-
grant. Speciﬁcally, immigrants must sign a “welcome and integration”
contract and take French language and civic courses. Before applying for 
permanent residence, immigrants must accordingly prove that they are 
“well-integrated” into French society. The government understands inte-
gration in this regard to mean that the immigrant respects and complies 
with the principles of the French Republic and has a sufﬁcient knowledge
of the French language.
The integration contract (contrat d’accueil et d’intégration or 
CAI) in France equally seeks to formalise the obligation between the 
immigrant and the state. The latter will undertake to provide quality 
newcomer support services while the former will have to complete 
training integration requirements consisting of: a language course, 
vocational training, and civic and social orientation. The integration 
contracts, which last for one year, will specify language courses (between 
200 and 500 hours) covering one-year periods and are renewable twice 
(for a total of three years).
Germany
In 1991 a new naturalization law marked the ﬁrst breach in the oppo-
sition to the permanent inclusion of foreigners in German society. Dur-
ing the 90s the new arrivals were beset by the problems of high unem-
ployment, social marginalization, and insufﬁcient linguistic integration.
Shortcomings in the educational system with regard to the teaching of 
linguistic skills and the acquisition of educational qualiﬁcations deprived
large numbers of young foreigners of the opportunity to pursue a career 
and acquire social standing. Most asylum seekers and refugees were not 
allowed to work and were denied the permanent residence status that 
would have protected them from deportation. In 1998 the integration of 
foreigners into German society was depicted as an important task by the 
local federal authorities. In 1999 was introduced an amendment in the 
law of naturalization and the period of residence in Germany, required to 
qualify for naturalization was reduced to eight years. Aging of the Ger-
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man population provoked widespread political response and a consensus 
policy on the necessity of organized immigration.
Despite Germany’s long history of recruiting foreign workers, 
the turn toward a more organized and focused recruitment of highly 
skilled labour in 2000 marks a watershed. This change, coupled with 
a demographic shift toward a more elderly population and a continuing 
low total fertility rate (now at 1.4) led to a broader discussion about a 
formal immigration policy that takes these factors into account.
Supporters of new legislation pointed to demographic deﬁcits and
growing shortages of qualiﬁed personnel. Opponents countered by
spotlighting a persistently high unemployment rate, which in 2000 stood 
at 9 % for the total working population, but hit 16 % for foreigners. 
Opponents also questioned the German society’s capacity to integrate 
more foreigners. Both groups, nevertheless, agreed on the need to 
improve the integration of foreigners.
In 2000, the Government appointed a commission to work out 
proposals for an immigration and integration policy. In July 2001, the 
commission presented a report titled “Structuring Immigration, Fostering 
Integration”. It highlighted well-known demographic developments, such 
as increasing life expectancy, low birth rates, and a workforce that was 
shrinking due to the aging population. In light of such developments, 
the commission argued for initiating a controlled immigration program 
for foreigners with favorable characteristics for integration into both 
the labour market and society. They proposed the implementation of a 
point system as a tool for selecting 20,000 immigrants per year, based on 
criteria of education, age, and language skills. In the event of urgent labor 
shortages, another 20,000 immigrants should be let into the country on 
a ﬁve-year basis. By that time, the authorities will have gathered some
experience, and changes and improvements can be made.
Furthermore, the commission recommended certain measures to speed 
up the asylum procedure and make it more difﬁcultforfraudulentapplications
to succeed, while rejecting proposals to eliminate the “fundamental right of 
political asylum” guaranteed by the Constitution. Finally, the commission 
report calls for serious efforts to foster the integration of immigrants, citing 
knowledge of the German language as a crucial point. 
A law was introduced to parliament in November 2001 by the ruling 
Social Democrat and Green coalition picked up on several commission 
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recommendations, including highly qualiﬁed migration and integration.
The immigration of those who plan to establish a business was also 
welcomed, and there was no cap on the numbers of such entrepreneurs. 
However, companies could only hire temporary migrant workers outside 
of the categories outlined above if there were no Germans (or foreigners 
such as EU nationals, who are legally treated as Germans) available for the 
work. The legislation also provided for language classes for immigrants 
in the future — with failure to attend possibly translating into difﬁculties
in extending residence permits. 
The law arrived at a time when immigration itself was in transition. 
In a trend that could be seen across many developed countries, low-
skilled laborers, recruited to feed an economic boom, were (and still are) 
giving way to a generation of skilled workers who are more carefully 
selected to meet the needs of the information age. Despite vocal criticism 
by the opposition, the law was passed by both chambers of parliament. It 
was subsequently signed by President Johannes Rau in March 2002 and 
was set to take effect on January 1, 2003. However, it was procedurally 
contested by the country’s conservative opposition, which successfully 
ﬁled a lawsuit in the Federal Court. In December 2002, the court blocked
the immigration law. In January 2003, the Government re-introduced 
the unchanged law, since the court objected only to procedural failings 
in how it had been passed. In May 2003, the bill again passed the lower 
house of parliament. However, a month later it was voted down in the 
Upper Chamber, where the federal states were represented and the 
opposition parties had a majority. Subsequently, difﬁcult negotiations
between government and opposition failed to achieve a compromise.
In June 2004, the long-running and difﬁcult negotiations ﬁnally
led to a compromise. The agreed-upon legislation picks up several 
recommendations submitted in the 2001 report of the government-
appointed commission, and parts of that year’s proposed immigration bill 
including sections on labor migration and integration. However, the core 
of the law - the innovative point system for selecting immigrants - has 
been eliminated at the demand of the opposition Christian Democrats, 
who have the majority in the upper house. 
The law, which ﬁnally passed both chambers in early July, will allow
highly qualiﬁed non-EU-workers such as scientists or top-level managers
to obtain a residence permit of unlimited duration at the outset. However, 
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companies can only hire non-EU workers if there are no Germans (or 
foreigners such as EU nationals, who are legally treated as Germans) 
available for the job. Under other provisions of the legislation, foreign 
students will be allowed to stay in Germany for a year after ﬁnishing
their studies to look for a job. Finally, asylum seekers who are persecuted 
because of their sex will be recognized as refugees. 
For their part, the Christian Democrats negotiated to obtain 
provisions that facilitate the deportation of foreigners for reasons of 
national security. This appears to be connected to security concerns that 
dominated negotiations in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks in the United States, and later the terrorist attacks in Spain on 
March 11, 2004. Besides allowing the deportation of foreigners on the 
basis of a “threat prognosis” supported by factual evidence, the new law 
will make it easier to deport religious extremists. 
However, the potential for migration from Eastern Europe is 
declining. The birth rate in many of the new member states has been 
low since political transformation at the beginning of the 1990s. As in 
Western Europe, a decreasing number of people will be of working age. 
Therefore, it seems that Germany will not be “swamped” by migrants 
from the new member states – though at the same time, this means those 
migrants may not be available to solve the demographic problems of 
Germany’s aging population. Either way, there is still a need for highly 
qualiﬁed workers in Germany. The initial closure of the labour market to 
citizens of the new EU states and non-EU citizens, which will be changed 
little by the immigration law, is likely to channel them to traditional 
immigration countries such as the United States, Canada, or Australia.
It remains to be seen if the new immigration law will help attract 
highly qualiﬁed migrants to Germany - one of the main goals of the
legislation from the beginning. Many analysts are skeptical about 
what it will accomplish in this regard, since the point system that was 
widely touted as the best way of reaching this goal has been eliminated. 
However, the true test of a new approach would not only be how well an 
immigration law helps Germany meet its need for workers, but also how 
successfully it eases the handling of domestic concerns about integration 
and national identity.
The new German Immigration Act, which came into force on 1 January 
2005, provides for highly qualiﬁed persons to be granted permanent
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residence and permission to work from the outset, rather than ﬁve-year
work permits as was previously the case. They must have a concrete job 
offer and get permission from the German Employment Agency. The new 
law also makes an attempt to reduce bureaucracy. Would-be immigrants 
will now report to one central place, most likely the German embassy in 
their home country, to receive work and residency permission.
With the introduction of the new German Immigration Act on 
January 1, 2005, foreigners need to obtain only a German residence 
permit, which gives them the right to work, rather than separate residence 
and work permits. Citizens of the US, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, 
New Zealand, and Switzerland may apply for their residence and work 
permit while remaining in Germany as visitors. Citizens of these 
countries, however, are not allowed to work in Germany until after their 
work and residence permit application is approved. Citizens of most 
other countries are required to apply for and obtain a residence and 
work permit prior to entering Germany at their German consulate. In 
Germany, the new Immigration Act provides a compulsory integration 
programme consisting of language training aimed at giving participants 
a good command of German together with an orientation course in 
which immigrants learn about the German legal system, history and 
culture. The stated aim of the integration policy is to make the newcomer 
autonomous in everyday life.
Most notably, the reforms regularized the status of “tolerated” 
asylum seekers, raised the minimum age of family reuniﬁcation for
spouses from 16 to 18, and required those wishing to naturalize as 
German citizens to vow that they accept the rule of law and democratic 
norms of German society. Anyone wishing to immigrate to Germany 
must now also pass a basic German-language test. Policymakers also 
incorporated a recommendation from the Interior Ministry’s evaluation 
of the 2005 law when they reduced the minimum investment level for 
entrepreneurs wishing to immigrate to Germany from 1 million euros to 
500,000 euros. Also, these immigrants will need to create ﬁve new jobs
instead of 10 as previously required. The changes are intended to make 
Germany a more attractive destination for foreign entrepreneurs.
A second set of reforms updated Germany’s integration program for 
immigrants. Notably, these reforms will increase the maximum num-
ber of hours of German language instruction from 600 to 900, decrease 
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the amount of federal subsidies offered to those immigrants who can-
not fully afford to pay for the courses, and impose ﬁnancial penalties
for immigrants who are required to take the courses but fail to enroll. 
Although the subsidy structure will change, the federal government also 
has decided to increase the integration course budget by 14 million euros 
to 154 million euros starting in 2008.
Netherlands
The Netherlands have experienced sustained growth over the past 
several years partly due to its favourable position within Europe and its 
ﬂexible labour force. It remains an attractive country for investment and
for foreign nationals to work.
A new policy instrument apropos of the new philosophy was the 
civic integration courses that aimed to facilitate the initial integration of 
newcomers. This instrument for integration was developed at the local level 
among a number of cities in the Netherlands beginning in the early 1990s. 
In these reception courses, newcomers were given a toolkit comprising 
Dutch-language training material and information about how important 
institutions in Dutch society function. Before entering the Netherlands, 
newcomers are obliged to pass an exam that proves their language skills 
and knowledge about Dutch culture and society. Once admitted, they have 
to follow civic integration courses. The granting of renewals of temporary 
and permanent permits is subject to successfully passing these courses.
Before an employer can apply for a Netherlands work permit for a 
non-EEA national, it is normally necessary to show that attempts have 
been made to ﬁll the position from the local and EEA labour markets.
These attempts should include advertising in national newspapers, web-
sites, industry publications, etc. However, the local employment service, 
or Arbeitsamt, will run searches for EU nationals with the appropriate 
skills by using the European Employment Services placement network 
(EURES). Usually Dutch employers should also have looked into train-
ing existing employees.
A few years ago the local Dutch labour authorities recognised cer-
tain shortages in some types of IT and Telecoms skills and work permit 
applications could be lodged for relevant IT / Telecoms positions without 
showing details of the above detailed recruitment search. Due to the cur-
rent IT situation in Europe, it is not as easy to obtain work permits for IT 
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professionals but it is still easier to do so in comparison to other highly-
skilled occupations, and usually does not involve the need to advertise.
Unfortunately, the application process for Netherlands work permits 
often means that candidates can not even visit the Netherlands to attend 
meetings while the Netherlands work permit application is being pro-
cessed, unless they are non-visa nationals.
One attractive aspect of employing foreign nationals in the Netherlands 
is that many will qualify to receive 35% of their income tax-free. The effect 
of this is to make the overall tax burden similar to that faced in the UK. 
After having lived in the Netherlands for three years on a work permit it is 
often possible for an individual to obtain permanent residence. Thereafter 
they are free to take up any lawful employment and no longer require an 
employer-sponsored work permit. The number of temporary work permits 
granted to workers from the countries that joined the EU in 2004, mainly 
for low-skilled employment, rose to almost 60 000 in 2006 (0.6% of the 
working-age population) under a sector based transition arrangement. All 
remaining restrictions were abolished for this group in May 2007. People 
coming from Bulgaria and Romania remain subject to the strict labour mar-
ket test applicable to all workers from outside the EEA. In many cases, this 
test entails a bureaucratic process to prove that no job seeker is available 
within the EEA. If labour shortages persist, the government should con-
sider implementing a transition scheme for Bulgaria and Romania similar 
to the earlier scheme for the other new EU member states.
Spain
In 2005, Spain announced a general amnesty for illegal immigrants. 
By registering with the relevant authorities, formerly illegal immigrants 
were able to legitimise their presence in Spain.
EU nationals
In 2005 Spain announced that it will be opening its borders for work-
ers from all EU countries in spring 2006. Therefore, as of that date, if 
you are an EU national you will not need a work permit to work in Spain 
— you can enter the country as a tourist and register with the Spanish na-
tional employment ofﬁce (Instituto Nacional de Empleo - INEM) to look 
for a job. You then have 90 days to ﬁnd employment — you can obtain an
extension after that date or leave Spain and re-enter for a further 90 days. 
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Once you ﬁnd a job, you will need your employment contract in order to
apply for your residence permit.
Non-EU nationals
Residents non-EU who wish to work in Spain must obtain a work 
permit. They must also obtain a visa before moving to work in Spain. 
Work permits must be applied for at the Foreigners’ Ofﬁce (Oﬁcinas de
Extranjeros) or to the provincial ofﬁce of the Ministry of Labour (Dele-
gación Provincial del Ministerio de Trabajo), if you are already in Spain. 
If you are not in Spain, a work permit must be applied for at the Consular 
ofﬁce of your home country. The provincial labour ofﬁces (Direcciones 
Provinciales de Trabajo, Seguridad Social y Asuntos Sociales) will de-
cide whether the work permit will be issued or not.
United Kingdom
Contrary to continental approaches, the focus in Britain has not 
been on how newcomers can blend into the society, but on how society 
can achieve equal treatment of different groups.  
The most important thing to understand in UK work permits is that 
in the UK the employer applies for the work permit and the the work 
permit is granted for a particular employee. If you are an individual hop-
ing to work in the UK, you cannot apply for a work permit. If you have 
a work permit for the UK, you can’t change jobs without getting a new 
work permit. As with the initial application, extensions of work permis-
sion can be requested for up to ﬁve years. All applications for extension
must be made before the current leave to remain expires. Note that exten-
sions cannot be applied for in the case of Multiple Entry Work Permits 
but a fresh application for a further permit can be made once the indi-
vidual concerned is outside the UK.
In 2002, a new opportunity to work in the UK for up to twelve 
months was announced under the work permit Sectors Based Scheme 
(SBS). The UK Government identiﬁed various skills shortage areas in
the UK economy and the sector-based work permit scheme was intro-
duced to address these shortages.
The accession of the new European Union member states in 2004, 
particularly Eastern Europe, brought in a larger than expected wave of 
immigration to the UK. In response, the government decided to phase 
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out the program by 31 December, 2006. However, with the addition of 
Bulgaria and Romania to the EU on 01 January, 2007, the government 
decided to extend the program to nationals of these countries.
The sectors based scheme only covers the Food Manufacturing In-
dustry. During 2008, the United Kingdom will be overhauling its immi-
gration law and implementing a points based system for non-European 
Union migrants wishing to come to the UK to work, study, and train.
The new immigration system will be broken into a ﬁve tiers. Each
tier will have different conditions, entitlements, and entry requirements 
for migrants wishing to work in the UK.
Below is the current outline that the government has provided about 
the new points based tiered immigration system.
The ﬁve tiers are outlined below:
▪ Tier 1: For highly skilled migrants, entrepreneurs, investors, 
and graduate students. This is designed to replace the Highly 
Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP), the Entrepreneur and In-
vestor schemes, and the International Graduates Scheme.
▪ Tier 2: This is for skilled workers who have a job offer. This tier 
will encompass the current UK Work Permit rules. 
▪ Tier 3: For a limited numbers of lower skilled workers to ﬁll
temporary shortages in the labour market. 
▪ Tier 4: Students. 
▪ Tier 5: For youth mobility and temporary workers, such as those 
who come under Working Holiday agreements with other countries.
Tiers 3 and 5 are temporary migration schemes and migrants who 
fall under these tiers will not be able to switch to a different tier from 
within the UK. The UK has also suspended Tier 3 in favour of migrants 
from the EU; however, this may change depending on labor market de-
mands. Tiers 1, 2, and 4 will be eligible to switch to another tier once 
they are in the UK if they can meet the requirements of that tier. Tiers 
1 and 2 can potentially lead to settlement if the permanent residence 
requirements are met at the time of application. Each tier will require 
the migrant to score a sufﬁcient number of points to gain entry clear-
ance or leave to remain (permanent residence) in the United Kingdom. 
Points will be awarded for various criteria speciﬁc to each tier. In all
tiers, points will be awarded for criteria which indicates that the indi-
vidual is likely to comply with immigration requirements. In Tiers 1 and 
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2, points will be awarded for criteria such as age, previous salary or pro-
spective salary, and qualiﬁcations; a system similar to the current Highly
Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) which has proven very successful. 
All migrants applying under Tiers 2-5 will be required to have sponsor-
ship from a licensed sponsor (an employer or educational institution). 
The certiﬁcate of sponsorship assures that the migrant is able to perform
the particular job or course of study. Highly skilled Tier 1 migrants do 
not require a job offer and thus do not require sponsorship. Dependants 
are allowed to come to the UK with the main applicant. However, they 
will not be allowed to work if they accompany a student under Tier 4 or 
a temporary worker under Tier 5 if -- in both cases -- the individual has 
been given less than 12 months leave to remain in the UK.
The UK has introduced a number of new UK immigration, natu-
ralization, UK visa, work permit and UK working visa categories in the 
last few years. The points based skilled immigration category the Highly 
Skilled Migrant Programme (HSMP) introduced in January 2002 has 
proved to be very successful. A Summary of UK HSMP Changes, as of 
17 November, 2006 has been placed here.
However, the HSMP is being replaced by Tier 1 of the UK’s new 
ﬁve-tier points based system which will encompass all work, study, and
training immigration routes into the country. People seeking extensions 
to their HSMP visa are now required to extend their leave to remain un-
der Tier 1 for General Highly Skilled Migrants. Starting in April 2008, 
applicants located in India are required to ﬁle initial highly skilled mi-
grants under Tier 1, followed by the rest of the world in summer 2008. 
The UK has also suspended Tier 3 in favour of migrants from the EU; 
however, this may change depending on labor market demands. Tiers 1, 
2, and 4 will be eligible to switch to another tier once they are in the UK 
if they can meet the requirements of that tier. Tiers 1 and 2 can poten-
tially lead to settlement if the permanent residence requirements 
IV. Recommendations for Adjusting Successfully Working 
Immigrants’ strategies in the Bulgarian Context
Currently, when the European Union enlarged to 27 member states, 
public opinion is sensitive to intra-European immigration and its impact 
on domestic unemployment rates. 
The Bulgarian integration policy of immigrants into the labor market 
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should be coordinated within the intra-European policy. The point of de-
parture should be from the position of still in a way developing country and 
the comparisons with the national integration strategies of the analyzed 
ﬁve developed countries (France, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and UK) 
should consider the large economic divergence. However, the successful 
implementation of the mentioned above strategies in the Bulgarian reality 
could be used as instruments to foster the convergence process.
Operating in the Bulgarian labor market, the local authorities in the 
past 15 years tackled large migration outﬂows with approximately 1.2
mln. people leaving the country. Despite the fact that unemployment rate 
in the state has decreased to the level of 6.6 % at the end of 2007, the 
ageing population will force the government to adopt immigration as 
a labour market strategy to ﬁll the already existing labor market gaps.
Through implementing strategies for integration of foreigners into the 
Bulgarian labour market policymakers should on one hand develop pro-
grams for the immigrants who are already in the country and on the 
other hand for those who will be attracted in the coming years in an ef-
fort to avoid shortages of employees in certain sectors. 
In the last few years, the Bulgarian Government has already stat-
ed a policy of attracting back to the country emigrants with Bulgarian 
citizenship. However, in parallel to this initiative the state’s authorities 
should provide opportunities for the immigrants on the Bulgarian labor 
market, thus avoiding any social contradiction which may occur. It is a 
fact that the economic actors as well as the authorities are not in a posi-
tion to forecast precisely their future labor needs. Quantitative forecasts 
are difﬁcult to make more than one or two years in advance for sectors, 
and more than six months for individual companies.
In general, the employment of migrants in the ﬁve targeted coun-
tries shows greater ﬂuctuations than total employment in the host 
countries, since it is more sensitive to cyclical variations. The individual 
characteristics of migrants such as skills, professional experience, 
length of stay, and other issues related to their concentration in certain 
economic sectors and (in some cases) to various forms of discrimination, 
make them more exposed to overall economic trends. The presence of 
immigrants in the labour market of the host countries seems to conﬁrm
the segmentation theory, since foreign workers are willing to meet labour 
needs when activities at the bottom of the social scale become unattractive 
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for nationals. Moreover, the foreign labor force may facilitate labour 
ﬂexibility in countries where the geographical and sectoral mobility of 
the native population is limited as is the case in Bulgaria. Currently, the 
unemployment rate in Soﬁa region is approximately 1.5 % while in some
northern cities in the country the unemployment rate is signiﬁcantly
higher, reaching the levels of 15-20 %. The absence of any proportional 
allocation of foreign direct investments on regional basis also fosters the 
process of depopulation in some border areas.
The integration of immigrants in the labour markets of France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Spain and UK is closely related to their 
overrepresentation in certain employment sectors. This is, ﬁrst of all,
the result of the restrictive rules governing migrants’ employment in the 
public sector of the host countries. Apart from that, the occupation of 
migrants in particular sectors mainly depends on the total employment 
in those sectors. The EU membership of Bulgaria makes the country 
attractive destination for immigrants not only for living but also as a de-
parture point aiming immigration in the western countries through Bul-
garian citizenship. This fact as the responsibilities which come for Bul-
garia for being an external border of the Union impose tightening legal 
requirements concerning the immigration as well as better managing of 
the migration inﬂows. All the ﬁve countries have already implemented
strategies for attracting highly qualiﬁed workers who are supposed to be
a prerequisite for gross added value in the economy.
Among the foreign labour force, self-employment is also an important 
element in the integration of immigrants into the labour markets of the 
host countries. In this respect, the situation clearly differs from one EU 
member state to the other. The number of selfemployed foreign workers 
is relatively higher in Spain and the United Kingdom, and lower in 
France. However, this picture is fairly different when self-employment 
for foreigners is compared with the total ﬁgures for selfemployment. If 
we exclude agricultural activities, foreign self-employment accounts for 
the largest share of total self-employment in Germany. In general, the 
degree of participation of foreigners in non-salaried activities is related 
to the share of self-employment in the total employment of the host 
country and to the nationality of foreigners as well. We considered that it 
is easier for EU citizens than for third-country nationals to enter certain 
professions. In this respect Bulgarian business climate should be further 
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improve in terms of legislation of self-employment as well as in terms of 
part-time work and job places with ﬁxed-term contracts.
For many reasons, foreigners are more vulnerable to unemployment 
than nationals. Economic trends and the nature of jobs taken on by foreigners 
determine both the disparities of unemployment ﬁgures between foreigners
and nationals and the differences in the frequency of being without a job. 
Moreover, the demographic structure of the foreign population and such 
characteristics of migrants as age, length of stay in the host country, gender, 
skill level and knowledge of the language of the host country, play an 
important role in explaining their vulnerability to unemployment.
In any case, the presence of migrants on the labor market is not only 
related to migration ﬂows but also to participation rates. Such factors
as age, educational level, professional experience and family structure 
usually determine whether a person can participate in the labour market. 
Especially for foreigners, the participation rates are also related to the 
length of their stay and to their knowledge of the language.
Putting great emphasis on national policy initiatives for a particular 
group, increases the risk of subdividing foreigners into various socio-
economic categories, and of becoming even more selective as regards 
their rights and the degree of their socio-economic integration. The best 
instrument for reaching high levels of social integration is through inte-
gration on the local labor market.
Basic prerequisite for integration on the labor market is knowledge 
of local language. Many countries throughout Europe implemented com-
pulsory language tests for managing the migration inﬂows. Currently the
Bulgarian system for integration of immigrants does not have enough ca-
pacity to provide adequate language courses. In terms of workforce inte-
gration, successful initiatives at the local level have provided immigrants 
the means for gaining the relevant skill sets to enter speciﬁc economic
sectors, including further education and language instruction if needed.
Another key issue is implementing the regional policy on national 
level in terms of preventing the depopulation by providing jobs oppor-
tunities in different border areas and small towns by attracting foreign 
direct investments (FDI) and providing adequate infrastructure, hous-
ing and social services. An appropriate tool for fostering inﬂows of
FDI could be offering of different tax reduction or even covering the 
minimum wages of the employed immigrants. Currently the Bulgarian 
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government implements such policy to decrease the unemployment rate 
among local citizens through stimulating employers to create more job 
places by ensuring minimum wages from the national budget.
An effective practice which is in use in Netherlands is signing an 
agreement between the government and the leading companies in the 
country for hiring with priority a certain number of immigrants for jobs, 
which require only low-skilled employees. This instrument could be ef-
fective only in countries with very low levels of unemployment which 
usually experience insufﬁciency of low-skilled employees such as sea-
sonal workers in tourism or agricultural sectors.
Our recent research studies show that Bulgarian integration system 
is rather centralized and is focused mainly in the capital Soﬁa. Although
reaching the strong and effective decentralized models in France and 
Germany are by far too optimistic aim for the local authorities any ef-
forts in this direction will give positive results.
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The democratic changes in the Republic of Bulgaria, the process 
of expanding the European Union to the East, as well as the economic, 
political and cultural globalization on world scale, basically changed the 
character of the migration situation in the country. Up to 1989 Bulgaria, 
as the other countries belonging to the former socialist block, was char-
acterized mainly as a closed state with restricted emigration as a result of 
exit visa regime. With the democratic changes in 1989 Bulgaria became 
an active subject within the European and global migration system. With 
the accession of ten new states from Eastern Europe to the EU on May 1, 
2004 and the succeeding accession of Bulgaria and Romania on January 
1, 2007 moved the Eastern border of the Union and created conditions for 
the facilitating of the migration in EU by citizens from other states within 
Central and East Europe, the former Soviet republics and countries from 
the Middle East and Asia. In contrast to the period before 1989 when 
Bulgaria had a limited migration proﬁle after the democratic changes the
country participates actively in the migration processes at European and 
world level. Bulgaria does not make an exception as regards the world 
trends of increasing population mobility due to the fast technological 
development, the accessible transport and communications. 
With the development of Bulgarian economy the tendency for gradual 
transformation of the country from emigrant to transit and recently to an 
immigrant country is observed. With the adoption of the European leg-
islation in the ﬁeld of immigration, the securing of residence is assigned
as compulsory condition for full rights membership in EU. Adapting of 
the legislation included introduction of strict requirements for providing 
visas to citizens from “risk” countries, approving and improving the laws 
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for combating the trafﬁc of people and implementation of contemporary
technologies for catching trespassers of the borders. The current migra-
tory situation in Bulgaria shows patterns that are typical for the other 
EU member states from South Europe which turned within short periods 
form emigration countries to countries attracting immigrants. 
The successful managing and regulation of the migration processes 
proved to be an important tool in terms of development in the frameworks 
of the globalizing world economy. This fact highlights the migration and 
immigrant integration issue as a key feature at national, regional and 
global level. Furthermore, the world witnesses a global redistribution of 
labour force which is an irreversible process that should be managed wise 
in interest of sending and receiving countries and migrants as well. Oth-
erwise, inefﬁcient migration processes management could lead to grow-
ing shadow economy, building up of tension in host countries and last but 
not least humiliation, exploitation and abuse of illegal immigrants. 
Consequently, development and implementation of Bulgarian migra-
tion policy should be not only bound to the national interest of Bulgaria 
but also consistent with the obligation resulting from the full-ﬂedged
EU membership in this ﬁeld, the new tendencies in global and regional
perspective and the established international standards. A shortage of 
labour force has been already observed on the Bulgarian labour market 
in several business sectors and for this reason Bulgarian economy needs 
a well balanced acceptance of foreign workers. 
Bulgarian migration policy should support the development of the do-
mestic economy. The national interest concerning this issue requires ﬁrst
and foremost active measures to be taken in order to be attracted foreign 
citizens of Bulgarian origin. In this regard, legislation initiatives are to be 
launched which concern their settlement, education and work in Bulgaria. 
Information on the current migration situation 2006 – 2007
The year 2006 is characterized by the increased ﬂow of foreign
citizens, who have crossed the borders of the country. The number of 
foreigners continuously or permanently residing in Bulgaria rises with 
small rates, but steadily during the last years. The number of the for-
eigners who were granted Bulgarian citizenship rises, whereas for the 
last years it was doubled. The number of EU citizens residing for long 
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steadily rises, as is the case with British citizens whose number is dou-
bled every year.
According to the provisions of the Law for Foreigners in the Repub-
lic of Bulgaria:
▪ short-term residence is up to 90 days – Art. 23, para. 2;
▪ long-term residence is up to 1 year – Art. 23, para. 3, point 1;
▪ permanent residence is without time limit – Art. 23, para. 3, 
point 2.
As to the beginning of 2007 year, over 55 000 foreigners had been 
registered in the country. On the territory of the town of Soﬁa live 35 %
of them, in Plovdiv and its district – 9 %, Varna and its district – 8 %, 
Burgas and its district – 5 %.
Characteristic indicator, showing the number of foreigners, is the 
number of the people who have permanently settled themselves in the 
country, i.e. who have acquired the right for long-term residence. Dur-
ing 2006 statute for long-term residence was received by over 14 000 
foreigners, with 20 % more than the previous year. Statute for permanent 
residence in the country was granted to 3 100 persons, or with 1.5 % 
more than the number from the previous year.
Predominating grounds for allowing long-term residence of foreigners 
in the Republic of Bulgaria according to the Law for foreigners are: stu-
dents, studying on regular bases – over 5 600 in 2006, followed by persons 
executing commercial activity in the country; persons, who have grounds 
to be given permission for permanent residence or have married a Bulgar-
ian citizen or accompany a permanently residing in the country foreigner; 
members of the family of a foreigner, having obtained license for a long-
term residence; foreign specialists, residing in the country on the bases of 
international contracts in which Republic of Bulgaria is a party.
Among the residents who have obtained statute for permanent resi-
dence in the country the largest number is that of the citizens of the 
Republic of Turkey – over 900 in 2006, followed by Russia, Ukraine, 
Macedonia and China. In comparison to year 2005 Chinese citizens who 
were granted permission for permanent residence are two times less.
Predominating grounds for allowing the statute of permanent resi-
dence in accordance with the Law for foreigners in The Republic of Bul-
garia are: marriage with a Bulgarian citizen – over 1000 for 2006, follow-
ing by persons of Bulgarian nationality or with permanently residing in 
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the country foreigner, born on the territory of Bulgaria who have lost their 
citizenship, underage children of Bulgarian citizens or of permanently re-
siding in the country foreigners, persons who have lived legally and with-
out interruption on the territory of the country during the last ﬁve years.
By the end of year 2006 there are around 1000 citizens from third 
countries who are working with work permit in the country. According 
to the granted permissions the countries rank as follows: Turkey – over 
200, followed by Macedonia – over 160, Ukraine, India, USA, Serbia, 
Russia, China and so on.
An important element of the migration situation in the country is the 
ﬁle with applications for obtaining Bulgarian citizenship. Most of the ap-
plications are ﬁled in by citizens from Macedonia and Moldova. As basic
motive the citizens of Macedonia and Moldova point out their origin and 
self-consciousness in order to utilize the benign procedure for obtaining 
Bulgarian citizenship. The total number (of citizens of Macedonia, Ser-
bia, Moldova, Albania, Ukraine, Russia, Montenegro) increases from a 
little bit over 2 500 in 2001 to a bit over 14 000 in 2006. The total number 
of individuals who were granted Bulgarian citizenship with a Decree 
from the Vice President of the Republic of Bulgaria is rising from over 
3300 individuals in 2002 to over 6600 in 2006.
With the accession of Bulgaria as a full rights member of EU an in-
crease of the willing to obtain Bulgarian citizenship citizens from third 
countries, utilizing the benign procedures, foreseen by the Law for Bul-
garian citizenship to individuals of Bulgarian origin is observed.
During the last years the tendency of consolidated interest towards 
permanent settling in Bulgaria on behalf of citizens from the European 
Union is getting bigger and bigger. Explicit interest for receiving statute 
for a long-term residence is delineated on behalf of British citizens, with 
50% more than the previous period, whereas the tendency for the last 
three years is stable. The large number of German and Greek citizens is 
retained, as well as expressed desire to acquire statute for long-term resi-
dence in the country on behalf of citizens from Cyprus and Italy is also 
reported. Predominating grounds for long-term residence are: studying 
(students on regular bases) – over 5600, followed by people performing 
business activities in the country, permanent residence or marriage to a 
Bulgarian citizen or to a permanently residing in the country foreigner 
and gathering of families of foreigners with long-term residence permits.
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The result from the scrutinized movement shows that by the end of 
year 2006 there are 536 citizens from the European Union on the Bulgar-
ian labour market. The number of the employed from the neighbouring 
countries Rumania and Greece is 130 persons.
Information on the economic situation and labour market
The Bulgarian economy keeps its dynamic development. During 
2006 Bulgarian economy noted a record-breaking growth with 6,1%. On 
the bases of the data, gathered by the National Statistic Institute (NSI), 
the gross domestic product of the country reached a nominal value of 
49,09 billion Leva (25,09 billion Euro). As a whole the growth of the 
Bulgarian economy remains relatively high since year 2002, despite of 
the observed slight retardation after year 2004. Basic prerequisite for 
the positive development of the GDP during the last several years is the 
expansion of economic freedom. Over 69% from the GDP is produced 
by the private sector. The basic factor for the growth with regards to the 
ﬁnal utilization is the domestic demand.
Following the steady economic growth, the average working salary 
is raising during the last couple of years with almost 10% per year in 
nominal expression basically due to the stable macroeconomic environ-
ment. This keeps on inﬂuencing positively the development of the labour
market in the country. The tendency for constant, stable ﬂow of foreign
investments in Bulgaria continues.
Demographic tendencies
A ﬁrm tendency for reducing the number of the population in the
country is set up. The basic problems in the demographic development of 
the country are the reduction in the number of the population and the de-
terioration of its age structure. By the end of 2006 the estimated constant 
population in Bulgaria is 7 718 750 people. For one year only, compared 
to 2005, and as a result of the bigger number of deaths than births, the 
number of the population decreased with more than 42 000 people, or 
with about 0,5 %. One of the main problems continues to be the ageing 
of the population. The average age of the population, generally for the 
country in 2006 is 41,2 years, whereas during 2001 it had been 40,4. The 
average duration of people’s lives for the period 2003-2006 is 72,55 years. 
The observed tendencies for ageing of the population during the last years 
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condition the necessity of continuing the policy for raising the economic 
activity of the population by increasing the age, wherefrom the necessary 
labour force for the development of the economy will be secured. 
Economic activity
The level of economic activity of the population belonging to the 
group from 15 to 64 years of age increases from 60,7 % during 2000 to 
64,2 % for 2006. Notwithstanding the observed growth in the activity 
level, there are still around 36,8 % from the population in the group from 
15 to 64 years of age who are outside the labour force, whereas 1/4 from 
the people within this group want to work, but are not looking for a job 
due to various reasons. The activity level of young people (15–24 y.o.) for 
2006 is averagely 27,7 % (bigger part from this group still belong to the 
education system). For the same period the level of activity among the 
adults (55-64 y.o.) is 41,4 % as compared to 38 % average for 2005.
The economic activity to a large extend depends on level of educa-
tion. During 2006 economically active are 85,5 % from the individuals 
with university education as compared to 72,4 % during 2005. Consider-
able increase in the economic activity is observed among people with 
lower education degree, respectively: 73,2 % for the people with high 
school degree, 38,2 % for people with primary school degree and 25,6 % 
for people with elementary degree or lower degree of education.
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Employment
During the last years stable tendency for increasing the number of em-
ployed individuals is observed in the country. For year 2006 the employed 
at the age from 15 to 64 years of age are 3 055,8 thousand. The employ-
ment coefﬁcient for the same period is 58,3 % with 2,5 percentage points
more than the previous year. The tendency from the last years for smooth 
increase in the employment coefﬁcient is preserved, but nevertheless it
is still considerably lower than the one in EU-25 – 64,3 % for 2006. The 
employment coefﬁcient for individuals with graduated university educa-
tion is 82%, with graduated high school education – 67,3 %, with primary 
– 31,2 %, with elementary and lower – 16,7 %. The fact that the level of 
employment among people with high school education and acquired voca-
tional qualiﬁcation (71,5 %) is rather higher than the level of employment
of people with general high school education (58,2 %) is indicative.
Regional differences
One of the basic problems on the labour market in Bulgaria during the 
last years is the availability of considerable and stable regional differences. 
With regards to all indexes, the terms of the labour market in the South-
West region are most favourable, while the level of economic activity and 
employment are lowest in North-West region – respectively 40,7 % and 
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35,7 %. Unemployment rate has decreased in all regions for planning, not-
withstanding that there is still essential difference between the level of un-
employment for the whole country – 6,7 % and the level of unemployment 
in the North-Western region for planning over 12 %. Increase in the degree 
of dispersing of the indexes for economic activity and for employment in 
the regions for planning was observed during the period 2003-2006. Posi-
tive tendency is observed only with regards to the unemployment level. 
This tendency is preserved during the ﬁrst half of 2006 as well.
Unemployment
During the last years the unemployment has dropped considerably. 
The current rate for the end of 2007 is calculated as 6,7 % – the lowest 
level since the changes started 18 years ago. Stable tendency of decrease 
is also observed with registered unemployment. Within the educational 
structure of unemployed, the biggest relative share is still occupied by 
the individuals with elementary or lower education – 60,6 %, followed 
by the ones with high school degree – 33,1 %. The share of unemployed 
with university degree in the totality of registered unemployed remains 
unchanged – 6,4 %. Within the vocational-qualiﬁcation structure of the
unemployed, the share of unemployed with no qualiﬁcation is still pre-
dominating – 64,7 %. In 2006 the number of the unemployed with work-
ers’ skills decreases by 18,0 %, while the number of the unemployed 
specialists decreases by 17,6 %.
Information about the Bulgarians living abroad - inseparable ele-
ment of Bulgarian nation
There is no single answer to the question what is the number of Bul-
garians living abroad. The information is quite ﬂuctuating due of fact
that different estimates do not match to each other and an ofﬁcial statistic
data is missing. Nevertheless, there are several sources of information 
which could be referred to. Firstly, it is the information that is provided 
by Bulgarian diplomat and consular representations, data-bases of the 
State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad and estimates of Bulgarian com-
munities in the countries of residence. Furthermore, to be considered are 
sources of scientiﬁc nature – historical, statistical and demographic stud-
ies and data (both Bulgarian and foreign), documents, memoirs, etc. 
Generally speaking, persons of Bulgarian origin living in other 
countries are: persons without Bulgarian citizenship, persons with Bul-
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garian citizenship or persons with double citizenship. Having in mind 
the conditional nature of this statement, almost one million people with 
Bulgarian citizenship live abroad. 
National migration and integration strategy
The already outlined trends of the labour market in Bulgaria and of the 
migration processes at global, regional and national level gave the opportu-
nity for deﬁning the frameworks of the Bulgarian migration and integration
policy towards third-country nationals. These guidelines were elaborated 
as of March 2008 as part of a project on National Migration and Integration 
Strategy that is envisaged to be in force during the period 2008 – 2015. 
Understandably, this strategy is bound to the National Employment 
Strategy, National Strategy for Demographic Development of the Repub-
lic of Bulgaria, National Housing Strategy, National Poverty Reduction 
and Social Exclusion Strategy, National Health Strategy and further stra-
tegic documents concerning the respective policy ﬁeld.   
The project on National Migration and Integration Strategy places an 
emphasis on the following two strategic objectives aiming at supporting 
Bulgarian economy and efﬁcient controlling of migration processes as well:
▪ attracting of Bulgarian citizens and foreign citizens of Bulgar-
ian origin for permanent settlement in the country
▪ implementation of new and adequate policy towards admission 
third-country nationals.
These two objectives should be fulﬁlled in mutual synergy and fol-
lowing the national interests of the country and its citizens. 
For these reason, it is not by accident that Bulgarians abroad are 
highlighted as a main priority within the migration and integration poli-
cy which present two inseparable processes that could reach the desired 
beneﬁcial results only if they are applied together.
In order to achieve the ﬁrst strategic objective the implementation of
two programmes is foreseen. The ﬁrst one aims at attracting back to the
country Bulgarians that have left it in the last two decades. The second 
programme includes measures for attracting of foreigners of Bulgarian 
origin and facilitating their permanent settlement in Bulgaria. In this re-
gard, issuing of a “green card” is to be launched. However, it will not be a 
typical “personal document” and will not substitute the residence permit 
but it will provide a set of rights available only on the territory of the 
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country. Furthermore, this approach will exist parallel to the procedure 
for granting Bulgarian citizenship. It is also to be pointed out that “new” 
Bulgarians are expected to contribute to the development of the Bulgarian 
economy and society as workers, self-employed persons, entrepreneurs, 
creators, etc. and also by paying taxes and investing in Bulgaria and thus 
supporting Bulgarian agriculture, tourism, transport, culture, etc., as, 
actually, other Bulgarians do. The endmost objective is their long-term 
settlement in Bulgaria instead of in other EU member states. 
As regards the second strategic objective it prioritize the following 
areas: admission of foreigners to the domestic labour market, their inte-
gration into the Bulgarian society, efﬁcient control of the external bor-
ders, struggle against illegal immigration and trafﬁcking, mechanisms
for returning of migrants and regulation of the migration processes. 
Further steps include the introduction of annual branch quotes regulat-
ing the admission of foreigners, foundation together with the social partners’ 
organizations of a special Council in charge of determination of the volumes 
of these quotes and concluding of agreements on employment of foreigners 
in the country. The basis of these activities is provided by eleven principles 
for integration of foreigners in the Bulgarian society and the EU tendencies 
in the ﬁeld of migration issues as a guidance for the policy Bulgaria will
implement in the years to come as a full-ﬂedged EU member state.
It is to be emphasized that a foreign citizen is allowed to enter the 
labour market after a Bulgarian employer has announced a job vacancy 
and it is proved that for the respective position there is neither Bulgarian 
applicants, nor citizens of other EU member states or foreigners with a 
permanent stay permit in Bulgaria. The employer is responsible for the 
acceptance of the foreign workers by ensuring payment or conditions al-
lowing a satisfactory way of live. On the contrary, the foreign employee 
is obliged to return to the country of origin after contract expiration. 
This aims at fostering circular migration and avoidance of “brain-drain”-
effects in the home countries. 
The above described draft-strategy is elaborated by team of experts 
not only form the concerned governmental bodies and units but also 
from syndicates, NGOs and academia. This draft document underwent 
several stages of discussions in different formats as working groups and 
national councils and ﬁnally, after a broad public debate the Council of
Ministers is about to approve it in due course. The strategy will be in 
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force till 2015 and will be divided in four-year stages in order to keep 
track of the dynamics in the development of the migration processes at 
national, regional, European and world level.   
Co-operation within the EU 
After January 1, 2007 Bulgaria become not only a full-ﬂedged member
of the EU, but also was given the opportunity to participate in the deci-
sion-making processes in the Union and thus to contribute and inﬂuence
the developments on Community level, including the issues concerning free 
movement of people, migration and immigrant integration. The involvement 
in the EU policy and practice results from the obligations the Republic of 
Bulgaria has assumed with the Treaty of Accession 2005 and also from the 
regulations and directives, the existing practice and initiatives in the ﬁeld. 
In terms of the free movement of people Bulgaria does its best to give a 
proof to its European partners that Bulgarian citizens do not pose a threat to 
the labour markets in the other EU countries. Unfortunately, there are still 
EU countries which keep transition periods before full opening up of the 
procedures of free movement of workers. However, a positive development 
in this regard is to be observed since increasing number of member states 
with imposed transition periods begin to re-examine their positions on the 
basis of own analysis and data concerning their experience with Bulgarian 
labour force so far and growing needs of the domestic employers. 
Bulgaria has an extensive experience in successful applying bilater-
al agreements in the ﬁled of employment and social security (Germany,
Spain). According to the Treaty of Accession between EU and Bulgaria 
and Romania, during the transition periods the acting agreements re-
main only as a subsidiary mechanism until these periods are abolished. 
When it comes to the European Migration policy, it attains more and 
more common European nature – through a series of initiatives and direc-
tives (launched by the Commissioner Ferattini) and initiatives for partner-
ships with third countries as well. Nonetheless, this process advances con-
sequently with respect to the national rights and competencies in the ﬁeld.
The Directives to be elaborated are as follows:
▪ Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council providing for sanctions against employers of illegally 
staying third-country nationals
▪ Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application procedure 
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for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work 
in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights 
for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State
▪ Proposal for a Council Directive on the conditions of entry and 
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly 
qualiﬁed employment
▪ Proposal for a Council Directive – seasonal workers
▪ Proposal for a Council Directive – intra-corporate transferees
▪ Proposal for a Council Directive – remunerated trainees
In 2007 the European Commission issued two guidelines concern-
ing the following topics:
▪ Circular migration and mobility partnerships between EU and 
third countries;
▪ Applying the Global approach towards migration for East and 
Southeastern regions bordering on the EU
The initiative concerning signing partnership agreements between the 
European Commission and a group of member states on the one side and 
a respective third country on the other side has acquired real dimensions. 
In 2008 some of the ﬁrst pilot partnership agreements will be signed with
countries from two different regions – East Europe and Central Africa. 
These partnerships will include elements that are prioritized and initiated 
by the European Commission and but also bilateral/multilateral agree-
ments, initiatives and projects of particular EU member states and third 
countries. In this regard, Bulgaria has proposed the inclusion of several 
countries in these pilot partnership agreements – Moldova, Macedonia 
and Armenia. Traditionally, Bulgaria has good relations with these coun-
tries and they are known for the Bulgarian communities living there. 
The ﬁrst country to participate in these partnerships is Moldova and
a pilot partnership agreement is already in progress. It is fully in accor-
dance with Bulgarian national interests since, as already mentioned, a 
considerable Bulgarian community lives in the country and it is proved 
that Moldovan people interested in work, education and life opportunities 
in Bulgaria are predominantly of Bulgarian origin. Other country to take 
part in similar partnership agreement is the Republic of Cape Verde.
Bulgaria has undertaken steps towards conclusion of bilateral agree-
ment with the Republic of Moldova in the sphere of social insurance 
and at present negotiations are in progress. Another initiative on the part 
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of the Bulgarian government envisages the launch of consultations as a 
preparation of an agreement that aims at regulation of labour migration 
with Moldova. These initiatives are meant to enter the common European 
approach for mobility partnership with Moldova. Furthermore, Bulgaria 
will render cooperation through expertise and sharing best practices.  
As a conclusion it should be emphasized that migration issues in 
Bulgaria have been always resolved transparent and after holding public 
debates. On the eve of Bulgarian membership in the EU in December 
2006, after a broad discussion, the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria de-
cided to apply the Community law as regards the admission to the labour 
market of EU-citizens. It was in 2004 when a special Interdepartmental 
working group has been founded in order to ensure discussion and re-
solving of migration and integration issues at expert level. The format of 
this Interdepartmental working group is based on the principle of broad 
representation and thus it encompasses about 50 experts from different 
administration bodies with competency in the ﬁeld and the respective
stakeholders. This approach proved to be well-working and productive 
and could be highlighted as a “good practice” within the process of im-
plemention of national migration policy.
Of enormous signiﬁcance are also the good interrelations with the
non-governmental sector and media since only in this way Bulgarian 
society will be better prepared for realizing and accepting the challenges 
of the global migration processes and the advantages of a contemporary, 
realistic and balanced migration policy aiming at stability and develop-
ment – a policy that Bulgaria claims to implement consecutively. 
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Activities of the State Agency 
for Refugees with 
the Council of Ministers
Neli Filipova
Social Activities Expert, Integration Centre for Refugees of the State 
Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers.
Ivelina Novakova 
Work and Labour Ofﬁce Expert, Integration Centre for Refugees
of the State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers.
The right of asylum is a fundamental human right, stated in Artl4 
(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human rights – “Each person has the 
right to seek and receive asylum in other countries when persecuted”. 
When having joined the Geneva Convention of 1951 related to the 
status of refugees and the New York Protocol of 1967 Republic of Bul-
garia responsibly implements the assumed engagements for providing a 
just refugee status procedure, a r-ight of asylum, social and health insur-
ance and support, a free access to education, professional training and 
qualiﬁcation conditions aiming at better social integration process; to the
aliens, seeking protection and asylum on its territory.
On the 2nd of October, 1996 the Republic of Bulgaria ratiﬁed the
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Thus our country acknowledges the right of protection to persons who 
because of well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a speciﬁc social group or political opinion
and/or conviction have left their countries of origin and are not able or do 
not wish to take advantage of their countries of origin protection.  
According to the recent data of the UNHCR the number of the refu-
gees in the world has increased by 14 % only for 2006 and has reached 
over 10 million people. Pursuant to the report the increasing number 
of the refugees is to a great extend due to the situation in Iraq, that has 
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forced over 1,5 million Iraqi people to seek asylum in other countries till 
the end of 2006.
A great part of the refugees in Bulgaria are also Iraqi. The countries 
that the refugees in Bulgaria originate from are 81 in number. Following 
Iraq are Afghanistan, Iran, Armenia, ex – Yugoslavia, etc. 
The implementation of the assumed engagements of Bulgaria is re-
alized by the State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers 
in close and effective cooperation with the Representative of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Migration 
Organization, governmental and non – governmental organizations.
The State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers coordinates 
the actions of the governmental institutions in connection with the granting 
of a speciﬁc protection of aliens on the territory of Republic of Bulgaria.
The state policy on the matters of the asylum, the refugees and their 
integration in the Bulgarian society is realized in correspondence with the 
international legal acts for refugee protection and with the attainments of the 
European legislation in the sphere of asylum and also with correspondence 
with the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and the other Bulgarian 
Laws. In order to obtain a comprehensive and adequate protection the Law 
on Asylum and Refugees is effectively applied. The Law on Asylum and 
Refugees is considered with the requirements of the Geneva Convention of 
1951 related to the status of refugees and the New York Protocol of 1967 for 
the refugee status; and it is in correspondence with the attainments of the 
European legislation in the sphere of asylum.
Pursuant to the Law on Asylum and Refugees the following territo-
rial units function connected to the State Agency for Refugees with the 
Council of Ministers:
▪ Registration – and - reception Center in the capital Soﬁa; with
450 persons capacity. Its functions are: implementation of sum-
mary procedures and general form procedures for granting a 
refugee status – implementation of an entire registration of the 
aliens, seeking protection in the Republic of Bulgaria; consid-
ering the protection applications, the organization of summary 
and general form procedures, accommodation, medical exami-
nations, social and psychological assistance till the enactment of 
the decision on the protection application.
▪ Registration – and - reception Center in the village of Banya, 
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Nova Zagora Municipality; with 70 persons capacity. Its func-
tions are:  accommodation, social activities, psychological con-
sultations, general form procedures and also work with unaccom-
panied under-age children – refugees who need special care. 
▪ Integration Centre for Refugees in the capital Soﬁa – there the fol-
lowing activities take place: planning and organizing training in 
Bulgarian language; professional training and qualiﬁcation at the
appropriate professional ofﬁces; social protection of aliens; cul-
tural, sport and other activities, necessary for the integration of 
the foreigners, who are seeking or have received protection in Re-
public of Bulgaria. In the Centre a Reception Ofﬁce is realized in
order to organize the social consultation of the refugees with pro-
vided status and included in the National Program for Integration 
of Recognized Refugees. During the receptions the Centre works 
together with the non – governmental organizations: the Refugee 
and Migrant Unit of the Bulgarian Red Cross, the Association for 
Integration of Refugees and Migrants and Caritas Bulgaria,
The Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union in 2007 sets new 
responsibilities before our country in the process achieving the common 
European purpose – creation of freedom, security and justice zone. The 
observance and the safeguarding of human rights founded on common 
democratic values, such as equality, solidarity, respect, prevention of dis-
crimination, appreciation of the ethnic and cultural diversity, are a part 
of this common purpose.
With the adoption of the Law on Asylum and Refugees, as well as 
many legal acts and documents, regulating the rights and the respon-
sibilities of the refugees, Bulgaria made its serious steps towards the 
elaboration of policy for integration of refugees in the Bulgarian society. 
The achieved positive changes in the process of integration of refugees 
in the Bulgarian society are the result of the long standing joint efforts 
of the State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers, the Rep-
resentative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the 
Bulgarian state institutions and non governmental organizations work-
ing with refugees.
In the sphere of integration the priority is the maximization of the 
positive impact of migration upon the society and the economy; the de-
velopment of measures for implementation of the best integration policy 
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aiming at the achievement of the maximal positive impact of migration 
upon the society and the economy; the prevention of isolation and the 
social elimination of the immigrant communities. Thus a contribution to 
the understanding and the dialogue among religions and cultures based 
on the fundamental values of the EU will be produced. Besides the ad-
ministrative cooperation among the EU member countries will continue 
stabilizing, in order to support the processing of the applications and the 
receiving of third country citizens. 
The practical cooperation among the EU member countries is a key 
element towards the efforts for the foundation of a common European 
system of asylum. It promotes the raising of knowledge and comprehen-
sion of the legislation decrees and procedures of the EU member coun-
tries and it provides a basis for legal harmonization as well. The purpose 
is the proceeding of the development of united standards in the protec-
tion granting procedure and the guaranteed access to the procedure at 
the inner and at the outer borders of the EU. The development of an ef-
fective united procedure will provide an effective migrant and refugee 
policy for the EU member countries
NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR INTEGRATION OF 
REFUGEES IN REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA
The long term National Program for Integration of Refugees has 
been adopted in May, 2005. As a document regulating the cooperation 
and improving the coordination between the state institutions and the 
non-governmental organizations in the sphere of refugee integration, the 
Program has been prepared on the basis of a thorough analysis of the 
legislation and the practices. It comprises the fundamental principles and 
goals of the integration of refugees in Bulgaria. The Program is directed 
towards all the aliens granted conventional or humanitarian status in Re-
public of Bulgaria for the acquisition of equal access to the rights, for 
active and equal participation in development of the Bulgarian society. 
The Program outlines the activities to be undertaken by the state 
institutions, non-governmental organizations and the local authorities in 
order to create economic, social, political and cultural preconditions for 
the integration of refugees in the Bulgarian society, in compliance with 
the 1951 Geneva Convention related to the status of refugees and the 
1967 New York Protocol, as well as other international legal acts in the 
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ﬁeld of human rights, the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and
the domestic legislation. 
The basic purpose of the Program for integration of refugees is the 
providing of opportunity of newly recognized refugees to learn Bulgar-
ian language, to acquire profession, to get acquainted with the structure 
of the state, the state institutions, the ethnic characteristics and habits; 
so that they could ﬁnd realization in the society, ﬁnancial independence
and self-reliant life. Within the frameworks of the Program they receive 
social assistance, health insurance, payment for accommodation and ev-
eryday necessities.
The Program is ﬁnanced by the state budget.
The adoption and the implementation of the National Program for 
Integration of Refugees create conditions for complete integration of the 
refugees in the Bulgarian society. The achieved progress in the sphere 
of the observation of human rights is conﬁrmed and develops; a tolerant
and friendly disposed atmosphere is created in the Bulgarian society.
The Program will promote the state institutions and the non-govern-
mental organizations in Bulgaria to accept the challenges in the sphere of 
asylum and refugees and will develop their capacity in the management 
and opening up of the resources from the European Refugee Fund and 
other funds and programs.
RIGHT OF WORKING, EMPLOYMENT AND 
QUALIFICATION OF THE REFUGEES
The recognized refugees have equal to the Bulgarian citizens rights, 
concerning the right to work and economic initiative. Their labour legis-
lation relations are regulated by the Labour Legislation of the state. The 
regulations in the labour sphere are harmonized with the international 
and the European legislation. 
A basic goal in providing of employment of the refugees is to secure 
their access to the labour market and their stable settlement there. This 
appears to be quite difﬁcult because as far as the professional structure
of the refugee community is concerned, it is dominated by persons with 
low qualiﬁcation or without qualiﬁcation; and the tendency at the labour
market is directed towards decreasing of the elementary employment 
and the increasing of the employment of the medium or high qualiﬁca-
tion employees.
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The construction of the civil society and the stabilization of the demo-
cratic principles in the country determine the necessity of encouraging of 
the integration of persons who experience difﬁculties at the labour market
by increasing of their employment correspondence and realization abilities. 
In the conditions of the market economy relations the recognized refugees 
can be registered in the Labour Bureau Directorates as active employment 
seekers, and consequently they acquire the right of employment mediation, 
professional information and consultation, directing to vocational training 
and prequaliﬁcation courses and aid in ﬁnding job. The refugees often lack
documents, proving a completed educational level or acquired qualiﬁca-
tion  in the country of origin; and that is the reason for their registration 
in the lowest category of unemployed – primarily educated and without 
qualiﬁcation; and that fact positions them in the unskilled workers rank.
The male refugees are situated in a more favourable position than 
the female. The highest percentage of the male refugee employment is 
in the sphere of trading, car repairs, construction business and fast food 
restaurants. 
The women – refugees and the aged refugees are especially hin-
dered to participate actively in the labour and social life.  The women 
– refugees are in most of the cases primarily educated or even illiter-
ate. The low educational level, the lack of professional qualiﬁcation and
labour habits are a prerequisite for a long lasting unemployment of the 
female refugees.
Besides the tendency for decreasing of the refugee unemployment, 
the measures and the activities reﬂected in different educational and
training programs; the refugees remain among the risky labour groups 
and they meet numerous difﬁculties in ﬁnding job.
The restricted abilities for professional realization are due to:
▪ None or poor knowledge of the Bulgarian language;
▪ Lack or loss of labour habits and abilities;
▪ Lack of education and professional qualiﬁcation documents;
▪  Reserves of the employers to hire refugees or the existence of 
discrimination      practices on the labour market;
▪ Cultural and religious differences, especially concerning the 
employment of the Muslim women;
▪ Insufﬁcient knowledge of the rights and obligations on the la-
bour legislation.
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Measures and recommendations for overcoming of the refugee 
unemployment and the successful integration and adaptation of the 
refugees on the labour market
For improving the conditions for the refugee integration in our society 
and for the rise of their economical activity, it is necessary to develop deﬁ-
nite activities and to implement them as active labour market measures:
1. Activities directed to providing conditions for complete social 
integration of the refugees by increasing of their employment 
adaptability. 
2. Encouragement of the employment access by training and pro-
fessional qualiﬁcation improvement.  
3. Realization of activities and programs supporting the labour 
market integration of the refugees.
4. Stimulation of the employers to open places of work for acquiring 
qualiﬁcation by working on probation or serving as an apprentice
for at least 6 - months period and a following job engagement.
5. Introduction of ﬁnancial stimulus as well as tax concessions for
employers who hire refugees.
The decrease of the disproportion between the supply and demand 
of labour power is of substantial importance for the future increase of 
employment and decrease of unemployment. The possession of abilities 
demanded on the labour market promotes better adaptation towards the 
labour market alterations and prevents the social elimination. 
As a result of the high economic growth, the opening of new places 
of work and the economic migration, our country will more often face 
the problem of the lack of properly educated, trained and qualiﬁed la-
bour power. Meanwhile there still exist a great part of the “unused” 
workers. The activation and the increasing of the labour supply, accom-
panied by the raising of the adaptability of the labour power are the ba-
sic components for restriction of the shortage. Our priority activities are 
the integration activities and programs stimulating the refugees to stay 
longer at the labour market and the access to training and educational 
opportunities. The reformation and the proper directing of the active 
labour market policy; the improvement of the effectiveness of the ac-
tivities and programs will contribute to the increasing of the economic 
activity and the employment level.
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Legal Dimensions of Immigrant Access 
to Employment in Bulgaria:
A Contextual Analysis
Themba Lewis
Manager, Legal Clinic for Refugees and Immigrants, Soﬁa, Bulgaria
Diana Daskalova
Lawyer, Legal Clinic for Refugees and Immigrants, Soﬁa, Bulgaria
This paper aims to illustrate the current legal landscape and practi-
cal challenges facing immigrants in Bulgaria as regards integration into 
the labour market. These challenges are signiﬁcant, and the current le-
gal procedures speciﬁc, demanding, and often confusing. Coupled with
an ill-deﬁned and incomplete formal immigration policy and systematic
disregard for the rights of asylum-seekers, legal employment opportuni-
ties for many immigrants are extremely difﬁcult to access. Many are left
no choice but to enter the informal economy, where abuse, exploitation, 
fragile circumstances, and potentially dangerous and illegal work char-
acterize the unregulated environment.
The paper will proceed in three parts. It will begin, in Historical 
Background, with a contextualization of current policy through sum-
mary of previous experience and history of state initiation of and re-
sponse to migration and minority politics. The second section, Current 
Legal Structures for Immigrant Access to Employment, will introduce 
and discuss contemporary legal requirements and restrictions placed on 
immigrants in Bulgaria. Issues, Challenges, and Recommendations de-
tails positive and negative aspects of the Bulgarian legal approach and 
aims to brieﬂy suggest areas of improvement and practical steps towards
the realization of effective, fair, and humane policy. Such policy not only 
respects the potential and necessary contribution immigrant labour may 
provide to the social and economic development of Bulgaria, but also 
shows respect for the common humanity and universal rights afforded 
all human beings regardless of citizenship.
78
Historical Background
Few nations in history have experienced the intensive regional scru-
tiny on market and labour policy as those about to ascend to, or newly 
ascended to, the European Union (EU). Fewer still have experienced the 
added pressures associated with hosting an EU ‘external land border’. 
While market access, support for human rights, geopolitical stability, 
and any number of other topics are regularly touted as central foci of Eu-
ropean governments towards newly ascended states, without fail issues 
of immigration are rigorously and exhaustively politicized, debated, and 
publicized in an effort to reinforce (and occasionally question) notions 
of control on the European ‘frontier’. The demands on regulation are 
signiﬁcant, particularly in the face of a rapidly re-adjusting economy and
state structure such as that brought about through dramatic social and 
political change - such as the transition from communism to democracy 
and the development of EU standard ‘free market’ policies.
Underscored in these international debates are subtle, and occasion-
ally insidious, notions of access and economics. Free movement and em-
ployment access within the union are implied (if not actualized1) central 
tenets of EU membership and citizens of new member states may for the 
most part reside and work in any other member state. The implications for 
those not holding citizenship however are not only more severe, but also 
more invisible. Many immigrants in Bulgaria, frustrated by impossible 
legal obstacles, are forced to leave the country, face extended and inhuman 
detention and deprivation of rights, enter the informal economy, or worse.
Bulgaria, one of three countries sharing a land-bridge to Asia and 
the Middle East at the base of the Black Sea, has long experienced mi-
gration ﬂows, but maintains no political or academic tradition of anaylsis
concerning this phenomenon. The post-communist “discovery of immi-
gration” (Krasteva 2006: 26) is still in its early stages, and historical 
context is critical to understanding the current state of legal and social 
immigrant conceptions.
From the early days of Ottoman occupation to independence in 1878, 
and continuing through to the second World War, the dissolution of the 
‘Soviet Bloc’, the Balkan Wars, and up to the current day Bulgaria has 
1 In 2006 the European Commission expressed ‘strict conditions’ on Bulgarian and Romanian access to 
labour markets upon accession. The United Kingdom took these restrictions further, announcing in 2006 that 
new citizens of Europe from Bulgaria and Romania would be “restricted to existing quota schemes to ﬁll
vacancies in the agricultural and food processing sectors.” HOME OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED KINGDOM (2006) Controlled Access To UK Labour Market For New Accession Countries.
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struggled with strong and persistent conceptions of national identity, 
popular migration, and far-reaching diaspora (see: Loizos 1999, Vassilev 
2001, Helton 1992, Skran 1998, Dacyl 1990, Mintchev 1999). Since 1950 
Bulgaria has seen two large-scale exodus movements of Turkish Bulgar-
ians. The ﬁrst, between 1950 and 1952, saw nearly 160,000 ethnic Turks
cross into Turkey. Subsequently, during the decade between 1982-1992, 
350,000 ethnic Turks “ﬂed from collective oppression, enforced Bulgari-
anization, and economic problems” although 150,000 of these are report-
ed to have returned in the years since (Fassman and Munz 1994: 532).
Bulgaria is an ethnically plural state, tracing clear, and at 
times xenophobic,2 differentiating lines around minority ‘migrant’ 
communities.3 Communist era policies reinforced notions of collective 
uniformity, often subjugating minorities. Indeed, the communist govern-
ment worked to “shore itself up by manipulating the majority’s national-
ist sentiments, [it] had created a polarizing conﬂict along ethno-religious
lines by subjecting the Muslim Turkish minority in Bulgaria to a cam-
paign of cultural and linguistic assimilation” (Vassilev 2001: 37). This 
policy of forced assimilation amounted to persecution of Muslim Bulgar-
ian nationals as demonstrated through the case of S. Kalaydsiev, J. Angue-
lov, A. Mladenov v. Decision 13/1985 of the Athens Court of Appeal 
Council (Helton 1992: 381-382). The advent of democracy threatened to 
inﬂame ethnic turmoil when the forced assimilation policy - termed the
‘national revival’ campaign under the Zhivkov regime in the mid-1980’s 
- ofﬁcially ended and minority rights were ofﬁcially (if not practically)
restored (Vassilev 2001: 37) in 1989.4 No ofﬁcial recognition of multicul-
turalism currently exists,5 and increasingly popular nationalist parties in 
Bulgaria have denied the existence of Bulgarian ethnic minorities within 
the country in an effort of create nationalist fervour (Vassilev 2001: 37). 
The effects of this are socially dramatic, presenting extreme difﬁculties
for, resentment towards, and suspicion of immigrants.
2 See Iliana Savova as cited in HERSHMAN, G. (2007) The Other Expats: Bulgaria’s forgotten foreign-
ers languish in limbo and the state seems indifferent. Vagabond.
3 This is perhaps most clearly demonstrated through treatment towards the Roma population and Bulgar-
ian Turks - both considered to differing degrees ‘migrant’ minority communities.
4 According to Vassilev, “the decision to renounce the ‘revival process’, made public on 29 December 
1989, sparked nation-wide protests by Bulgarian nationalists to resist the new policy.”  These protests includ-
ed slogans such as “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians” and objected to what they called “the governments ‘policy 
of national nihilism’.” VASSILEV, R. V. (2001) Post-Communist Bulgaria’s Ethnopolitics. The Global Re-
view of Ethnopolitics, 1, 37-53.
5 The Bulgarian Government does however publicly recognize the existence of a Muslim Turkish minor-
ity in Bulgaria, and although not ofﬁcially registered as such, the ethnic Turkish-dominated Movement for
Rights and Freedoms (MRF) [is] the largest and most inﬂuential ethnic minority party in Bulgaria” Ibid.
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However, Krasteva identiﬁes three exceptions to the “strictly con-
trolled” movements to, from, and within Bulgaria during the commu-
nist years. Perhaps not surprisingly, these were based in reassuring po-
litical advantage (see: Mintchev 1999: 148), and include the emigration 
of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey, the immigration of students “with the 
speciﬁc purpose of providing higher education to left-wing intellectuals
as part of a long-term strategy for the preparation of world revolution,” 
and the immigration of sympathetic activists from neighbouring coun-
tries (Krasteva 2006: 26). While these were very speciﬁc movements
with geopolitical goals, economics ultimately provided for a fourth mi-
gration. Not unlike predominant Western trends, the appeal of labour-
related immigration lead to the loosening of otherwise extremely re-
strictive conditions and Bulgaria accepted ‘guest worker’ (Gastarbeiter) 
Vietnamese in the 1980s (European Intercultural Workplace 2006: 18, 
Krasteva 2006: 26).
Two signiﬁcant modern events have deeply shaken established ef-
forts towards near-total migration restriction. The ﬁrst is the onset of the
‘changes’ and advent of democratic governance in 1989 and the second 
is accession to the EU in 2007. According to Mintchev, 
 After the fall of the Berlin Wall, considerable changes occurred 
in the mechanical movement of the Bulgarian population. Dur-
ing the period 1989-1997, over 650 thousand people emigrated 
from the country permanently. According to data from 1994, for 
the period 1986-1992, Bulgaria exported 19.6 million years of 
‘life’ and 11.4 million years of ‘labour’ (1999: 148).
The onset of EU membership represents the second stage in an evolv-
ing process of ‘opening up’ Bulgaria not only to foreign economic invest-
ment (and subsequent business-related migration of people and monies) 
but also to Bulgarian emigration at an unprecedented level. According to 
current statistics produced by European Union, projections of negative 
population growth in Bulgaria due to emigration surpass any other coun-
try in Europe all the way through to 2050, the year beyond which the re-
search group ceases projection (Eurostat 2004). This level of exodus has 
signiﬁcant consequences for the labour market. While remittances repre-
sent a potentially immediate beneﬁt for the Bulgarian economy, the cost
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of highly-skilled emigration is high (Markova and Reilly 2006)6 and of 
great economic concern to the Bulgarian Government (Chompalov 2000: 
3). Simultaneous, the necessity for qualiﬁed labour in Bulgaria conse-
quently increases in an environment less-attractive to citizens tempted by 
promises of higher-wages in newly-accessible Western European markets. 
At the same time, low-skilled labour in the EU market presents potential 
beneﬁt to Bulgarians unable to ﬁnd satisfactory wages for the same work
at home, again creating gaps to be ﬁlled. Bulgaria needs immigrants.
 Current Legal Structures for Immigrant Access to Employment
1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
CONCERNING MIGRATION POLICY IN BULGARIA
Bulgarian legislation related to the integration of migrants into the 
labour market, indeed Bulgarian legislation in the sphere of migration 
in general, has experienced and continues to experience dynamic ad-
justment and changes since the early 1990s. This adjustment has been 
notably intensiﬁed during recent years with the push towards harmo-
nization of Bulgarian laws and norms with International and European 
standards. In January 2007 Bulgaria became an EU member state and 
began hosting an external border of the EU. Together with a number 
of positive new adjustments following this event, the accession has de-
manded stronger and more repressive state policy on restriction of move-
ment and immigration regulations. This process has been justiﬁed in the
name of concerns for security and combating illegal activities. In search 
of the crucial balance between state interest in migration regulation and 
its obligation to respect the human rights of all people - including mi-
grants - Bulgaria is in the initial steps of formulating and implementing 
just, appropriate,  and comprehensively sustainable responses to the op-
portunities and challenges of migration, and current systems demand 
signiﬁcant improvement.
The general legal framework of migration regulation in the country 
is composed of series of norms, allocated at Constitutional, legal and 
sub-legal level, regulating the rights and obligations of the different mi-
6 It is important to note that lack of substantive data and “interpretive problems” affect discussions 
surrounding ideas of ‘brain drain’ Bulgarian economic development.  See: BAGATELAS, W. T. & KU-
BICOVÁ, J. (2003) Bulgarian emigration - a closer look. South-East Europe Review, 4, 27-36, MINT-
CHEV, V. (1999) External Migration and External Migration Policies in Bulgaria. South-East Europe 
Review, 2, 123-150.
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grant groups, as well as the speciﬁc regulation procedures together with
the structure and functioning of the corresponding institutions.   
Article 26(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (hence-
forth the ‘Constitution’) ensures all foreigners the rights proceeding 
from the Constitution except those which speciﬁcally require Bulgarian
citizenship.7 Article 19, which details economic activity, declares the Bul-
garian market to be based on free economic initiative and suggests that 
the economic activity of foreign persons shall enjoy the protection of the 
law. The right to equality before the law, however as presented in Article 
6(2), applies only to citizens. Citizenship, as elaborated in article 25(1) 
shall be granted to “anyone born of at least one parent holding a Bulgarian 
citizenship, or born on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, should 
he not be entitled to any other citizenship by virtue of origin. Bulgarian 
citizen-ship shall further be acquirable through naturalization.”
Article 22 of the Constitution, the so-called ‘Foreigners Clause’, re-
stricts foreign access to ownership of land and the acquisition of certain 
rights. However, this article was amended in 2005 by the Treaty concern-
ing the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union so 
as to provide for the legal ownership of land by foreigners and foreign 
legal persons. The revised article entered into legal recognition on Janu-
ary 1, 2007, as Bulgaria entered the European Union.
A small number of national laws are in place to further regulate the 
status of foreigners in Bulgaria. Some of these include: the Law for the 
Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria; the Law on Asylum and Refu-
gees; the Law for Entering Residing and Leaving the Republic of Bulgaria 
of European Union Citizens and Members of their Families, the Law of 
Protection from Discrimination, which protects “all individuals on the ter-
ritory of Bulgaria”; the Law of Encouragement of Employment; the Law 
for the Bulgarian Identiﬁcation Documents; the Law on Bulgarian Citizen-
ship; the Law of Fighting the Illegal Trafﬁc of People. These laws provide
for some clariﬁcation - and some confusion - of legal provisions, however
Bulgaria remains without an articulated and comprehensive formal policy 
concerning non-citizens present within the territorial bounds of the state.
On the sub-legal level, the Bulgarian state employs a number of 
regimes for control and maintenance of migration systems through the 
7Article 26(2) of the Constitution declares that “Foreigners residing in the Republic of Bulgaria shall be 
vested with all rights and obligations proceeding from this Constitution, except those rights and obligations 
for which a Bulgarian citizenship is required by this Constitution or by another law” CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA (1991), 39th National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria.
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application of the Law for the Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria. 
Demonstrations of such mechanisms are tangibly evident in visa controls 
(the issuance and denial thereof as well as the determination of duration 
and access), residency and employment permissions, permits for non-
proﬁt activity, permissions for economic and investment purposes, and
the like. The most disturbing demonstration of sub-legal mechanisms 
affecting immigrants is without question the use of administrative deten-
tion for the physical restriction of non-citizens (see: Ilareva 2007a, 2007, 
Hershman 2007). The detention of foreigners has a long history in Bul-
garia - with cases of prolonged airport detention (sometimes exceeding 
many months) reaching into the early 1990’s (Hughes and Liebaut 1998). 
Even more disturbing has been the documented trend towards practical 
obfuscation of the asylum process and systematic denial of internation-
ally recognized rights and procedures. The blocking of asylum claim 
submission and the forcible deportation of foreigners has on multiple oc-
casions amounted to refoulement, a violation of international law under 
Article 33 or the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
Article 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment which Bulgaria ratiﬁed in
1993 and 1986, respectively.  
Similarly divided into hierarchical structure are the various ‘cate-
gories’ of immigrants themselves, ranking from those recognized with 
legal rights and access to those undocumented and unrecognized by the 
Bulgarian state.These different immigrant categories can be roughly 
separated into four main groups:
▪ Immigrants with short-term or long-term (prolonged or perma-
nent) stay permits;
▪ Refugees,8 foreigners with humanitarian status, temporary pro-
tection or asylum protection;
▪ Asylum seekers;9
▪ Undocumented Immigrants.
8 The term ‘refugee’ has a very speciﬁc meaning in international law, and the Bulgarian state is obliged to
this deﬁnition: a refugee is any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” Article 1(A)(2) CON-
VENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1951) Geneva, United Nations Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly 
resolution 429 (V) of 14 December 1950.
9 Asylum Seekers are those people who have entered the territory of Bulgaria with the intention to request 
formal protection from persecution under the deﬁnition of ‘refugee’ above.
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The corresponding institutions dealing with the administrative or-
ganization of migration management are:
▪ Ministry of External Affairs and its consular units, where entry 
visas are issued; 
▪ Ministry of Interior, responsible for border control and the inter-
nal regulation regarding the processing of migrants. This regu-
lation affects stay permits, the issuance of formal identiﬁcation
documents, and the exercise of compulsory administrative mea-
sures;  
▪ Ministry of labour and social policy, where work permits for 
foreigners are issued; 
▪ State Agency for Refugees towards the Council of Ministers, 
which regulates the different forms of protection offered asylum 
seekers and takes decisions regarding the granting of particular 
status; 
▪ Ministry of Justice and the President’s ofﬁce, where approval 
for Bulgarian citizenship and for asylum by order of the Presi-
dent, are issued. These organs are also responsible for granting 
permissions for non-proﬁt activity.
These bodies function under speciﬁc regulation towards manage-
ment of immigration in Bulgaria. An essential part of immigrant integra-
tion in Bulgaria is conditioned by the regulation of entry and stay regime 
for foreigners, arranged in the Law for the Foreigners in the Republic of 
Bulgaria (henceforth the ‘Law on Foreigners’), Law for Entering Resid-
ing and Leaving the Republic of Bulgaria of European Union Citizens 
and Members of their Families (henceforth the ‘EU Citizens Law), and 
the Law on Refugees and Asylum (henceforth the ‘Law on Refugees’).
There are two main entry and stay regimes on the territory of Bul-
garia, short term stay and long-term stay. 
Short term stay is not of much concern for the purposes of labour 
discussion, as it permits up to 90 days stay in the country for a period 
of six months and does not grant the possibility of engagement with 
the labour market. Non-EU citizens with short term stay must enter 
on the territory of Bulgaria with visa “C,” issued at a diplomatic or 
consular mission of Bulgaria abroad.  Such a visa is not needed for 
citizens of the EU or other countries parties to speciﬁc international
or interstate agreements. 
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The long-term residence regime applies in regard to foreigners who 
want to reside continuously (with a permitted period of stay up to a year) 
or permanently (with a permitted indeﬁnite period of stay) in the Republic
of Bulgaria. The legal procedure for receiving long-term residence has 
been greatly facilitated for citizens of the EU with the entry into force of 
the EU Citizens Law. The main relief in this case comes from dropping 
the necessity for EU citizens pursuing employment to enter in the country 
with the otherwise required visa type “D”. Visa “D” is required for for-
eigners of non-EU citizenship, including non-EU citizen family members 
of Bulgarian citizens. The grounds for issuing such a visa and obtaining 
long-term residence are explicitly referenced in Articles 24 and 25 of the 
Law on the Foreigners in the Republic of Bulgaria10 and can be applied for 
different individual intents, such as: a labour contract, commercial activ-
ity, investment, non-proﬁt activity, marriage, and education.
The regimes of entry described above are not applied - or at least 
should not be applied - to the category of asylum seekers, who ought 
to enjoy a privileged right of access to the territory and the right not to 
be returned on a place where his life or freedom are threatened. These 
rights are inviolable11 and detailed in the Law on Refugees. 
2.  LEGAL RIGHTS TO WORK FOR IMMIGRANTS IN 
BULGARIA
For the purpose of exploring immigrant integration into the Bulgari-
an labour market we will look more closely at the rights that immigrants, 
refugees, and asylum seekers currently enjoy in the country and how 
these rights are applied in reality. As mentioned above, a considerable 
step forward is the facilitated procedure for receiving continuous and 
permanent long-term residence in Bulgaria for EU citizens through re-
lease from the visa “D” requirement and additional complications. 
The reality in Bulgaria, however, is that the largest ﬂow of immi-
grants is not comprised of EU citizens, but rather citizens of non-EU 
countries. As a result, access to the market of larger groups of migrants 
is still regulated by complicated, cumbersome, and unwieldy visa regu-
lations arranged in the Law on Foreigners. In order for a non-EU, non-
10 See appendix 1
11 While the rights described are protected in Bulgarian and International Law, there is evidence that they are 
not currently respected in Bulgaria.  See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2007) BULGARIA. Europe and 
Central Asia: Summary of Amnesty International’s Concerns in the Region: January – June 2007. Amnesty In-
ternational, ILAREVA, V. (2007a) Bulgaria’s treatment of asylum seekers. Forced Migration Review, 29, 60-61.
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asylum seeking foreigner to work on a labour contract in Bulgaria, s/he 
must ﬁrst receive a labour permit from the Ministry of labour and social
policy. The application for this labour permit is made by the local em-
ployer, whose foreign employees should not comprise more than 10% 
of the total number of employees, and who should be paid a minimum 
salary signiﬁcantly disproportionate to the minimum salary received by
Bulgarian employees. In addition, the process is burdened by the triple-
level procedure, which requires it’s consideration once before the Minis-
try of labour and social policy in order to receive the work permit; once 
before a diplomatic and consular mission of Bulgaria abroad in order to 
apply for receiving a visa “D,” and lastly before the Ministry of Interior 
for receiving a stay permit.12
The rights of refugees and asylum seekers are detailed in the Law 
on Refugees. According to chapter IV, art. 32 of the Law on Refugees, 
foreigners granted legal status (refugee or humanitarian)13 have equal 
rights to Bulgarian citizens, excluding rights which speciﬁcally require 
Bulgarian citizenship. As a result access to the labour market is, legally 
if not practically, equal to Bulgarian citizens.  
In order to facilitate refugee access to employment - and thereby en-
courage integration - the government established a national plan-for-ac-
tion program for the integration of refugees in 2002 to be funded by the 
state and implemented by the State Agency for Refugees in cooperation 
with governmental and non-governmental organizations.14 This program 
includes both language and professional education, as well facilitation of 
12 An immediate example presents itself from the experience of the Legal Clinic for Refugees and Immi-
grants. In this case, the pursuit of all the mentioned requirements for hiring a US citizen as Project Manager 
have been considerably difﬁcult and, six months from initiation, the LCRI remains at the initial stage of
obtaining a work permit from the Ministry of labor and social policy. This stage alone has required interna-
tional cooperation on the part of numerous governmental, personal, and institutional entities on four conti-
nents. Upon the fulﬁllment of initial requirements, the application was deemed to require additional support
demanding the extra submission of additional documentation of similar difﬁcultly to acquire. This process
is ﬁnancially, practically, and often temporally impossible for many applicants, practically locking out those
organizations and individuals without the resources or connections necessary for successful application 
submission. Such obstacles open the door for corruption in the procedure.
13 Pursuant to the Law on Refugees art. 8, par. 1, a status for refugee in the Republic of Bulgaria shall 
be granted to a foreigner, who owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in particular social group or because of political opinion, is outside the country of 
his origin, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country.
Pursuant to art. 9 of the Law on Refugees, humanitarian status shall be granted to foreigners, who have 
been compelled to leave their country of origin, because in this country there are real anger of severe aggres-
sion like: death penalty of execution; torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; severe and 
personal menaces against the life and personality as a civil person by reason of violence in case of internal 
armed conﬂict. Humanitarian status shall be granted on a temporary basis by the time of drop out of the
reasons for its granting.
14 See the National program for integration of refugees in 2005-2007, available at http://aref.government.
bg/?cat=25
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the contact with respective employers. However, the places available are 
restricted and state funding is not sufﬁcient in spite of the expectation
that the National Program for 2008-2010 foresees an increased budget. 
The non-governmental sector taking a signiﬁcant role in this sphere is of
crucial importance. 
Regrettably, the law grants less access and fewer rights to asylum 
seekers despite the fact that many spend months if not years awaiting 
the results of their asylum applications. According to art. 29(3) of the 
Law on Refugees, asylum seekers with ongoing procedure before the 
State Agency for Refugees “shall have the right to access to the labour 
market, provided that the proceedings are not ﬁnalized within up to one
year after the submission of the application for a status due to reasons out 
of his/her control”. In practice this means that people seeking asylum do 
not have access to the labour market or to programs for integration when 
potentially most needed.
Additional difﬁculty here comes from complications and inconsis-
tencies in the application of the law. For example, in order for the initial 
protection prescribed in law for asylum seekers to function, one needs to 
be recognized as an asylum seeker. As a result of recent changes in the 
Law on Refugees, this happens with the registration of an asylum appli-
cation, not with its submission.  In Bulgaria the time between submission 
and registration has no restriction, resulting in tremendous hardship for 
asylum seekers as many are obliged to remain indeﬁnitely without legal
recourse to basic rights while awaiting ‘registration’. During this limbo 
period asylum seekers are without any legal status in the country and are 
correspondingly without access to the labour market, livelihood support, 
medical care, and in danger of being deported in violation of their inter-
nationally protected rights against refoulement.15
3.  IMMIGRANTS NOT PERMITTED ACCESS TO LABOUR 
MARKET
Legal access to the labour market, as well as to any kind of proper 
activity in Bulgarian society, is granted only to foreigners with legalized 
stay in the territory. However, the number of undocumented and semi-
15 The principle of nonrefoulement is the cornerstone of International Refugee and Asylum Law.  It pro-
hibits the return of refugees and asylum-seekers to countries in which they may face persecution or any form 
of torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  The principle is articulated in article 33 of the 1951 Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees and is reinforced in a great number of instruments of international 
scope.  It is widely considered a principle of Customary International Law.
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documented immigrants in Bulgaria is signiﬁcant, and greatly outnum-
bers those with legal stay.16 While undocumented immigrants comprise 
a dynamic group, many demonstrate continuous presence within the ter-
ritory of the country. It is therefore necessary to establish methods to fa-
cilitate the enjoyment of basic rights and livelihood strategies - including 
employment.  Bulgaria is not a signatory to the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, and has made little progress to recognize obligations 
towards the realization of basic rights elaborated in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights which apply to all people, regardless of legal 
status, and which, in article 23, articulates a universal right to work and 
to protection from unemployment.
Issues, Challenges, and Recommendations
The following section details practical challenges to the above con-
structions through the experience of the Legal Clinic for Refugees and 
Immigrants (LCRI), an independent non-proﬁt organization that pro-
vides training in refugee, migration, and human rights law to Bulgar-
ian students and utilizes their skills though the provision of legal aid 
to immigrant clients.17 The LCRI is unique in Bulgaria, existing as the 
only organization training university students by providing them practi-
cal experience,18 and assists immigrants with a wide variety of concerns 
and challenges.
NON-EU IMMIGRATION
As concerns non-EU immigrants and the process surrounding visa ‘D’ 
status entry, Bulgaria could beneﬁt greatly from a streamlining of the pro-
cedure and by the facilitation of processes such as to ease access. Demands 
16 The term ‘undocumented,’ rather than ‘illegal,’ is appropriate, as it is impossible, in legal terms, for a 
person to be ‘illegal’, but rather in the concrete cases they may not dispose of some of the necessary docu-
ments according to the requirements of the local migration legislation ILAREVA, V. (2007) Immigration 
Detention in International Law and Practice: In Search of Solutions to the Challenges Faced in Bulgaria. 
Statewatch.
17 For more information on refugee and immigrant legal clinics see: ACER, E. (2004) Making a Differ-
ence: A Legacy of Pro Bono Representation. Journal of Refugee Studies, 17, 347-366, HARRELL-BOND, 
B. (forthcoming 2008) Starting a Movement of Refugee Legal Aid Organizations in the South. International 
Journal of Refugee Law, 19, 729-735.
18 While the LCRI works with over 100 clients at any given time, the need for legal aid is an overwhelming 
one, as noted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR BO SOFIA (2002) Bulgaria 
Country Operations Plan 2003. Soﬁa, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees., the lack of re-
sources available to provide and expand legal assistance is a “core problem” in Bulgaria UNHCR BO SOFIA 
(2002) Bulgaria Country Operations Plan 2003. Soﬁa, The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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placed upon applicants are often insurmountable, shutting out qualiﬁed and
willing foreign contributors to the Bulgarian economy and labour market. 
Bias towards larger employers build into visa ‘D’ requirements de facto 
excludes the possibility of small organizations (organizations with fewer 
than ten employees) from legally hiring foreign labour. Similarly, the costs 
afﬁliated with the process present an impossible obstacle for many start up
and small employers. Recognition of the unique economic value intrinsic 
in business and organizational diversity should provide impetus to facilitate 
the growth of these sectors through the facilitation of foreign access.
DETENTION
The tendency towards increasing numbers of asylum seekers and 
immigrants being deprived of their liberty through the concept of ad-
ministrative detention is the single most disturbing trend in Bulgaria and 
threatens fundamental concepts of human freedom, including access to 
the labour market and quality contributions to the Bulgarian social and 
economic environment. This procedure creates and maintains physical 
barriers to social and economic integration and reinforces notions of 
‘otherness’ and false conceptions of criminality. It simultaneously raises 
alarming human rights concerns.
Detention is executed through imposed orders for deportation of for-
eigners due to unsettled legal status or threat to the national security, but 
is wrought with procedural inaccuracies and often applied in violation 
of international law (Ilareva 2007). It is alarming that asylum-seekers 
are treated on an equal basis with undocumented immigrants and are 
detained on orders for deportation, in spite of the fact that the Bulgarian 
Penal Code and International Law provides asylum seekers special pro-
tections in terms of ‘illegal’ entry. Due to the delay in registration of re-
quests for asylum, applicants often spend months before their procedure 
in front of the State Agency for Refugees begins, and are often detained 
for the months following registration.  Additional complications in regard 
to administrative detention relate to an existing vacuum in the Law on 
Foreigners as to temporal limitation. As a result hundreds of immigrants 
are detained for months if not years due to a lack of cooperation from 
consular bodies, statelessness, or through simple bureaucratic mishap 
and administrative malpractice (Ilareva 2007a). Those detained remain 
at the provision of the state rather than contributing to the economic de-
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velopment of Bulgaria through participation in the labour market. While 
statistics are hard to ﬁnd, it is clear that detention is expensive, and a
member of the Migration Directorate has cited a cost of 12.20 leva per 
detainee, per day (Petkov 2007). In another EU member state pursuing 
similar strategies, the cost of detaining one person for one month “far 
exceeds” the average monthly household income (Ilareva 2007: 22-23).19
While there do exist structures in Bulgarian for the supervised re-
lease of detainees though local guarantors, the opportunity to ﬁnd a guar-
antor while detained is minimal to non-existent due to physical restric-
tions on social contact, particularly for people without pre-established 
connections in Bulgaria as is the case with many asylum-seekers. In the 
case that a guarantor is found, the ﬁnancial burdens and strict demands
of the Migration Directorate can be oppressive and place the option out of 
reach of many would-be guarantors. Additionally, the daily requirements 
placed on ‘guarantor released detainees’ to submit themselves daily to 
the Migration Directorate place additional ﬁnancial burden on guarantors
and make impossible and substantive contribution to Bulgarian society 
through volunteerism, informal education, social involvement, or other 
constructive pursuits. Additionally, those released under this program re-
ceive no formal status recognition in Bulgaria, forfeit any access to medi-
cal care and are not permitted to access the labour market. The result 
is reliance on the informal economy, where medicines are unregulated, 
mislabelled, and extremely dangerous and where labour conditions are 
exploitative and unreliable.  Participation in this economy is an illegal ac-
tivity, criminalizing people who have no other access to live-saving medi-
cations or monies to sustain themselves and, at times, their families.
Bulgarian detention practices seriously compromise positive devel-
opments in the sphere of immigration and necessitate immediate and 
substantive review. This review should focus on human rights concerns, 
access to integration (even if temporary), and temporal limitations on 
administrative removal of freedoms (see: Ilareva 2007, 2007a). Changes 
should be implemented to bring Bulgaria in line with and surpass Euro-
pean best practice to demonstrate exemplary leadership in the treatment 
of immigrant populations.
19 Simultaneously, state interest in maintaining detention centres may ﬁgure around increasing employ-
ment rates of citizens.  As Ilareva points out, “[a] detention centre creates jobs and business opportunities 
for many people.”  The question then arises as to whether “the deprivation of liberty truly serves higher 
national interests or…are [there] too many particular interests involved”? ILAREVA, V. (2007) Immigra-
tion Detention in International Law and Practice: In Search of Solutions to the Challenges Faced in Bulgaria. 
Statewatch.
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REFUGEE INTEGRATION
While it is commendable that Bulgaria has recognized the inade-
quacy of current legislation to fulﬁl its stated commitment to refugees
holding status in terms of equality with Bulgarian citizens as concerns 
rights and services,20 practical steps towards this goal have been slow to 
materialize, and current commitments are weakly worded. In terms of 
efforts to assist in language acquisition - a critical point in integration 
and in capacity to access the labour market - the government is commit-
ted to ‘discuss’ the ‘possibility’ of providing compulsory language train-
ing for refugees newly granted status (State Agency for Refugees with 
the Council of Ministers 2005).   
The 2005-2007 Bulgarian program for the integration of refugees 
is a document which is almost entirely forward-looking, rather than 
grounded in solid policy. It elaborates on potential future courses of ac-
tion without strict commitment to them. Regarding labour access for ex-
ample it states that: 
 A comprehensive approach should be developed in order to 
successfully provide employment to refugees. This includes 
Bulgarian language education, individual assessment of the 
professional knowledge and abilities, directing (sic) to voca-
tional training and prequaliﬁcation courses and helping (sic) 
with ﬁnding work. The refugees should provided (sic) assis-
tance and help with developments (sic) of small business proj-
ects. (State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers 
2005)
No report on development since the initial drafting of this program is 
publicly available, and confusion among assistance organizations about 
the details of the actual services provided - and access to them - exists. 
The State has, however, has informally declared that it pays for ‘courses 
and accommodation’ for those in the program, a sum of 360 leva per 
20 According to the National Program for Integration of Refugees “some of the existing legal acts in 
the field of social care, health care, education, accommodation and etc. need to be specified, expanded 
or changed in order to guarantee the full equality of the rights and services for the refugees.” STATE 
AGENCY FOR REFUGEES WITH THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (2005) National Programme 
for Integration of Refugees in 2005-2007. http://aref.government.bg/?cat=25, State Agency for Refugees 
with the Council of Ministers.
21 This ﬁgure was presented in an informal meeting between members of the International Project on Im-
migration Trends and Immigrant Integration Policies for the Bulgarian Labor Market with State Agency for 
Refugees ofﬁcials at their ofﬁces in December 2007.
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participant.21 Practical obstacles to application and acceptance to the 
program, or qualiﬁcations surrounding decisions to admit, are unclear.22 
Facilitation of access needs to be made available to all refugees and in-
formation regarding the program ought to be widely disseminated in 
multiple languages.  Additionally, State commitment to “involvement on 
the part of the refugees in the development of the policy for integration” 
(State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers 2005) is criti-
cal to the success of such policy and must be respected. It is advisable 
that the integration program also be expanded to include asylum-seekers. 
The beneﬁts of successful social integration cannot be overstated, and
the earlier this process is begun, the more fruitful the result.
SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS
Support for independent assistance organizations is a critical step to-
wards successful policy, especially in terms of working with less visible 
or potentially vulnerable populations hesitant to approach government 
agencies.23 The provision of independent legal and other assistance to 
these populations needs to be facilitated and widely supported if integra-
tion is to be successful and law respected (see: Acer 2004, Harrell-Bond 
forthcoming 2008). Support for such organizations strengthens democrat-
ic institutions and values social contributions to community betterment.
UTILIZATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND 
IMMIGRANT VOICES
The private sector is a critical player in the discussion, and should be 
encouraged to facilitate immigrant access as much as possible within the 
conﬁnes of the law. Successful integration depends to a large extent on
private sector initiative, and encouragement through ﬁnancial relief and
government initiative would have a signiﬁcant positive impact. Similar-
ly, utilization of immigrants’ particular experience and perspective may 
serve to provide unique and highly successful contributions to policy 
and economic development initiatives which concern them. Bulgaria has 
rhetorically espoused its appreciation for and commitment to the value of 
22 It has been suggested by a refugee assistance organization in Soﬁa, for example, that knowledge of
Bulgarian is a requirement for acceptance to the integration program, thereby shutting out those who most 
desperately need the assistance and signiﬁcantly narrowing the number of actual applicants.  Such a require-
ment serves to defeat the purpose of the program.
23 Undocumented immigrants, trafﬁcked people, survivors of tortures, and others may, for any number
of valid reasons, be hesitant to approach authority ﬁgures and government ofﬁcials for crucial advice, as-
sistance, and information.
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ethic diversity (State Agency for Refugees with the Council of Ministers 
2005) and should work to utilize and celebrate that diversity to its advan-
tage socially, economically, and geopolitically.   Similarly, appreciation 
and respect for Bulgarian community input is essential to success.
Conclusion
Bulgaria has a long history of migration and has faced dramatic 
changes in approach to immigrants and emigrants over the course of 
the last half century. Developments away from the ‘forced assimila-
tion’ policies of the mid-1980’s and into democratic and European 
Union institutions should be commended, however there is great room 
for improvement in terms of access, respect, and treatment of foreign-
ers within the Bulgarian territory.  Current access regimes are heav-
ily tiered and hierarchically fashioned and corresponding regulations 
obstruct access to all but the most privileged of immigrants and orga-
nizations, frustrating the capability for social and economic integra-
tion of great numbers of foreign contributors to economic and social 
growth.  These structures demand review as the potential beneﬁts of
wider access are signiﬁcant.
Detention of immigrants needs to be reconsidered or substan-
tively regulated. Detention costs present an economic drain and the 
social and economic potential of detainees (if regularized) is consid-
erable, if temporary. Additionally, immigrant integration procedures 
are not currently adequate and should be expanded beyond current 
capacity and restriction to refugees, thereby involving wider portions 
of the immigrant community, including those members in process of 
status regularization.
Finally, support for and utilization of the private sector, indepen-
dent assistance organizations, and Bulgarian and immigrant commu-
nity input are absolutely fundamental to the success of immigration 
policy in Bulgaria. The contribution make by these elements can not 
be over emphasized.
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Appendix 1.  
Articles 24 and 25 of the Law for the Foreigners in the Republic 
of Bulgaria, regulating non-EU citizen access to extended stay and 
the labour market.
Art. 24. 
(1) (amend. – SG 29/07) A permission for long stay shall be able to 
receive foreigner who have a visa under Art. 15, para 1 and:
1. (Amend., SG 42/01; amend., SG 112/01) wish to work under le-
gal terms of employment upon permit by the bodies of the Min-
istry of Labour and Social Policy;
2. (Amend., SG 42/01; suppl., SG 37/03) carry out commercial ac-
tivity in the country according to the legally established order, 
and as a result of this activity at least 10 positions have been 
opened for Bulgarian citizens, unless agreed otherwise by an 
international agreement, ratiﬁed, promulgated and enacted in
the Republic of Bulgaria;
3. are admitted to regular education in licensed educational estab-
lishments;
4. are foreign specialists staying in the country by force of interna-
tional agreements to which the Republic of Bulgaria is a party;
5. (amend. – SG 29/07) have grounds to have permitted permanent 
stay or have married with a foreigner with permanent stay in the 
country;
6. (Amend., SG 42/01) are representatives of foreign commercial 
companies registered at the Bulgarian commercial - industrial 
chamber;
7. (suppl., SG 37/03) are ﬁnancially ensured parents of foreigners
with permanent stay in the country or of a Bulgarian citizen;
8. (amend., SG 70/04) have started long treatment in a medical 
establishment and dispose with ﬁnancial resources for healing
and maintenance;
9. are correspondents of foreign mass media and have accredita-
tion in the Republic of Bulgaria;
10. are pension ensured and dispose with sufﬁcient resources for
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maintenance in the country;
11. (amend., SG 37/04) implement activity under the Law for en-
couragement of investments;
12. implement activity by order and request of persons who have 
made investments in the country by the order of the Law for the 
foreign investments;
13. (Amend., SG 42/01) are members of the family of a foreigner 
who has received a permission for long stay;
14. (New, SG 42/01; amend., SG 37/03, amend., SG 63/05 – in force 
from 01.01.06; amend. – SG 29/07) are parents of a foreigner or 
live in concubinage with a foreigner who has obtained a permit 
for continuous stay on the grounds of Art. 22, para 3;
15. (New, SG 42/01; amend., SG 112/01) wish to carry out free-
lance practice upon permit by the bodies of the Ministry of La-
bour and Social Policy in compliance with art. 24a;
16. (New, SG 112/01) wish to carry out non-proﬁt activity upon per-
mit of the Ministry of Justice under conditions and by an order 
determined by an ordinance of the Minister of Justice, in coor-
dination with the Minister of Interior;
17. (new – SG 29/07) have acquired statute of special protection as 
per Art. 25 of the Law of Fighting the Illegal Trafﬁc of People;
18. (new – SG 29/07) are members of the family of a Bulgarian 
citizen under Art. 2, para 2.
(2) The persons of para 1 shall have ensured home, maintenance, 
obligatory insurances and insuring according to the legislation of the 
Republic of Bulgaria. The normatives for this shall be determined with 
an act of the Council of Ministers.
(3)(new – SG 63/05, in force from 01.01.06) the requirement under 
Para 1, item 2 for opening of at least 10 working positions shall not refer to 
citizens of the Member States of the European Union, as well as to citizens 
of the other Member States of the Common European Economic Space.
Art. 24a. (New, SG 42/01; amend., SG 112/01) 
(1) (suppl., SG 37/03) A foreigner who wishes to stay continuously 
on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria with the purpose of carrying 
out free-lance activity can obtain a visa for continuous stay or a permit 
for continuous stay if he meets the legally established requirements for 
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entry and stay in the country, presenting to the diplomatic and consular 
representations, respectively to the ofﬁces for administrative control of
the foreigners, the following documents:
1. application in a form;
2. permit for carrying out free-lance activity.
(2) The permits for carrying out free-lance activity shall be issued 
by the bodies of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.
(3) The conditions and the order of issuance, refusal and revok-
ing permit for carrying out free-lance activity by foreigners shall be 
determined by an ordinance to be issued by the Minister of Labour 
and Social Policy in coordination with the Minister of Interior and the 
Minister of Finance.
(4) Not issued shall be visa for continuous stay for the purpose of 
carrying out freelance practice to a foreigner in the cases under art. 24, 
para 1, item 1 - 13 and 16.
(5) Foreigners who meet the legally established requirements for 
carrying out the respective free-lance activity shall be released from the 
requirement for issuance of permit if this is stipulated by an international 
agreement party to which is the Republic of Bulgaria.
Art. 25. A permission for permanent stay shall be possible to receive 
the foreigners:
1. of Bulgarian ethnic origin;
2. (amend. – SG 29/07) ﬁve years after the marriage with a foreigner
staying permanently in the country;
3. (amend. – SG 29/07) small or below age children of a foreigner 
with permanent stay in the country and who have not been married;
4. (Amend., SG 42/01) parents of Bulgarian citizens when they pro-
vide the due legally established support, and in the cases of acknowl-
edgement or adoption - upon expiration of 3 years from the acknowl-
edgement or adoption;
5. (amend. – SG 29/07) stayed on legal grounds without interruption on 
the territory of the country during the last 5 years, provided that in the cases 
under Art. 24, para 1, item 3 only half of the term of stay shall be recognised;
6. (amend., SG 11/05) invested in the country over 500 000 US$ by 
the lawful order;
7. (New, SG 42/01) who are not persons of Bulgarian origin, born on 
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the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, lost their Bulgarian citizenship 
according to emigration agreements or by their own wish and they wish 
to settle permanently on the territory of the country.
8. (new, SG 37/03) who, by December 27, have entered, stay, or were 
born on the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, and whose parent has 
married a Bulgarian citizen;  
9. (new – SG 29/07) members of the family of the Bulgarian citizen, 
if they have stayed continuously in the territory of the Republic of Bul-
garia during the previous ﬁve years.
Art. 25a. (New, SG 42/01) Permit for stay in the Republic of Bul-
garia, without the presence of the requirements of this law can be 
obtained by foreigners who have contributions to the Republic of Bul-
garia in the public and economic sphere, in the sphere of the national 
security, science, technology, culture or sport.
98
References
ACER, E. (2004) Making a Difference: A Legacy of Pro Bono Representa-
tion. Journal of Refugee Studies, 17, 347-366.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2007) BULGARIA. Europe and Cen-
tral Asia: Summary of Amnesty International’s Concerns in the Region: January 
– June 2007. Amnesty International.
BAGATELAS, W. T. & KUBICOVÁ, J. (2003) Bulgarian emigration - a 
closer look. South-East Europe Review, 4, 27-36.
BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION (2006) Access limited for 
new EU nations. BBC NEWS. London.
CHOMPALOV, I. (2000) Brain Drain from Bulgaria Before and After the 
Transition to Democracy. Bulgarian Research Symposium and Network Meeting 
April 7, 2000. Atlanta.
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA (1991), 39th Na-
tional Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria.
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL INHU-
MAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (1984) Geneva, 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984.
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES (1951) 
Geneva, United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees 
and Stateless Persons convened under General Assembly resolution 429 (V) of 14 
December 1950.
DACYL, J. W. (1990) A Time for Perestroika (Restructuring) in the Interna-
tional Refugee Regime. Journal of Refugee Studies, 3, 26-46.
DMITRICHEV, T. F. (1991) Bulgaria: The Impact of Reform (May 1991). 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 3, 288-300.
DMITRICHEV, T. F. (1991a) Bulgaria: Political Parties and Groups (April 
1991). International Journal of Refugee Law, 3, 273-287.
EUROPEAN INTERCULTURAL WORKPLACE (2006) European In-
tercultural Workplace: Bulgaria. IN EUROPEAN INTERCULTURAL WORK-
PLACE (Ed.) Soﬁa, European Centre for Education and Training.
EUROPEAN UNION (2004) Table 1 - Population projections for the EU25 + 
Bulgaria and Romania: Total population. EUROSTAT.
EUROSTAT (2004) Table 1 - Population projections for the EU25 + Bulgaria 
and Romania: Total population. European Union.
FASSMAN, H. & MUNZ, R. (1994) European East-West Migration, 1945-
1992. International Migration Review, 28, 520-538.
FOREIGNERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA ACT (2006) Soﬁa,
State Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria.
HARRELL-BOND, B. (forthcoming 2008) Starting a Movement of Refugee 
99
Legal Aid Organizations in the South. International Journal of Refugee Law, 19, 
729-735.
HELTON, A. (1992) Ten Case Abstracts. International Journal of Refugee 
Law, 4, 381-392.
HERSHMAN, G. (2007) The Other Expats: Bulgaria’s forgotten foreigners 
languish in limbo and the state seems indifferent. Vagabond.
HOME OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KING-
DOM (2006) Controlled Access To UK Labour Market For New Accession Coun-
tries.
HUGHES, J. & LIEBAUT, F. (1998) Detention of Asylum Seekers in Eu-
rope: Analysis and Perspectives, Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
ILAREVA, V. (2007) Immigration Detention in International Law and Prac-
tice: In Search of Solutions to the Challenges Faced in Bulgaria. Statewatch.
ILAREVA, V. (2007a) Bulgaria’s treatment of asylum seekers. Forced Mi-
gration Review, 29, 60-61.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION OF THE 
RIGHTS OF ALL MIGRANT WORKERS AND MEMBERS OF THEIR 
FAMILIES (2003) Geneva, Adopted by United Nations General Assembly reso-
lution 45/158 of 18 December 1990.
KRASTEVA, A. (2006) Post-communist discovery of immigration: the case 
of Bulgaria. South-East Europe Review, 2, 25-34.
LAW FOR ENTERING RESIDING AND LEAVING THE REPUBLIC 
OF BULGARIA OF EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENS AND MEMBERS OF 
THEIR FAMILIES (2006) Soﬁa, State Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria.
LAW FOR THE BULGARIAN IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS 
(2007), State Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria.
LAW FOR THE FOREIGNERS IN THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA 
(2007) Soﬁa, State Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria.
LAW OF ENCOURAGEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT (2007), State Ga-
zette of the Republic of Bulgaria.
LAW OF FIGHTING THE ILLEGAL TRAFFIC OF PEOPLE (2005), 
State Gazette of the Republic of Bulgaria.
LAW OF PROTECTION FROM DISCRIMINATION (2004), State Ga-
zette of the Republic of Bulgaria.
LAW ON ASYLUM AND REFUGEES (2002) Soﬁa, State Gazette of the
Republic of Bulgaria.
LAW ON BULGARIAN CITIZENSHIP (1989), State Gazette of the Re-
public of Bulgaria.
LOIZOS, P. (1999) Ottoman Half-Lives: Long-term Perspectives on Particu-
lar Forced Migrations. Journal of Refugee Studies, 12, 237-263.
100
MARKOVA, E. & REILLY, B. (2006) Bulgarian Migrant Remittances and 
Legal Status: Some Micro-level Evidence from Madrid. Sussex Migration Working 
Paper No. 37. Sussex, Sussex Center for Migration Research, University of Sussex.
MINTCHEV, V. (1999) External Migration and External Migration Policies 
in Bulgaria. South-East Europe Review, 2, 123-150.
PETKOV, S. (2007) DEBATE: Is there a legal deﬁcit in the detention centers
for foreigners? Obektiv.
SKRAN, C. M. (1998) Proﬁles of The First Two High Commissioners. Jour-
nal of Refugee Studies, 1, 277-296.
STATE AGENCY FOR REFUGEES WITH THE COUNCIL OF MIN-
ISTERS (2005) National Programme for Integration of Refugees in 2005-2007. 
http://aref.government.bg/?cat=25, State Agency for Refugees with the Council of 
Ministers.
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1948) Ge-
neva, Adopted and proclaimed by United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 
A (III) of 10 December 1948.
TREATY CONCERNING THE ACCESSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
BULGARIA AND ROMANIA TO THE EUROPEAN UNION (25 April 2005) 
Luxembourg.
UNHCR BO SOFIA (2002) Bulgaria Country Operations Plan 2003. Soﬁa,
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
VASSILEV, R. V. (2001) Post-Communist Bulgaria’s Ethnopolitics. The 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1, 37-53.
WOLTON, S. (2000) Conference and Symposium Reports: ‘Barbed Wire 
Europe: Conference against Immigration Detention’ held in Ruskin College, Ox-
ford, 15-17 September 2000. Journal of Refugee Studies, 13, 415-423.
101
Immigration, Gender, Labour
Anna Krasteva
Director, Centre for European Refugees, 
Migration and Ethnic Studies, New Bulgarian University
Feminization of migration
Gender and labour is an inescapable aspect of any encompassing 
study of migration (Apitzsch 2007). The topic is central for a large number 
of studies (Hersent and Ziadman, 2003). It is due to three main reasons:
▪ The feminization of migration. If in the eve of the modern mi-
gration phenomenon women have been a tiny minority of the 
ﬂows, this tendency has been reversed in the 70s onwards and
now women account for half of the migrant population in Eu-
rope;
▪ The types of women migration patterns are also evolving: from 
family reuniﬁcation to labour migration. If in the classical mod-
el women accompanied their parents or husbands, today more 
and more often they undertake the migration alone in the search 
of better professional or labour opportunities;
▪ The theoretical sensitivity to the female migration is also in-
creasing. Women studies have contributing a lot to developing 
the gender perspective. 
The theoretical ﬁeld of gender and migration is strengthening by
the signiﬁcant support of the European commission. I’ll quote just two
examples:
▪ Integration of female (im)migrants in labour market and society. 
Policy assessment and policy recommendations. Project funded 
by the 6th Framework program of the EU covering 11 European 
countries.
▪ Network in ethnicity and women scientists with participation of 
8 countries (including Bulgaria). The project I also funded by 
the 6th Framework program.
The ﬁrst one is illustrative of the comprehensive ambition of sev-
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eral projects: to present the state of the art combining the women point 
of view (biographical narrative interviews with female migrants) with 
the policy perspective (interviews with administrative ofﬁcers, statistical
and comparative analysis, policy recommendations).
The second is quite unique. If most projects focus on discrimination 
and inequality in the access to the labour market, NEW project studies 
women in the top, female representatives in the intellectual elite.
The present article aims at analyzing the ﬁrst study in Bulgaria of
gender and migration. It is conducted by CERMES and directed by the 
author1. It includes both quantitative and qualitative methods, a survey 
and biographical interviews. The article presents some preliminary re-
sults, the project being in progress.
Four portraits
The Japanese
She looks like a young girl – with a slightly tilted sports cap and 
artistic clothes. Bulgaria is just another stop in her global routes. Para-
doxically, she found a job on the Internet – she saw an advertisement and 
responded.
She taught Japanese to the children in a taekwondo club. She also 
helped run a bed and breakfast which another migrant, a young Bulgar-
ian, had opened with his savings when he came back from abroad.
She had lived in Australia, toured Ireland, found it curious everywhere 
she went, but she didn’t stay long anywhere, she doesn’t want to settle. She 
is not sure where she want to go, rather she is sure she doesn’t want to live 
in Japan – too regulated, too strong social control, too strictly deﬁned roles,
the girls of her milieu have to get a good education, then marry well…
She impressed me with her taste for second-hand shops. Laughing, 
she recounted of the Bulgarians’ amazement that a Japanese woman would 
wear second-hand clothes. But she is attracted by the discovery, the unique-
ness of these clothes, every item being one of a kind. You dig, you search 
and there is a chance to ﬁnd yourself, to be different from the others.
Indeed she was the opposite of our stereotypes of the Japanese peo-
ple – she laughed loudly, made many funny faces, did not hurry, gener-
ously gave of her time. We try to catch the typical, while she enjoys the 
unique, the different.
1 The project “Invisible communities: being a woman abroad” is funded by the Trust for civil society.
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The Lebanese
No one knows the Arab community better than her. No one is better 
known to the Arab community than her. She is present at all events – from 
the celebrations of the national holidays of the different communities to 
the celebrations in the many Arab schools (Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian, 
Iraqi), at the exhibitions of oriental artists, at receptions and discussion 
forums, at sad events commemorating the death of famous Arab political 
leaders and at festive events. She not only attends events but she initiates 
some: she gathers women – Bulgarian and Arab – on March 8, 2008, in-
terviews them a propos in the pleasant atmosphere in order to give them a 
more subtle image of themselves, organizes competitions.
She is initiator and publisher of the most successful immigrant’s magazine 
in the country – considering the scope of its readership, its ﬁnancial autonomy,
and as a bridge above the political, religious and national differences. 
Her whole life is intercultural dialogue. She publishes the magazine 
in two languages she has perfect command of Arabic and Bulgarian. 
She has friends both among the Arabs and among the Bulgarians. She is 
invited as a dear guest by the Arab communities in Bulgaria and by the 
Bulgarian communities in the Arab countries.
The African
“Where are you from?” is the ﬁrst question she is invariably asked.
She always wonders what to answer, because she is from Bulgaria, she 
was born here, Bulgarian is her mother tongue. However, people don’t 
listen to the way she speaks but look at her appearance. Her Nigerian 
father and Bulgarian mother have endowed her with exotic beauty.
She feels constantly people’s eyes on her – because she is young, 
and because she is beautiful, and because she is different. So she made 
it a part of her job – airhostess, fashion model, singer. She has a gift 
for everything – languages, communication, movement. She succeeds so 
easily that she never does only one thing at a time. From the catwalk she 
goes to the university to take an exam, then sets out for the next ﬂight.
To appear as a representative of a visible minority when actually 
you are a member of the majority, is a dual fate. It may be stigmatic or it 
may be a chance for a brilliant career. She chose the latter, to transform 
the difference into success. If her occupations are artistic, her studies are 
quite serious – political sciences. 
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Bulgaria is her homeland, but because mixed blood runs in her veins, 
and because she discovers the world with curiosity, she feels comfortable 
in mobility, in movement.
The Afghan
She arrived in Soﬁa by chance. She had left her tumultuous country
in search of a better life. The trafﬁcker has been paid to bring her and
her kids to Germany. One day she woke up in the train, the trafﬁcker has
disappeared; she had no documents and no idea where she was…
Because Afghanistan is a major asylum seekers’ sending country, she 
got relatively easy a refugee status. Her husband joined the family, as well 
as her brother and sister with their siblings. The big family is here, all well 
established, all having their small or medium business. She still dreams 
sometimes of Germany, yet the kids are so happy in Bulgaria that they 
laugh at her: “You can leave; we stay here with our friends”. The neighbors 
love them and joke that they speak better Bulgarian than themselves. 
Four types of labour migration
The ﬁrst is of the global nomads, who travel round the world, often 
on unpredictable routes, and sometimes land in Bulgaria. The second 
portrait pertains to the integrated immigrant, who feels Bulgaria as her 
second motherland, she works dedicatedly both for her community and 
the relations of her compatriots with our country. The next portrait re-
ﬂects the paradoxical attitude of the Bulgarians towards otherness. Many
of us still cannot accept that Bulgarian citizenship by birth may be held 
by people who look different. The last portrait refers to another type of 
migration – the asylum seekers.
Despite the differences of all kinds – nationality, age, type of mi-
gration, education – the four women have a fundamental characteristic 
in common – all of them are active, they have interesting jobs and feel 
self-conﬁdent. This is the main peculiarity of the female migration in
Bulgaria which will be detailed and developed in the article.
Men vs. women
In immigrant communities, especially in countries with new migra-
tion such as Bulgaria, the ratio men/women is very different from the 
normal ratio in the population. In our country, three quite different cases 
are apparent. In the Russian community the women deﬁnitely predomi-
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nate, in the African community the women are an exception. The Arab 
community is somewhere in between, but there again the men outnum-
ber the women, who are barely one third of the group. 
The gender imbalance is striking also in the refugee community: only 
one woman per ﬁve men among the asylum seekers. There are thirty coun-
tries without applications for asylum from women. The number of women 
is almost equivalent to the one of children with the notable exception of the 
Afghan group where the kids are 2.5 more numerous than women.
The mixed marriages are also unevenly distributed. They are a rule 
in the Russian community, often referred to as the “Russian daughters-in-
law”. There are almost no Arab women married to Bulgarians. The same 
is to a great extent valid for the Chinese and the Afghan communities.
Why Bulgaria?
What makes women leave their homeland and choose Bulgaria – labour 
opportunities, studies or family? The ﬁrst reason happens to be romantic
– love. Nearly half of the women immigrants in our country come with 
their husbands. The other reasons are no different from the men’s – 20% 
come to seek a job or because they have already found one, 10% come to 
get higher education. Some ﬂee their countries and seek asylum in Bulgaria
(8,9%), others, on the contrary, decide to invest in housing – still a small 
share (5,2%) but with a tendency to grow is the category of immigrants, 
who have ﬁnancial resources and invest them in real estate, attracted by the
low compared to European standards prices and the good climate.
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How long in Bulgaria?
For several migrants Bulgaria is still a transit country. Another ten-
dency is emerging – a dynamic category of women professionals whose 
carrier is international and they move like one of the personages in the 
beginning of the article from Japan to Australia to Ireland to Bulgaria or 
like another informant - from France to Senegal to Estonia to Bulgaria. 
For both categories Bulgaria is a stop in their labour migration.
For those who have already settled Bulgaria looks quite hospitable 
and over 4/5 have no plans of leaving it. 
Labour
Like the Bulgarian women, female immigrants are active: they work 
in the private businesses – mostly of their community, but also in Bulgar-
ian ones. The latter is very uneven: there are almost no Chinese, Arabs, 
Afghans who work in Bulgarian companies2. The Russians, Ukrainians 
and other immigrants from former Soviet Union are very well integrated 
and almost evenly present in different professional ﬁelds. They are also
employed in the administration.
If several studies in the western countries analyze the difﬁcult access
of migrant women to labour, the Bulgarian case looks quite optimistic: 
very few declare themselves unemployed. Those ﬁgures, of course, should
be dealt with precaution. First, the survey includes few asylum seekers 
2 While the opposite is very often the case: Bulgarians working in immigrants’ companies.
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and refugees and the rate of unemployment is the highest in their group. 
Second, we observe a high percentage of no reply to this question. Some of 
the reasons for the reticence are cultural: the social role of women is con-
ceived in a different way in the various groups. Some immigrants devote 
themselves to the kids and family – this peculiarity is most prominent in 
the Arab, Afghan, Iranian communities, whereas it is rather an exception 
in the Chinese and Russian groups. The understanding of the other reasons 
for the no-answers of this question should be investigated further.
A more detailed look at the occupations shows that immigrants are 
both white and blue collars, yet much more concentrated in the former: 
among the most qualiﬁed are medical doctors, pharmacists, the experts
in the communication and ﬁnancial sector. Women immigrant work pre-
dominantly in the commerce, services, restaurants, tourism. Relatively 
few occupy unqualiﬁed jobs.
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Commerce 32,00%
Restaurant, café, bar 8,40%
Teachers 6,30%
Services 5,20%
Administration 4,20%
Pensioner 3,70%
Unemployed 3,70%
Manufacturing 3,10%
Health sector 3,10%
Tailor 2,60%
Transport 1,60%
Social work 1,60%
Housekeeper 1,60%
Communications 1,00%
Economist 1%
Doctor 1%
Construction 1%
NGO 1%
Advertisement 0,50%
Worker 0,50%
Dentist 0,50%
Nurse 0,50%
Cleaner 0,50%
Bank 0,50%
Printing house 0,50%
Pharmacist 0,50%
Insurance 0,50%
Media 0,50%
Tourism 0,50%
Accounter 0,50%
There is one important indicator of integration: the satisfaction. Bul-
garia proves to be a favorable new homeland – more than half of the 
female immigrants (56%) feel better materially here than in their own 
countries. A positive ﬁnding that is unexpected for many Bulgarians.
Only one of every ten female migrants complains of her deteriorated 
material status and for just 3,1% the situation today is much worse.
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The comparative aspect of satisfaction has two axes: the pre-migra-
tion situation and the host society. Concerning the latter we see one of 
the most signiﬁcant results of the survey: female migrants (56%) feel
they are in line with the host society and live like the average Bulgar-
ian. Even more important, one third is better off than the majority of the 
local population. Only one per ten women complains she live under the 
Bulgarian standard.
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These results are complemented by the answer to the question of the 
advantages of the immigrant life n Bulgaria. Job opportunities are the 
main advantage according to more than one tenth of the respondents. 
Several appreciate the education, especially the tertiary one and the 
larger horizons for their kids in terms of professional development and 
carrier opportunities. The tolerance and cordiality of Bulgarians are ap-
preciated by most and according to one quarter of the respondents this is 
the main advantage of being a foreigner. A few are really impressed how 
nice people are and how they do their best to please them. The network 
theory applies also to the case of migrant women in our country – the 
main reason and facilitator of their lives here is the existence of a large 
and strong community of their co-nationals.
Advantages of the immigrant women’ life in Bulgaria
Friendly attitudes, nice people 19.4%
No advantages 16.8%
Beautiful nature, good climate 14.1%
Here we have a job and better standard 11%
Peace 5.8%
More independent, free and autonomous life 4.7&
My family is here 3.7%
Till 90ies calm and regulated life and relationships 2.6%
Member of EU 2.6%
Bulgarian is like a homeland 2.1%
Good universities 1%
Knowledge of different country, traditions and way of life 1%
Good cuisine 1%
I feel Bulgarian 1%
Everybody is doing his best tries to please me 1%
Opportunities for studies and carrier of my kids 0,5%
More dynamic country 0,5%
Better services 0,5%
There are already a lot of persons of my community 0.5%
The same religion 0.5%
One gave us a ﬂat 0.5%
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Life in immigration is often described in terms of deprivation, dis-
crimination, difﬁculties. Immigrant women in Bulgaria also face several
problems: the list of disadvantages is longer than the one of advantages. 
Several frustrations and discontents are shared by all leaving in nowa-
days Bulgaria: corruption, inefﬁcient administration, difﬁcult access to
kindergarten, bad infrastructure, costly and deteriorating health system, 
etc. Others are speciﬁc to foreigners: intolerance and discrimination,
difﬁcult access to Bulgarian citizenship, disqualiﬁcation, nostalgia. One
sees the illustration of quite general rule: for getting recognition the for-
eigner needs to invest much more efforts. It’s valid also for women. Being 
migrant lady means accumulating these two disadvantages. An interest-
ing result of the survey is that women immigrant in Bulgaria complain 
mainly as immigrants, much less as women. In the answers we do not 
feel special discrimination or deprivation only because of gender. A few 
feel as a restriction the moral obligation to marry to a man of their group. 
This restriction however refers much more to the traditional culture of 
some communities than to the Bulgarian society.
It’s worth noting than even when the question concerns disadvantag-
es, a few (8,4%) answer positively, that everything is ﬁne, life is nice.
Disadvantages of the immigrant women’ life in Bulgaria
Intolerance, lack of respect 9,4%
Difﬁculties in ﬁnding a job corresponding to the qualiﬁcation,
difﬁcult professional realisation
8,4%
Low income 8,4%
No disadvantages, life is nice 8,4%
Difﬁculties in acquiring Bulgarian citizenship 6.8%
Difﬁculties in understanding, communications and inclusion 6,3%
Difﬁcult initial social adaptation 5.8%
One remains always a foreigner 4.7%
Nostalgia, I miss my relatives and friends 4.2%
Difﬁculties and problems connected to the 17-years
transition
2.6%
Not clear, trash everywhere 2.%
Laws change and are not respected 2.1%
Bureaucracy 1.6%
Not easy to ﬁnd what you need 1.6%
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Corruption 1.6%
Too hard work 1.6%
Expensive education in the Bulgarian schools 1%
Discrimination when looking for a job 1%
No special housing for foreigners 1%
No rights to vote 0.5%
Difﬁculties in sending kids to the kindergarten 0.5%
Deprived of some rights 0.5%
One has to invest more efforts to prove oneself 0.5%
Bad law for foreigners 0.5%
Not merits, but connections 0.5%
Conservative views of Bulgarians 0.5%
Roads, infrastructure 0.5%
Inefﬁciency of social services 0.5%
Lack of mutual help 0.5%
Racism 0.5%
Deteriorating health system 0.5%
Criminality 0.5%
One has to marry a man from her nationality 0.5%
Discriminated or tolerated
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Whether owing to their material security or out of female delicacy, 
most of the interviewed spoke of the Bulgarians in ﬂattering terms – over
80% rate our attitude to otherness as friendly. Field work nuanced these 
data with facts of discrimination. The women are not spared hostile and 
unfair treatment. All the more so, that they take as theirs the experience 
of their children and strongly suffer from the acts of xenophobia and 
discrimination on the part of schoolmates and even teachers.
Female migrants in Bulgaria – active, self-conﬁdent, integrated
The portrait of the female migrant in Bulgaria is quite positive. This 
is the striking difference in comparison with most of the studies on gen-
der and migration in western European countries. 
The woman immigrant in our country is active, integrated, satis-
ﬁed person, who has retained her language, culture and relations with
the community of her compatriots, but who feels Bulgaria as her second 
motherland.
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The Meaning 
of the EU Common Basic Principles 
for the Integration 
of Middle East Immigrants in Bulgaria
Tihomira Trifonova, 
Research Fellow, Centre for European Refugees, 
Migration and Ethnic Studies, New Bulgarian University
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the situation of the in-
tegration of immigrants from the Arab Middle East states in Bul-
garia through the Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integra-
tion Policy in the EU, adopted by the Council of the European Union. 
It is based on data collected for a doctoral thesis. The analysis uses 
national strategic documents, policy drafts and ﬁeldwork-generated
background information. The paper is structured in ﬁve parts: a de-
scription of the studied immigrant communities; introduction of the 
common EU policy for the immigrants; summary of the Common Ba-
sic Principles for immigrant integration policy; the integration experi-
ence of the studied cohort (bottom-up approach); and the policy axes 
of the integration. 
Immigrant integration is emerging on the political agenda of the 
new member states more as a result of the development of a common 
policy than as a rationalised need of their societies. Like the Western 
democracies, they are affected by migratory movements, but the scale 
is not as signiﬁcant yet, and certainly not comparable.
In Europe there is a great diversity of approaches to the questions 
of “how” to promote integration. As a concept and a practice integra-
tion is not uniform not only as a result of the speciﬁc immigration
histories, but also of the role of governments and civil society. An 
important open question is which groups are or should be the targets 
of integration policy, which is in the focus of the present analysis.
The long-term goal of integration is most often to achieve self-suf-
ﬁciency of the immigrants: for the governments it is important that they
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lead an independent life in terms of jobs, housing, education and par-
ticipation in the life of society. The European Commission’s ﬁrst An-
nual Report on Immigration and Integration1 demonstrates that in all 
member states access to the labour market and language skills, and a 
sufﬁcient level of education constitute the weightiest objectives for se-
curing successful integration. Unavailability or low-quality housing and 
immigrant overrepresentation in deprived urban neighbourhoods are 
problematic for most, predominantly the earlier, member states. This 
dimension of integration draws the attention to local and urban policies 
and to the central role of local authorities in the process of integration. 
Although the common European policy is still heavily focused on 
social and economic issues, the emphasis on the importance of the so-
cio-cultural domain, the personal dimensions of integration and the fre-
quency and intensity of social interactions is increasing. This approach 
prioritizes the need for including immigrants into the civic, cultural and 
political ﬁelds in addition to the economy. Moreover, the interpretation
of integration as a reciprocal process suggests immersion on the attitudes 
of the recipient societies and their citizens, structures and organizations. 
All these aspects are intertwined and mutually amplifying their effects. 
The ultimate attainment of this approach is expected to be social cohe-
sion and equality in diverse societies. 
Fair and effective integration policies necessitate a proper balance 
of responsibilities. Integration is a shared responsibility and involves the 
participation of many actors: different levels of government, economic 
and social partners such as employees, unions, business associations, re-
ligious organizations, civil society structures, migrants’ associations, the 
media and NGOs. Roles are determined by their speciﬁc competences
and powers. Political leaders for example are an important player in pro-
moting a positive attitude towards immigrants and in countering xeno-
phobic and discriminatory moods. Employers may provide access to jobs, 
vocational training and language teaching, facilitate access to housing, 
create a favourable environment and inform the public debate about the 
economic beneﬁts of immigration. Organizations of all types are involved
in the process of acceptance of intercultural realities through their equal 
opportunity policies and corporate social responsibility actions.
The role of the media in informing the public’s attitudes towards 
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 16.07.2004, COM (2004) 508 Final 
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newcomers is paramount. Relatively small portions of the public have 
direct interaction with them and their attitudes and perceptions are very 
much inﬂuenced by the images created in the media.
In the Bulgarian political domain the immigrants are not considered 
a target of political decisions, but rather a solution of existing problems 
that necessitate active interference. No political platform or program of 
any of the political parties pays attention to the foreigners settled in the 
country or the immigration ﬂows and their management. The govern-
ment radar, on the other hand, discerns them only as manpower in its 
demographic strategy2. 
The National Implementation Plan to the National Demographic De-
velopment Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria (2006-2020) envisages 
the drafting of national immigration policy. Four categories of immi-
grants are particularly targeted: 
- Bulgarian citizens living abroad;
- The Bulgarian diasporas wishing to acquire Bulgarian citizenship;
- Foreign citizens of Bulgarian origin;
- Persons who have already immigrated to Bulgaria. 
The immigration phenomenon as subject of various social sciences 
has various deﬁnitions, but they do not differ substantially and are essen-
tially the same. The concept is deﬁned in a variety of ofﬁcial documen-
tation of international organizations and national authorities. If we ap-
ply the immigration deﬁnition of the United Nations Organization, “the 
phenomenon where a person leaves his or her country of origin in order 
to settle in another for a period of at least one year” it becomes evident 
that the ﬁrst target category identiﬁed in this plan does not qualify as
“immigrant” and therefore does not belong to this policy. It also becomes 
evident that the guiding line of the strategy is to invest maximum efforts 
in preserving the national homogeneity. 
New member states, and Bulgaria as one of the latest among them, 
have historically placed emphasis on addressing minority issues rather 
than immigrant integration. Also, there is no agreement whether im-
migrants, however identiﬁed, should be considered as one group. More
often they are addressed as individuals or as members of communities 
deﬁned by national or ethnic origin, religion, by the reason of their ar-
rival (economic migrants, refugees or family members) or by their skills 
(high/low-skilled). 
2 National Strategy for demographic development of the Republic of Bulgaria (2006-2020)
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The problem with all data on the topic, not just for Bulgaria but for 
the whole of Eastern Europe, is that they are less than comprehensive and 
derived from a variety of sources, concepts and deﬁnitions. In Bulgaria 
there is no systematic and ofﬁcially accessible statistics of the number
of foreigners in the country. The publicly available data from unofﬁcial
channels are scarce and contradictory. What is more, the classiﬁcation of
the migrants in various categories is in a state of confusion, which further 
hampers the desegregation of the data and might lead to wrong estimates 
and assumptions. The very few publication on migration in Bulgaria3 do 
not employ the categorisation set out in the Law for Foreigners by status 
of the sojourn, which distributes them into short- and long-term residents 
(the latter being divided into long-term and permanent residents), but use 
their own classiﬁcations. Thus the quoted ﬁgures are at best tentative.
The most reliable and the least questionable are the data on the number 
of permanently residing foreigners in the country at the end of 2004 of 
the National Statistical Institute. The source of this information is the 
register of long-term stay permits issued by the Ministry of the interior 
in the period 1991 – 2004. Unfortunately, foreigners originating from 
the Arab Middle East states are included in the “other” category, which 
makes the exact numbers impossible to extract. 
According to their own estimates4 the foreigners from the Middle 
East residing in Bulgaria are around 10,3 thousand, or roughly 10% of 
the migrants in Bulgaria. One of their routes for arrival is through Tur-
key. In the last two decades Turkey has increasingly experienced large, 
diverse inﬂows of foreign nationals, including transit migrants, illegal
labour migrants, asylum seekers and refuges, or smuggled and trafﬁcked
persons. The irregular migration ﬂows are mostly transit migrants en
route to other countries, notably Western Europe, through Bulgaria. 
Other demographic features that characterize the studied population 
are the lack of gender balance and the manifestly high education status. 
Together with the African, Kurdish, Vietnamese and Afghan groups, the 
group of Arab middle East settlers is one of those where the discrepan-
cies in the gender proportions are the most expressed (3/4 men to 1/4 
women)5. The majority are married and the percentage of mixed mar-
3 Migration trends in Selected EU Applicant Countries, Volume 1: Bulgaria. IOM 2003; Имиграцията в 
България, съставителство и научна редакция Анна Кръстева. София: ИМИР. 2005 
4 Data collected from interviews with the leadership of the immigrant associations and the embassies of 
the respective states to Soﬁa.
5 According to a survey of the sociological agency Alpha Research conducted in July and August 2007. 
(For comparison’s sake the Africans are almost entirely male.)
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riages is high. The education status in aggregate average values is higher 
in this group than that of the local population, which is largely due to the 
fact that the majority has initially arrived in the country to pursue higher 
education. The dominant part resides in the country for more than 10 
years and has the status of long-term or permanent sojourn (over 50%). 
More than 80% do not have plans for moving elsewhere. 
The labour markets as a dimension of the host country context are 
probably the most important in their sociological aspect, i.e. the ways that 
speciﬁc groups of immigrants get classiﬁed on them. Generally speak-
ing, the employers could either be indifferent to a speciﬁc group or they
could form positive or negative attitudes. The preferential treatment rare-
ly occurs, unless the employers are of the same nationality. Describing 
the studied population through employment, we get a two-dimensional 
picture. If we do not count the professionals employed in the civil ser-
vice – a relatively small share of the early arrivals of the socialist period, 
working in the foreign ministry’s administration and other government 
structures as translators or experts – the remaining categories are located 
along the axis employers – self-employed – wage workers. 
The ﬁrst category is formed by the business owner employers with
capital investments and developed productions. The law obliges them 
to provide at least 10 jobs in the country to be able to stay. Quite a few 
in fact have more than 100 Bulgarian ethnic employees (falling in the 
medium-size enterprises according to the standard). Only in Soﬁa there
are no less than 1000 registered ﬁrms of Lebanese and Syrian nationals. 
The working conditions and salaries in these enterprises are not below 
the level of those offered by the rest of the private businesses.
The self-employed are predominantly petty traders of goods or ser-
vices - retail trade, catering (fast food and restaurants) or barber shops, 
but there is also a visible number of medical doctors and some private 
clinics. The third category of the hired workers is in fact the only one to 
which the market is prejudiced. Their chances of ﬁnding employment
in private businesses owned by Bulgarians are triﬂing, much more as
a result from the prejudiced distrust that was already pointed out than 
from any negative experience. The problem is not that the employers 
have negative expectations but that they have none. Simply put, the Bul-
garian employers do not know them and are not willing to take any risks 
by hiring them.   Nonetheless, the employment rate among the migrants 
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from the Arab Middle East is higher than the country’s average. 
The latter category is the one that relies most heavily on the network. 
Without ﬁnancial and skills capital they ﬁnd themselves in the unfavour-
able situation of uncertainty and vulnerability. Thus the only source they 
can rely on in order to be able to stay is their “kin”. In the outlined cir-
cumstance what they could lean on, not counting the illegal sources of 
income, are the businessmen of their own nationality who are usually 
ready to offer a helping hand. To sum up, the community of Arab Middle 
East immigrants does not create a threat to the jobs of the local residents 
because it occupies a separate labour market niche. Neither does it add 
to the burden of social assistance to the unemployed.  
The employment dimension of the integration has a strong gender 
aspect. In the spirit of their traditionally conservative culture men rou-
tinely ﬁrst migrate on their own, later followed by the women. To marry
Bulgarian women is a frequent choice, although some of the migrants 
return to their country of origin to ﬁnd a wife. The migrant women ac-
companying their husbands are placed in a culturally alien environment, 
to which they have great difﬁculties to adapt. Many remain at home as
housewives, have very limited linguistic competences (and limited op-
portunities to practice the language) and their social contacts are often 
conﬁned to their community. This makes them heavily dependent on
their spouses and the information about the surrounding world is to a 
great extent “interpreted” for them. Thus the men turn into “gatekeep-
ers” of the community. Even when they have some employment, the 
women rarely exit the community. 
From economic point of view, this immigrant group is characterized 
by intense economic activity. If the entrepreneurial business success is 
taken as a dependent variable, the values in this community would be 
higher than the average in the broader economic environment. However, 
this economic contribution is largely unknown to the broader public and 
remains unrecognized. 
The Council of the European Union adopted the Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the EU (CBPs)6 in 2004. 
In September 2005 the European Commission put forward a Common 
Agenda for Integration, which provides a framework for the integration 
of third-country nationals in the EU7. The cornerstones of this frame-
6 Council Document 14615/04
7 COM(2005) 389
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work are proposals for concrete measures to put the CBPs into practice, 
both at EU and national levels8. Furthermore, the Common Agenda pro-
vides supportive EU mechanisms to facilitate this process, developing 
a distinctive European approach to integration through cooperation and 
exchange of good practice. Taking this approach as a point departure, the 
integration model of the Arab immigrant communities is further anal-
ysed in the conceptual framework of the CBP. 
CBP 1 and 2: Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation by all immigrants and residents of member states. 
Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European 
Union. 
To apply these principles in their policy, member states are encour-
aged to consider and involve both immigrants and national citizens in 
integration policy and to communicate clearly their mutual rights and re-
sponsibilities. The Commission’s conclusion is that structural initiatives 
targeting the host population to reinforce its ability to adjust to diversity 
are still underrepresented in national strategies. Although discussions 
of the integration of immigrants are increasing at the EU level, at the 
national level the responses are slower. Three are the European countries 
that currently have mandatory integration programs for third-country 
nationals – Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. 
In this text integration is understood as the efforts of the authorities 
to incorporate various foreign-born, or descendants of foreign-born, into 
the larger community. The essential reason why the immigrants need to 
be included is that they were not “born in”. The recent reactions of second 
or successive generations in some Western European states have shown 
us that inclusion is a process rather than an act, and that the process 
may be long. Furthermore, the process is not the same as the attempts to 
integrate those who were “born in” but nevertheless suffer from various 
forms of exclusion, namely the local minorities.
The government policy forms the ﬁrst stage in the immigration pro-
cess because it affects the likelihood of establishing successfully in a 
country and in the respective legal framework.  The government support 
is important insofar as it gives the newcomers access to resources that 
might otherwise be inaccessible. If for the immigrants with professional 
or business skills the government assistance is a way of faster social inte-
8 The European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions welcomed the developing of the EU integration framework in their respective opinions
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gration and economic mobility, for those lacking such resources it could 
turn either into a means of permanent social dependence or of economic 
marginalization.
Most often the newcomers arrive where other members of the com-
munity have already settled. As we know from the observations of the 
sociologists, the existing communities mitigate the shock of the cultural 
change and protect the newly arrived from the societal prejudices and 
the initial economic hardships. More importantly, the process of socio-
economic achievements in this context is normally driven by networks. 
The ethnic or national networks provide the sources of information about 
jobs and economic opportunities, the sources of jobs inside the commu-
nity and the sources of credit and support for entrepreneurship. 
Although the intentions to formulate an immigration policy are al-
ready on track to realization, the government currently lacks a policy 
for the immigrants. The “immigration policy” is the policy that regu-
lates the migration ﬂows: there is the Law for the Foreigners regulating
the entrance and stay in the country and the Migration Directorate with 
the ministry of interior, which exercises administrative control on the 
foreigners on the country’s territory. As a matter of fact, the law does 
not contain “immigrant” status - the law, as well as the broader public 
political discourse use the terms “refugees” and “foreigners”.  The latest 
legislative amendments introduced certain liberalization of the regime in 
view of transposing the EU directives for the free movement of people 
and goods through the state borders. These amendments permit longer 
stay in the country of foreigners wishing to perform freelance or non-
proﬁt activities and thus broadened the opportunities for settlement.
The “immigrant policy” refers to the integration of foreign-born 
residents. In Bulgaria no political consensus exists as regards the neces-
sity for management and stimulation of the immigrant population. As 
already mentioned, none of the political parties considers this to be a pri-
ority area. A paradox can be found in the administrative arrangements as 
well: although the country receives very few refugees, it has well devel-
oped administration to tackle this issue; in comparative perspective the 
numbers of immigrants are much larger, but no administrative arrange-
ments have been made for their integration. 
As is currently the case a variety of institutions are engaged in the 
process: the ministry of foreign affairs issues entry visas; the interior 
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ministry is responsible for the border and administrative control – issu-
ing of identity cards and stay permits, as well as extraditions; the min-
istry of labour and social policy issues work permits and permits for 
freelance employment to foreigners; the presidency is in charge of the 
naturalization and the ministry of justice issues permits for performance 
of non-proﬁt activities of foreigners in the country. All of them are part
of the “immigration policy”, but there is no coordination unit in the pic-
ture and no institution is involved in the integration of migrants, i.e. re-
sponsible for the “immigrant policy”.   
For the immigrants’ perspective the absent government policy is an 
issue, especially after Bulgaria became an EU member state as of 1 Janu-
ary 2007. Logically, they are becoming more demanding to the authori-
ties based on the comparisons they make with the existing arrangements 
in the West European part of the Union. 
One important and policy-relevant characteristic feature of group of 
immigrants under consideration is that they are communities with good 
level of organization. In Bulgaria there are associations or forums of 
the Lebanese, Syrians, Palestine, Iraqi. When expressing an opinion of 
questions of public relevance, they often speak as representatives of their 
organized communities, especially on issues that have been internally 
debated. As settlers already belonging to the nation, it appears as a com-
mon understanding from their point of view that the country has sufﬁ-
cient capacity to accommodate migrants on its territory and it would be 
in its interest and to its beneﬁt to purposefully manage the professional
and ﬁnancial resource that they provide.
From a researcher point of view it is important to make one clariﬁca-
tion as regards the studied cohort. In the course of my ﬁeldwork I was
repeatedly corrected when referring to my respondents as “Arab”, since 
this is not how they self-identify. Without denying their Arab belonging, 
they often insisted on national identiﬁcation, meaning Lebanese, Syrian,
Palestine, Jordan etc. 
There is agreement in the literature that within a particular cul-
tural and/or societal context there operate a plurality of identities, each 
of which is based on a social classiﬁcation that can change over time.
Increasing research evidence shows that individuals can have multiple 
identiﬁcations even within a single identity criterion that derives from
the various ways in which individuals and groups categorize each other 
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in social interaction. In the data collection process there were many re-
spondents who introduced themselves as Lebanese Bulgarian, Palestin-
ian Bulgarian or even Arab European etcetera.  
The European identiﬁcation has a special meaning for the Middle
East migrants. In a sense their interest in the Bulgarian EU membership 
is higher than that of the local population because living in Bulgaria for 
them was a predetermined choice.
The latest results9 from the public opinion polls on the country’s EU 
membership among the Bulgarian citizens show high approval rates of 
80% against 17% disapproval. At the same time only 24% of the sample 
population in the conducted surveys expresses positive expectations to 
this membership (young people, people with higher education, freelance 
professionals, business owners) while 62% do not expect any signiﬁcant
changes in their lives. The opinions of the effect of Bulgaria’s joining the 
European Community10 show the following results: 59% the situation has 
not changed; 13% it has improved and 28% it has deteriorated. 
The attitudes among the immigrants are in the positive section of the 
scale11, which could be explained with the fact that the majority are in the 
higher education/high status/high income category and to a greater ex-
tent recognize their individual opportunities in the context of the mem-
bership, including mobility. Also, to be part of Europe for them seems to 
be a source of satisfaction and pride – a major condition for acceptance 
and respect of basic values. 
This belonging has a special meaning for the women, interpreted 
through their roles and freedoms in the society. The feeling they build 
is of being more “modern” and “progressive”. An indirect illustration 
of this experience is how they use the word “European” to describe 
men who are less traditional in their understanding of the place and 
functions of women. 
CBP 4 and 7: Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, his-
tory and institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants 
to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful integration. 
Frequent interaction between immigrants and member state citizens 
is a fundamental mechanism for integration.
In 1995 Alejandro Portes studied the economic well-being of vari-
ous immigrant communities in the United States. The study showed that 
9 From May 2007, The European Commission Representation in Bulgaria.
10 Personal assessment of the situation in April 2007. 
11 According to data from interviews without statistical validity. 
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some groups12 do better than other groups13 due to the social structure of 
the communities where the new migrants arrive. The successful commu-
nities are capable of offering the newly arrived assistance in providing 
informal ways of crediting, insurance, child care, learning English and 
ﬁnding a job. The less successful demonstrate a more short-term engage-
ment to the host country and their abilities to provide important services 
to their members are much lesser. 
The relation between this social capital and immigrant inclusion is 
complex. Individuals acquire their networks differently. How well im-
migrants can participate fully in the receiving society depends, along 
with other factors, on the type of social capital they are able to acquire 
both within ethnic communities and in mainstream society such as the 
workplace, schools, and the society at large. The practice shows that the 
concept is useful in designing policies that promote diversity without 
divisiveness in multicultural societies because social capital may foster 
mutual understanding and respect between different groups. Three basic 
types of social capital have been identiﬁed by the social scientists: bond-
ing, bridging and linking.
Bonding refers typically to relations among members of families and 
ethnic groups. Bonding social capital is viewed as a possible contributor 
to the concentration of immigrants in urban areas. Through generations 
of migration, some ethnic groups have developed an infrastructure such 
as business and social services that often parallel those in the mainstream 
society, hence the term “institutional completeness”. Co-ethnics provide 
valuable information on the local labour market. As well, these ties can 
provide a social safety net by meeting material and ﬁnancial needs dur-
ing lean times and caring for children and elders.  On a structural level, 
retention of home language and of ethnic identity derives from a greater 
institutional completeness and viability of the ethnic group.
Bonding is typical for the Arab Middle East immigrant communi-
ties. Family bonds are traditionally strong in the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordan 
and Iraqi societies and reproduced in the new host society. Very often the 
establishment of one family member leads to the arrival and settlement 
of several others (immediate family or relatives). In this sense, bonding 
accounts for the geographical concentration, which is mostly, although 
not exclusively, in Soﬁa, Plovdiv and Varna. The women in the group,
12 Like the Koreans in LA and the Chinese in San Francisco
13 like the Mexicans in San Diego or the Dominicans in NY
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being more conﬁned to the home, miss the bonding opportunities of their
home country and their process of adaptation is slower. “In my home 
country I can always ﬁnd a relative or a friend to spend my time with
because many women are in the same position and stay at home. Here it 
is different. I’m alone most of the time, I cannot easily ﬁnd company to
have coffee or smoke hookah with and I feel isolated.”
The ethnic restaurants have become one of the “bonding spaces” 
where the migrants gather to communicate and celebrate holidays and 
occasions. This is also one of the main places for the meetings of their 
associations, which do not have formal ofﬁces. The main purpose is to
provide social services and assistance to members, information about 
legal and administrative formalities and business opportunities, as well 
as alternative crediting.
Bridging refers to relations between ethnic and other social groups. 
Most immigrants generally do not want to remain in their own ethnic 
community, nor do they wish to reproduce their home country in the 
receiving nation. As they immerse in their new country, immigrants are 
becoming “the locals”. They become citizens, learn the language, and 
become aware of the values and norms of the receiving society. Bridging 
capital enables immigrants to fully participate in their adopted country 
socially and economically.
The Lebanese and Syrians are probably the most active in their 
bridging efforts targeted at the host society. The most indicative fact in 
this respect is that they say they have more Bulgarian than Arab friends 
and feel pretty comfortable living in the country. Also, they make ac-
tive efforts to increase the knowledge of the public about their culture 
and self-organize to learn about the host culture. For instance, the “1001 
Candles” TV show of the Lebanese association was running once a week 
for two years, telling about traditional and modern art, music and litera-
ture, rites and customs, traditional practices and food, about Lebanon 
and featuring many guest speakers. The only reason why it ceased its 
existence is that the anchor (an orthodontist by profession) is too busy to 
be able to continue. Another bridging effort, aiming to increase the mu-
tual familiarity and understanding, is the Maraya magazine, published 
in Bulgarian and Arab languages. It is the imitative of women. Similar 
to the TV program, it is equally striving to communicate with the broad 
public and bond the immigrants (women especially) together. The desire 
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to be part of the Bulgarian society is obvious, but equally obvious is the 
pride of being of Arab origin: „It is truly enriching to be a representative 
of two civilizations”. The Arabs in Bulgaria are not trying to disguise 
their ethnic identity; rather they want their cultural “story” to be heard, 
they want to “translate” themselves in their new home country. „We love 
Bulgaria. We hope that Bulgaria likes us in return. All our lives we’ve 
been trying to prove that we are Bulgarians.”
Linking refers to relations between different social strata in a hierarchy 
where different groups access power, social status and wealth. However, 
the acquisition of social capital is a two-way street. To accumulate linking 
capital not only requires the willingness of immigrants to connect with the 
society at large, but also the willingness of the receiving society to accept 
newcomers. Through linking, ethnic groups, regardless of immigration 
status, are able to have a say in the type of society that they want.
There is evidence of bias against this particular group of foreigners 
in the Bulgarian society. This attitude is nourished by a variety of sourc-
es, both international and local: the world-wide acts of terrorism, more or 
less isolated criminal deeds committed by representative of these nation-
alities among other pieces of media reality, and to a much lesser extent 
everyday interactions. I have heard opinions that they have taken pos-
session of the urban market places and sell low quality goods, that their 
attitude to women is discriminatory and explicitly sexual, that they are 
drug dealers etc. These impressions are however used to label the entire 
community, wherefrom the reluctance to get to know them. 
CBP5: Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, 
and particularly descendants, to be more successful and more active par-
ticipants in society. 
This principle calls for attention towards scholastic underachieve-
ment, early school-leaving and all forms of immigrant youth delinquen-
cy and for policy intervention in the education sphere. Many initiatives 
promote respect for diversity in the educational environment and support 
for teachers. However, immigrant children and youth face speciﬁc chal-
lenges that should be further addressed.
The existence of own schools of the Arab immigrant community is 
telling of three important features of this group. Firstly, education is im-
portant for them and they have organized and invested resources to pro-
vide the conditions they consider the best for their situation. Secondly, 
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these schools provide the education and the schooling conditions that the 
community wants for its children: they can study both the host society’s 
and their own ethnic language and culture, and the girls can attend the 
classes in the outﬁt that is speciﬁc for their confession, which is problem-
atic in the regular schools. Thirdly, the schools provide employment for 
many members of the community. Before the opening of these schools 
many of the families usually provided home education to their children, 
managed by the educated mothers.
In Soﬁa there are several private schools of the Middle East mi-
grants’ community - Iraqi, Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian. The majority 
of the children attend these schools, mostly because of the Arab lan-
guage classes. The interest to Arab language acquisition is expressed: for 
example the Armenian School organized specialized classes with just 13 
students in the ﬁrst year that increased to 45 in the second and are now
70 by initiative of the parents. In the mixed families where the wife is 
Bulgarian the children learn Arabic at school and practice it mostly when 
they visit their father’s relatives. In rare occasions the families decide to 
transfer their children from the specialized private to a regular school. 
The reasoning behind this is often that the child needs a better knowl-
edge of the host country, if he or she were to live there and therefore the 
language of the home country is less essential. The problem that emerges 
with this situation is that the children at the private schools have fewer 
opportunities for close everyday contacts with other (the host) cultures 
and rarely participate in common national educational initiatives. 
The summarized picture of the Arab community presence in the Bul-
garian society thus appears to be: private business, civic activities, cul-
tural presence, diversity in education. And their mission, formulated by 
the organized structures, is as follows: “Our role is to change the negative 
image of the Arabs in the Bulgarian society and the European context”. 
In contrast with the Chinese group they do not isolate in their housing 
solutions. There is no concentration in speciﬁc neighborhoods.  The hous-
ing practice is rather a reﬂection of their economic achievements: when
a family’s ﬁnancial situation improves, it moves to a better part of the
city. Since the neighbors are very important in their culture, they usually 
maintain close and friendly connections in the neighborhood. 
It may be due to the early stage of immigrant presence in the country 
but the migrants in general have not searched for active political expression 
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or representation of their interests on the decision-making level. However, 
they did use political agency, predominantly in crisis situations and by way 
of self-representation, by ofﬁcially announcing their support when Bulgar-
ians were taken hostages in Iraq, by sending delegations to the president of 
the country to express solidarity with the nation, by condemning violence 
and expressing readiness to cooperate, by their active position on the case 
of the Bulgarian medics convicted in Libya. On a more everyday level rep-
resentatives of the community participate willingly in public discussions. 
Although they prefer to avoid the topic, the migrants have political afﬁlia-
tions and those who have the right vote in elections.    
CBP8: The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed 
under the Chapter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded, unless 
practices conﬂict with other inviolable European rights or with national law.
Member states also have a responsibility to ensure that cultural and 
religious practices do not prevent individual immigrants from exercis-
ing other fundamental rights or from participating in the host society. 
The Commission conclusion is that while the importance of inter- and 
intra- faith dialogue, as an element of broader intercultural initiatives, is 
widely recognised, measures to reinforce this aspect often appear as ad 
hoc responses to current events.
Naturally, most of the immigrants from the Arab states are Muslims. 
It seems there are three important characteristics of this Muslim immi-
gration to a secularized orthodox country like Bulgaria that shed light 
over the integration model which has developed here. The ﬁrst is the dom-
inating secular spirit in the country. It is well known that the freedom of 
confession is one of the cornerstones of human rights. At the same time, 
even before 9/11 and certainly after it and post the recurrent violent ac-
tions in different west European countries the religions are perceived as a 
source of division in democratic societies. In popular speech the “secular 
society” deﬁnes religion as one (of many) forms of voluntary association.
Such perception of religious faith, however, neglects the fact that religions 
have for long centuries been among the leading characteristics of the soci-
eties and cultures in the course of their historical development, and have 
had major political, social, economic and cultural consequences. 
According to the latest published data of the National Statistical In-
stitute around 82,6% of the citizens of Bulgaria self-deﬁne as Orthodox
Christians and around 12,2% as Muslims. These are the two dominant 
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religions in the country. Also represented are confessions like catholic, 
various forms of Protestantism, Judaism, Gregorian Armenian Chris-
tians etc., or a total of 36 ofﬁcially registered confessions. Since 1998
the governments have been active in promoting religious tolerance and 
seeking to achieve understanding between them. Nevertheless, although 
there is no exact data on the proportion of practicing believers, most 
observers are of the opinion that a very small percentage, no more than 
1,5% of the population regularly attend religious services. 
In other words Bulgaria ﬁts into the deﬁnition of a secular state. And
although the Muslims are generally more zealous in their faith, anyone 
expecting signs of the religious devotion familiar from the Arab states 
(for instance head-scarved women, scarcity of alcohol and the like) would 
quickly conclude that religion plays a somewhat different role in the lives 
of Bulgarian Muslims. Religious rituals are more important insofar as they 
show respect for a family’s traditions. The few exceptions are to be found 
in closed and geographically isolated communities. Religious celebrations 
are often feted across the boundaries of faith, which builds bridges to other 
communities and maintains particular afﬁliations. A word one often hears
in the ﬁeld is “respect”, and the emphasis is placed on inter-ethnic har-
mony. That is to say, the seeming distance between Muslim and Christian 
Orthodox can be non-contradictory in a secularized reality.
The second characteristic is the institutional development of Islam 
in the country, which is another determining factor. In Bulgaria there 
are four Islamic schools functioning (including one university), a Mus-
lim cultural center, theological university forms and primary religious 
schools. The public schools offer facultative religious educatory courses. 
After the successful introduction of optional Islam classes in the primary 
schools in 2002, using the textbook proposed by the Chief Mufti and 
approved by the Ministry of Education, in 2004 the ministry agreed to 
also assist them ﬁnancially. According to ministry data the classes are
attended by some 18 000 pupils in the primary and secondary schools. 
Most of the Bulgarian Muslims, the majority of them ethnic Turks, 
are followers of a moderate form of Sunism. Concerns exist that Muslims 
of Bulgarian ethnicity (Pomaks) and Roma Muslims, particularly those 
living in remote (usually mountainous) areas, are susceptible to “funda-
mentalist” inﬂuences (often locally referred to as “Arab” or “Wahabi”),
associated with foreign funding of mosque construction and training of 
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imams in Arab countries. Opponents of the Chief Mufti within the Mus-
lim community have accused him of failing to counteract or even fo-
menting the spread of Islamic extremism; none of these allegations have 
however been proven. Perhaps it is more important in terms of the coun-
try-speciﬁc background that Islam in Bulgaria has strong political ties
and has become a major identiﬁcation marker in the Bulgarian society.
The third essential point has to do with the attitudes, held by im-
migrant Muslims in Bulgaria. There are two predominant attitudes: the 
“neighborhood” attitude and indifference. The ﬁrst one is more character-
istic of the earlier arrivals of the socialist time. Spending their high school 
years in Bulgaria and the friendships they have made in that period seems 
to have created an emotional attachment to the country in general. The 
way migrants express this attitude is: “The Bulgarians are my neighbors 
and in Islam the neighbor is very important, almost a part of your family”. 
In the other group the respondents, although Muslim by confession or at 
least by belonging, show indifference to the topic of religion in general.   
CBP10 and 11: Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in 
all relevant policy portfolios and levels of government and public services is 
an important consideration in public policy formation and implementation. 
 Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms 
are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration 
and to make the exchange of information more effective.
The major challenges that still must be faced with regard to these 
principles are outlined as effective sharing of information, coordinating 
with all tiers of government and stakeholders and paying due attention 
to the mainstreaming of gender equality and to the speciﬁc needs of mi-
grant youth and children. 
Measuring integration is difﬁcult and ambitious task. The question
how to do it does not have a universal answer: through mixed mar-
riages? Through the number of enterprises found by the immigrants? 
Through citizenship? Or through the successes of immigrant children 
at school? Judging by the objective indicators of the Arab immigrants’ 
socio-economic proﬁle like education and employment, income, eco-
nomic activity, citizenship and participation the conclusion will be that 
the majority are sufﬁciently integrated into the society. But the question
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remains why then their children, some of which were born in the coun-
try, are different from their peers. 
It is true that the integration is a voluntary act. Its successful realiza-
tion is to a very large extent an expression of the free will of the individu-
als and their personal prioritization of goals. Nevertheless, the consistent 
policies also play an important role in the process. 
The research of the immigrants from the Middle East states in Bul-
garia has outlined the following policy-relevant conclusions:
1. Problematizing is not the only possible approach. An immi-
grant community that does not create a self-sufﬁciency problem
should not be automatically excluded from the policy for the im-
migrants. The integration policy may involve other approaches 
that could be more appropriate and beneﬁcial.
2. The central government structures are not the only agent of the 
policy initiatives. There are policy aspects more pertinent to the 
local governments or the civil society organizations, especially 
when they concern the everyday type of interactions.  
3. A differentiated approach to the various migrant communities 
with speciﬁc attention to their needs would be more effective.
4. The migrant associations, especially those with an opinion an ac-
tive attitude, could be key partners in the policy-generating con-
sultation mechanisms. Their capacity remains so far unutilized. 
5. The migrant communities have equal right of access to the pro-
grams and funds, available for the ethnic minorities (for instance 
those managed by the NCCEDI).
6. Speciﬁc attention should be paid to the incorporation of the pri-
vate schools attended by the immigrant children into the na-
tional educational initiatives. 
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Introduction
Bulgaria has a speciﬁc status within the European migratory area
due to its geographic location as well as its political and economic situa-
tion. The Eastern European region plays an important role in the interac-
tion between the developed countries of the EU and other countries of 
Eastern Europe and Asia. The ﬂows of transit migrants heading "further
to the West" are routed through this region, and for this reason it is often 
described as a ‘buffer-zone’. However, the statistics describing migrants 
with long-term and permanent residence show that in the last nearly two 
decades Bulgaria is gradually becoming an attractive target country. 
This paper reviews immigration trends and their labour market im-
pacts in Bulgaria. The Bulgaria’s speciﬁcity is analyzed as a host country
for immigrants and refugees from different countries of origin and their 
adjustment to the local economic environment. Some of the main factors 
driving immigration are brieﬂy discussed. The paper considers mainly the
economic and social implications of immigration, in particular the inte-
gration of the immigrants into the Bulgarian labour market. The study is 
focused on the recent developments of the immigrant ﬂows, as a conse-
quence of the political and socio-economic changes in Bulgaria since 1989 
onwards and the accession of this country to the European Union (EU). 
The paper is organized as follows: Firstly, basic demographic indi-
cators for Bulgaria are presented in order to outline the population crisis 
observed in the last two decades related to depopulation, ageing popula-
tion, and migration. Secondly, the participation of the Bulgarian popula-
tion in the labour market is described: economic activity, employment, 
and unemployment. The Bulgarian labour market speciﬁcity and the
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perspective of its changes in the condition of the going on process of glo-
balization, and integration of this country into the EU labour market are 
concerned. Thirdly, a proﬁle of the immigrant ﬂows in Bulgaria since the
beginning of the 1990s is presented: basic demographic indicators, coun-
tries of origin, educational level, professional qualiﬁcation, etc. Fourthly, 
immigrants’ participation in the Bulgarian labour market is considered. 
Finally, implications for the present economic and social policy in terms 
of the topical and complex issues related to immigration ﬂows and inte-
gration of immigrants into the labour market in Bulgaria are given.
1. Main demographic indicators for Bulgaria
In the last nearly two decades the dynamics of the population in Bul-
garia worsened beyond even the most pessimistic forecasts. (Table 1).1 
In 1990 the yearly rate of natural increase turned its sing to negative and 
throughout the last 18 years it  was steady about minus 5 per 1 000 per-
sons. As a result the total population number decreased by nearly 1.2 mil-
lion. The tendency of mortality rate dropping until 1960 (when reached 
8.1 per 1 000 population) gradually upturned. At the beginning of the 21st 
century the mortality rate is over 14 per 1 000 population. Nevertheless 
the reduced birth rates are the main reason for the depopulation. Bulgaria 
is among the countries in Europe with the fastest rate of depopulation. 
Table 1. Demographic statistics for Bulgaria, 1989-2006 per 1 000 population 
(unless otherwise indicated)
Indicator 1989 1995 2006
Population - to 31.12 (thousand) 8993.4 8384.7 7679.3
Share of urban population (%)     67.3 67.8 70.0
Birth rate     12.6 8.6 9.6
Mortality rate     11.8 13.6 14.7
Infant mortality rate*     14.4 14.8 9.7
Including:
In towns 14.0 8.6
In villages 16.7 13.1
Rate of natural increase       0.8 -5.0 -5.1
Life expectancy at birth (years) 71.2(1989-91) 70.6 72.6
1 Population ageing is observed in all developed countries, and those located in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. The speciﬁcity of the latter is that in the 1990s this process was combined with the difﬁcult situation of
the transition from centrally planned to a market type economy. 
135
Including
Men   68.0 67.1 69.1
Women   74.7 74.9 76.3
Average age (years)   37.3 38.9 41.4
Including:
In towns     .. 36.8 39.7
In villages     .. 43.3 45.3
Rate of demographic ageing 101.4 100.8 99.3
Age dependency ratio   50.4 (1990) 48.9 44.3
Total fertility rate   1.81 (1990) 1.23 1.38
* Infant mortality rate - up to one year of age per 1000 live births.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of R Bulgaria, various issues, National Statistical Institute.
The depopulation process is accompanied by continuing ageing pop-
ulation. This process is more strongly expressed in the rural areas, where 
about one third of the Bulgarians live, than in the urban. The population 
ageing leads to increase in the average age which in the 1990s changed 
faster than in the previous decades, and after 2000 has exceeded 40 years. 
In 2006 the average age was 41.4 years for the total population, including 
39.7 years in the towns and 45.3 years in the villages (Table 1). 
Since 1990 the population in Bulgaria has aged considerably in com-
parison with other countries. According to United Nations’ data at the end 
of the XX century Bulgaria ranks among the ten countries with the largest 
share of population aged 60 and over, just after Italy, Greece, Germany, 
Japan, Sweden and Belgium (Rangelova, R., 2002). The proportion of this 
age group in the villages is twice higher than in the towns of the country. 
In 2006 the share of the old people (65 and over) reached over 17% of the 
total population and it is likely to increase further (Table 2).
Table 2. Age structure of the total population in Bulgaria, 2006, %
Total Male Female
0-14 13.6 14.4 12.8
15-64 69.2 70.9 67.6
65+ 17.2 14.7 19.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Statistical Reference Book of R Bulgaria. National Statistical Institute, Soﬁa, 2007, 16-17.
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Different projections of United Nations, World Health Organization, 
International Labour Organizations and individual authors show that the 
process of depopulation and ageing in Bulgaria will deepen. It is ex-
pected that up to 2050 the proportion of the old population (65 years and 
over) will be over twice higher than that of the young people (Figure 1). 
According to these projections the number of Bulgaria’s population will 
decrease by roughly 2 million – from about 7.8 million in 2003 to nearly 
6 million at the end of the projected period. The proportion male/female 
will keep slightly in favour of female population. 
Figure 1. Projection of the population number by age in Bulgaria, young (0-14) 
and old people (65 and over), 2003-2050
Source: Rangelova R. and G. Sariiski, 2007, 47-66.
The second unfavourable change in the age structure in Bulgaria is 
the considerably reduction of the working-age population (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Projection of population number in Bulgaria by age group, 2003, 2025 
and 2050
Source: Rangelova R. and G. Sariiski, 2007, 47-66.
The changing age population structure was very seriously inﬂu-
enced by the emigration outﬂows of Bulgarians to other countries. The
emigration wave was a result of the lifting of administrative barriers 
and restrictions, the very large difference in standards of living between 
Bulgaria and developed countries, the reticence of the regime of the 
1945-1989 period, etc. In the ﬁrst a few years, external migration from
Bulgaria was driven mainly by disparities in earnings and unemploy-
ment; people were often willing to accept a job which did not match 
their education or professional qualiﬁcation. The main reason which
motivated people to emigrate was the opportunity to ﬁnd a job which
could guarantee them a higher standard of living. This motivation is 
supplemented by the pursuit of professional realisation and making a 
personal career (Rangelova, R., 2006, 50-73).
By ofﬁcial data of the National Statistical Institute (NSI) in the
1990s on average 45 thousand people emigrated every year. Most of 
them are young people what has aggravated the problem of ageing 
population. From 1989 up to now, over 750 000 people have emigrated, 
which was about 9% of the total population in 1989 (or nearly one in 
ten Bulgarians).2 The main emigration ﬂows are to the USA, Canada,
Germany, Austria, Italy, and France.
2 There is not yet regular statistics on the real migration from Bulgaria. The empirical data is gathered 
from several sources – population census, population registers, administrative sources, border statistics and 
sociological surveys. NSI and IOM organise studies on potential migration. 
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Table 3. Scale of the migration from Bulgaria, 1989-2005 
Period Number of migrants
1989 218,000
1990-1992 252,000
1993-2000 221,000
Total 1989-2000 691,000
Total 1989-2005 750,000
Source: National Statistical Institute, 2006.
The proﬁle of the potential migrants from Bulgaria, summarized by
the results of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) study 
for 2001 is presented in Box 1. It gives more details and additional infor-
mation on the demographic changes, including mobility of the Bulgarian 
population and gives some implications for the development of the local 
labour market (Rangelova R., 2007).
Box 1. The proﬁle of the potential migrants
"The average potential migrant is a highly mobile, well-educated 
young person, more often male than female, rather single than mar-
ried, and inhabiting the capital or other larger towns in Bulgaria. This 
reﬂects a signiﬁcant shift in the social proﬁle of the potential migrant
since, during the last decade of transition, it was the poorly educated 
people who prevailed in the group of potential migrants. The average 
potential Bulgarian migrant is a temporary labour migrant. He is most 
likely to stay abroad for shorter period of time than is usually thought. 
The survey showed that the majority of Bulgarians who plan to mi-
grate would not wish to spend more than 3 years in a foreign country 
and would rather work there for a while than to permanently settle." 
Source: Proﬁle and Motives of Potential Migrants from Bulgaria. IOM study 2001, p.3.
2. Basic features of the Bulgarian labour market and the perspec-
tive of its changes in view of country’s full membership in the EU.
The dramatic demographic changes inﬂuenced on the size of the
labour force in the country. Basic data for the participation of the Bulgar-
ians into the labour market in 2006:
▪ The total number of economically active population aged 15 and 
over is 3,448 thousand, including 57.2% men and 46.8% women.
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▪ The total number of economically active population aged from 15 
to 64 is 3,408 thousand, including 69.4% men and 60.6% women.
▪ The total number of employed persons aged 15 and over is 
3,139.1 thousand or 47.1% of the population of the age of 15 and 
over, including 1,667.0 thousand or 53.1% men and 1,472.1 thou-
sand or 46.9% women.
▪ Employment rate - 52.2% for men and 42.5% for women.  In 
the urban settlements total employment rate is 52.1 %, while in 
rural areas it is 35.5 %. 
▪ The share of employed in private sector of the total number 
employed persons reached nearly 80%. 
▪ A tendency observed: the larger place of residence and/or the 
shorter distance to the administrative centres the easier access 
to the labour market and particularly to a job. 
▪ The overwhelming proportion by employment status is that of 
the employed persons (87%), followed by self-employed (8%), 
employers (4%), and the smallest is the proportion of the unpaid 
home workers (Figure 3).
▪ Most of the employed persons are engaged in the service sec-
tor (close to 60%), followed by industry (nearly one third) and in 
agriculture and forestry, where the proportion is 9%, which how-
ever is a little high for a modern developed country (Figure 4).
▪ The number of unemployed persons was 308.9 thousand or 
9.0% of the economically active population, of which 159.3 
thousand (8.7%) men and 149.6 thousand (9.2%) women.
Figure 3. Structure of the employed persons by employment status, 2006
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Figure 4. Structure of the employed persons by economic sector, 2006
▪ By level of education women with higher and secondary educa-
tion are in a better position than men. The opposite is the situ-
ation concerning people with basic and lower education, where 
women prevail, which could be explained by some ethnic gen-
der speciﬁcity (Table 4).
Table 4.  Structure of people by level of education and gender, 2006 *
Level of education Men Women
Higher 40 60
Secondary (high) 52 48
Basic and lower 46 54
* The ﬁgures are rounded.
Source: National Statistical Institute.
 
▪ According to a national representative survey (“Women, La-
bour, Globalization”, 2003) the ranking of the most important 
factor for access to employment of both men and women is as 
follows:
- Age 
- Level of education 
- Place of residence 
- Language skills  
- Sex
 In general this means that age is the ﬁrst criterion for access to
employment, followed by level of education, place of residence, 
language skills, and sex. This means also that more or less we 
can not speak about gender discrimination.
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▪ According to the same survey the pay gap by gender is on av-
erage 67% in favour of men. A survey organized by the NSI 
for 2004 points out another percentage of gender pay gap 
– about 72%. This gap is due mainly to the lack of access 
of women to highly-paid jobs in spite of their comparatively 
higher level of education. 
The following perspectives of the Bulgarian labour market changes in the 
condition of the country’s full membership in the EU could be pointed out:
▪ As far as the EU model of the economic and social development 
faces a replacement of the present leading economic paradigm 
with that to build a knowledge-based economy and to follow the 
Lisbon strategy (2000) the labour market meets great challenges 
to get more ﬂexible and at the same time to ensure security of
the employed (to create the so-called ﬂexsecurity), to develop
businesses and open new jobs; to get more competitive, and to 
contribute to social cohesion.
▪ Extending working lives by improving the incentives and op-
portunities for older workers has become a priority in the EU 
in order to mitigate the impact of population ageing on labour 
supply and retirement systems.
▪ Extending working lives and delaying retirement through policies 
that promote active ageing is one of the priorities in the revised 
European Employment Strategy (2003) for the period 2003-2010. 
To summarize: the going on demographic processes in Bulgaria and 
the labour market developments in the current conditions of the acceler-
ating economic activity in the country indicate that still in the near fu-
ture there will appear a need to import labour force from abroad. In this 
aspect it is interesting what are the immigrants in this country and what 
is going on with them in terms of their economic activity?  
3. Scale and a proﬁle of the immigrant ﬂows in Bulgaria
The new immigration ﬂows in Bulgaria have appeared since 1898
onwards.3 International Organization for Migration (2003) published a 
study indicating that the number of permanently and long-term staying 
3 A very serious limitation for studying the immigration ﬂows in Bulgaria is a lack of reliable statistical
data. It is known that the most reliable are data form periodically conducted population census in Bulgaria, 
but this opportunity was missed at the last census carried out in 2001. On the other hand, we could not claim 
that the applied methods for the immigrants counting are precised. For this reason there are big differences 
among the available data on immigration by individual sources. 
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foreigners in Bulgaria increased from nearly 45,000 in 1994 to 60,000 in 
2002. According to this study the biggest part of the immigrants in 2002 
came from Russia (19,113), followed from Syria (1,780), Iraq (390), Iran 
(275), Afghanistan (129) etc.  
Immigration in Bulgaria differs from immigration in the developed 
Western European countries, USA and others by the following features:
▪ Immigration in Bulgaria began later and it is incomparable 
smaller by size than immigration in the developed Western 
countries.
▪ The immigrant ﬂows in Bulgaria are incomparable smaller by
size than that of the emigrant ﬂows from the country, which is
an opposite phenomenon of the observed tendency in the devel-
oped countries.  
▪ Unemployment among the immigrants in the developed coun-
tries is rather higher than among the local people and immi-
grants are treated as the ‘periphery’ of the labour market. 
▪ There are not impoverished immigrants in Bulgaria (without 
counting the refugees).  
▪ Almost there are not immigrants hired by Bulgarians, but there 
are quite a few Bulgarians hired by immigrants.  That means the 
immigrants rather create jobs than to take from away jobs from 
Bulgarians.
▪ Immigrants in Bulgaria are coming from different geographic 
regions and countries: Russia, the Ukraine, the Arab world, 
China, neighbour countries and others. For many of them Bul-
garia is not the terminal but a buffer country in their intention 
to move to Western Europe. This is an important element of the 
Bulgaria’s attractiveness for immigration.    
There are two basic groups of immigrants playing a comparatively 
more important role than the others in the Bulgarian labour 
market. One of them is coming from the Near and the Middle 
East and the second one is coming from China. Here you are 
shortly presented proﬁles of the immigrants from these groups.
Proﬁle of immigrants from the Near and the Middle East
The changed political and socio-economic situation in Bulgaria 
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since 1989 created conditions from immigration ﬂows from the Near 
and the Middle East. The number of foreign students considerably de-
creased in the 1990s but at the same time a big number of entrepreneurs 
and traders came. It is important that the immigrants are not desperate 
and extremely poor people in their countries of origin. Тhey are rather 
representatives of the middle class: 10% of them are highly qualiﬁed
specialists, 28% had been students or pupils in their countries of origin, 
25% had had their own business or had been craftsmen, about 10% had 
been unemployed and only 6% had practiced low qualiﬁed work.4   
The immigrants from the Near and the Middle East could be divided 
into two groups: one of them come for the ﬁrst time in Bulgaria; the rest
of them have already been there studying at the University in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The latter have some knowledge and relations with local peo-
ple, and they exercise mainly trade and intermediary activity.
The permanently living immigrants from the Near and the Middle 
East are aged from 25 to 45, which means they are at their best (or good) 
age for adaptation and professional realization. They are predominantly 
men. Women are less in number and do not exercise paid work. Most 
women immigrants do not speak the local language, making integration 
into the local population more difﬁcult.
Immigrants from Syria, Iraq and the Lebanon are typical by easier 
and better adaptation compared with other nationality groups of immi-
grants. This could be explained by the fact that they are the biggest and 
the oldest colonies in the country.
The immigrants from Arab origin come as a rule from big towns 
and capitals in their home countries (only 3.6% come from rural areas). 
Тhis facts predetermine their professional proﬁle. Most of them practice
typical urban professions: traders or craftsmen in their own countries. 
The basic part of these immigrants deal mainly with food stuff: meat, 
clothing, sugar products, restaurants, auto services, sales of auto spare 
parts, etc.
Most of the interviewed immigrants claim they are retailers with 
small capital and limited ﬁnancial opportunities. They say they have felt
pressed by big economic actors in their own countries and the only way 
for them to go out of the situation is to move abroad.
4 A good study on the immigration in Bulgaria is that one edited by Anna Krasteva (2005). Here and after 
this source is used to depict the proﬁle of the immigrants in Bulgaria. Anna Krasteva organizes studies based
on surveys and interviews on immigrants from China, the Near and Middle East, and Africa in Bulgaria in a 
sociological comparative aspect, and they are may be the best research work on immigration in Bulgaria.
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Because of the small initial capital (between 10 and 40 thousand 
USD) the Arab immigrants combine their funds among them and rent 
trade premises as partners. 
The employment structure of the Arab immigrants by activity is as 
follows: in whole trade 20.1%, in retail trade – 46.9%, in service sector 
- 27.8%, аnd in the production sphere - only 4.3%. The highly educated 
immigrants can not accept the very low payment in Bulgaria and prefer 
to develop their own business in order to ensure higher living standards 
of their families.
Bulgaria is attractive for immigrants because of some market ad-
vantages coming from the country’s geographic location and the positive 
perspectives for development. Comparatively the low technological level 
and tastes of the local population favoured the sooner adaptation of the 
Arab traders and entrepreneurs at the Bulgarian market.
The Arab immigrants are willing and initiate social contact with 
Bulgarians trying to keep steady friendly relations. Working in teams 
with Bulgarians they are loyal to the institution and the employer, and 
moreover to their colleagues. 
Concerning the business ethics of the Bulgarians as employees some 
foreigners, who are owners of restaurants and snack bars regard Bul-
garians as lazier than the Arabs and although they receive any wages, 
they are used to steal. They acknowledge however that no one Arab man 
would agree to work for too low payment. On the other hand, the Arabs 
could not accept the distant attitude of the Bulgarians to the job for witch 
they get money. 
Proﬁle of immigrants from China
Chinese people migrated to Bulgaria for the ﬁrst time after 1989 and
their number is gradually increasing. The main their purpose is to make 
money. That means they are aimed not at surviving in the host country 
but to achieve a higher economic and social status for them and their 
families. Their main activity is entrepreneurship.
The proﬁle of the Chinese immigrants could describe in brief as
modest, industrious and mobile. Bulgarians think of them as unsociable 
people. At the same time Bulgarians would hire willingly Chinese people 
because they regard them as hard-working – twice as much than Arab 
and African people.  Most of the interviewed Bulgarians declare that 
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they would agree to work for Chinese people because of the curiosity 
or if they have not another option, as well as depending on the payment. 
Concerning employment in case at a foreign (immigrant) employer the 
Bulgarians are mostly reluctant to work for Arabs, followed by Africans 
and the least prejudices they have towards Chinese immigrants.
The Chinese immigrants are typical of two main features:
▪ The ﬁrst one concerns intra-group links among the members
of the community and results in the solidarity in view of cop-
ing with the difﬁculties with the people’s adaptation to the new
life.
▪ The second reveals the paradox between on the one hand, con-
solidated and closed community like the Chinese, which on the 
other hand, is very capable of  ﬂexibility, adaptability and in-
novativeness.
4. Immigrants’ participation in the labour market in Bulgaria
In general, presence of immigrants in the Bulgarian labour market 
could be considered in different aspects:  ﬁrstly, it is a favourable factor 
for cultural diversity, secondly, in a near perspective it will lead to stron-
ger competition and struggle for jobs between local people and foreigners, 
thirdly, it could also to be a factor for intensifying the economic progress 
by means of opening new jobs both for foreigners and Bulgarians.5
Between the two main considered groups of immigrants in Bulgaria 
(from the Near and Middle East and from China) there are some differences:
▪ In the vast majority the Chinese people are low educated, and are 
engaged in two economic sectors: restaurants and trade (whole 
and retail trade). The Arabs are the main competitors of the Chi-
nese people in the two economic sectors. The Chinese are more 
aggressive and succeed to oust the Arabs from some of their easy 
conquered position at the beginning of the transition to a market 
economy in Bulgaria (at the beginning of the 1990s). 
5 International migration has long been a concern in both originating and receiving countries. At the be-
ginning of this decade, the debate has focussed on the role that immigration may play in easing the economic 
and budgetary impacts of declining and ageing OECD populations. The impacts of immigration concerned 
four themes linked to migration in OECD countries: (a) what are the consequences of immigration for la-
bour market performance? And what role can immigration play easing skilled labour shortages in speciﬁc
sectors? (b) what are the budgetary impacts of immigration? (c) to what extent is immigration a solution to 
ageing and declining OECD populations? and (d) what are the consequences of migration on economic de-
velopment in the source country? (see Coppel, J., Dumont J.-C. and Visco I., 2001). On these issues see also: 
Borjas, G.J. (1993),   Winkelman, R. and K.F. Zimmerman (1993), Freidberg, R and J. Hunt (1995), Carillo, 
M.F. et al (1999), Daveri, F. and R. Faini (1999), United Nations (2000), etc.
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▪ The Arab woman is devoted to her family and the children, thus 
she stay to a great extent ‘invisible’ for the society. The Chinese 
woman is as much active and ‘visible’ as her husband (partner) is. 
▪ In terms of economic activity immigrants could be regarded as 
‘representative’ for their countries of origin. In the host countries 
they are more enterprising and more ready to get risk. Together 
with the positive side of this feature we can mention the observed 
practice in particular among the Chinese people of smuggling. 
It was marked that there are not yet regular and reliable data on 
immigration in Bulgaria. Published data on immigrants’ participation 
in the labour market are fragmentary and irregular. According to data 
of the Employment Agency the number of the foreigners coming from 
countries outside of the EU and taking jobs in Bulgaria is permanently 
increasing. If they were 1242 in 2007 or about 100 in a month in January 
2008 they are 235.6 During the whole 2007 the biggest is the number of 
work permissions of citizens from Turkey (454), followed by those from 
FYR Macedonia (164), India (110), the Ukraine (93), etc.  
The picture about the annual employment process of immigrants we 
can add with the data in table 5. The data show that in 2007 the total 
number of unemployed persons with permission for permanent stay in 
Bulgaria is 1,204 coming from over 44 states all over the world, as the 
biggest is the number of moving from Russia (852), the Ukraine (144), 
followed by several states with similar number of registered for staying 
citizens (from 26 to 18) – Serbia, Poland, Armenia, Moldova. Only 31 
unemployed persons are refugees with humanitarian status, as the biggest 
is the number of coming from Afghanistan (8), Iraq (5), Iran (4) and so 
on. For the purpose of the present study however it is more important that 
nearly one in every three persons has got job through the Directorate “La-
bour Bureau” and about 12% of the unemployed are included in courses 
for professional qualiﬁcation. We would reserve our judgments on the
presented ﬁgures because the Bulgarian reality is still at the beginning of
organization, including statistics of the immigrants’ participation in the 
local labour market and in this case any comment would be imperfect.
6 The data do not include the number of the applying for a job foreigners who has not yet received  work 
permission for the procedure has not yet ﬁnished. 
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Table 5.  Registered foreign citizens at Directorate „Labour Bureau” in 
Bulgaria, 2007 
Country
Unemployed 
Employed 
through Di-
rectorate “La-
bour Bureau”
Included 
persons in 
courses for 
professional 
qualiﬁcation
Persons 
with per-
mission for 
permanent 
stay
Refugees 
and per-
sons with 
humani-
tarian 
status
Total
Total 1173 31 1204 364 100
Including
Russia  851 1 852 257   73
Ukraine  144 0 144  45   17
Serbia   26 0  26   4    0
Poland   21 0  21 10    0
Аrmenia   18 1  19  6    2
Моldova   18 0  18  4    2
Каzakhstan   12 0  12  3    1
FYR Mace-
donia   10 0  10  2    0
Czech Repub-
lic    9 0   9  4    2
Тurkey   6 1   7  2    0
Аzerbaidjan   4 0   4  2    1
Greece   4 0   4  2    0
Uzbekistan   4 0   4  1    0
Others 46 28 74 22    2
Source: Directorate „Labour Bureau” in Bulgaria, 2007. 
While migration systems present some similarities across countries, 
institutional arrangements vary widely and impact on the size and com-
position of migration ﬂows (Box 2).
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Box 2. Immigration labour policies in selected European 
countries
Austria accepts immigrants based on yearly ﬁxed quotas as a per-
centage of the labour potential in the country. The needed number of 
immigrants is estimated by the Austrian Institute for Economic Stud-
ies. The so-called important workers could get a permission to work in 
the country on the basis of different quotas. This is the mechanism to 
attract highly qualiﬁed employees. In order to get a permanent permis-
sion for work a given economic immigrant should have at least 5 years 
legal staying in Austria, and should have applied ﬁrstly for a labour li-
cense and after that twice to receive individual work permission. This 
procedure shows that the Austria’s system is very complicated, us-
ing considerable administrative discretion. It implies why the country 
could not attract enough immigrants, including highly skilled.  
The system in Portugal is similar to that in Austria. The decisions 
to admit immigrants in the country are taken from the administration 
and are based on the estimates of the needs of the labour market. Ac-
cording to these estimates a yearly quotas for immigrants is deﬁned.
In reality however more than twice is the real number of immigrants 
engaged in the gray sector of the economy, coming mainly from the 
ex-colonies of Portugal and from Eastern Europe. 
The Cyprus immigration policy is different. It follows the logics of 
the temporary labour immigration residence. After ﬁnishing the permis-
sion term any immigrant should leave the country. There is no system 
in Cyprus giving permanent work permissions and actually settlement 
of the immigrant in the country. As a result most of the immigrants in 
Cyprus are low skilled looking for seasonal and not highly paid work. 
The immigration labour policy of Ireland is based on the econom-
ic demand of the country, depending on the labour force deﬁcit and the
immigrants’ skills. A basic feature of this policy is that it is based on 
labour market signals, but not on the estimates and discretion of the 
administration. This makes the system very ﬂexible and effective.�
There are no limitations at all for people from other EU countries 
and the countries from the European economic space to settle and 
work in Ireland. The basic demand about immigration from countries 
outside the European economic space is work permission. The system 
149
of work permission is based on the untaken jobs which employers 
could not satisﬁed by people from the European economic space. To
prove the necessity to employ foreigners any employer should declare 
his position at the National Employment Agency and if there are not 
local candidates for these jobs within the next month, they could be 
taken from immigrants. Work permissions are given to employers for 
a preliminary deﬁned workers or employees for a ﬁxed term.
The immigration policy system in Bulgaria is similar to that of 
Ireland. There is a limitation for a given employer to employ foreign-
ers up to 10% of the total number of the stuff. There is also a re-
quirement for a given immigrant applying for a job to have past the 
so-called market test, i.e. the given job could not be taken from a 
local person. At present the immigration policy concerning the la-
bour market in Bulgaria is in a very dynamic process of adaptation 
to the new economic situation: the achieved economic progress and 
the membership in the EU. Recently the market test was lifted from 
foreigners of Bulgarian origin. Until recently unemployment rate in 
Bulgaria was high, but it has decreased and now is nearly the average 
for the EU countries (7.75% in 2007). The main economic problem 
left is that payment is very low and does not stimulate foreigners to 
work in the country. 
Conclusion and policy implications
▪ The demographic trends in Bulgaria over the last nearly 20 years 
and in a long-term perspective are unfavourable in terms of de-
population and high rate of population ageing. Aging population 
has a number of harmful economic and social consequences, 
ﬁrst of all reﬂecting on the labour force in the country.
▪ Тhe following tendencies in immigration ﬂows to Bulgaria are
observed:
- The immigration pressure intensiﬁes gradually and smooth-
ly. It has visibly increased since the beginning of 2007 when 
Bulgaria got a full EU member.
- Immigrants are moving mainly from low developed coun-
tries from the Near and the Middle East, MAGHREB, Asia, 
and the Balkans.
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- Until now there was not tension among the local people and the 
immigrants in the labour market, but growing up by num-
ber it is possible to set in complications. This is why it is 
necessary to study the process of immigration in Bulgaria.
▪  Immigrants in the Western European countries are treated as ‘pe-
riphery’ and ‘marginals’ of the economic centres of their society, 
as well as people who have to take unwished jobs from the local 
people. Immigrants in Bulgaria are regarded as partners who can 
be hired but can also hire employees. Moreover, they have success 
where not all Bulgarians can get through in spite of the difﬁculties
which they meet with the language barrier and cultural adaptation.
▪ There is a general rule: the host countries can play a signiﬁcant
role in reducing immigration pressures through more open mar-
kets and greater transfers of technology.
▪  More or less in all countries tensions are manifested between 
new arrivals and parts of the native population. Such tensions 
are partly invoked by the perception of unchecked ﬂows of new
immigrants as well as overtly anti-immigrant political parties. 
Proponents of migration note the positive economic role immi-
grants can play, for instance in terms of addressing speciﬁc la-
bour shortages and the problems linked to ageing populations. 
Opponents of migration, on the other hand, fear adverse impacts 
on the labour market, public ﬁnances, social conditions and on
the distribution of income. In the case of Bulgaria the size and 
the impact of the immigrants are still limited, but it does not 
mean that these issues should be neglected.
▪ Despite no obvious relationship between immigration and un-
employment, concerns are often expressed that immigration 
will lead to higher unemployment and lower wages for the na-
tive population. These concerns are especially evident in many 
European countries, where unemployment rates are higher and 
the proportion of long-term unemployment is greater than in 
many non-EU OECD countries. In theory, the labour market 
impact of immigration depends on how the skills of immigrants 
compare with those of nationals in the host country. 
▪ Concerning the Bulgarian labour market the following two is-
sues are important: 
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(a) Due to the undergoing unfavourable for the labour market 
demographic processes in Bulgaria, including the large-
scale emigration from the country leading to shortages of 
labour force a very important issue is that of ensuring higher 
levels of immigrant employment, professional and language 
training, re-qualiﬁcation of immigrant workers, etc.   
 (b) It is very important for Bulgaria to study what role immigra-
tion can play in ﬁlling labour shortages/gaps, caused by emi-
gration. What is ‘the price’ of the ‘substitution’ of Bulgarians 
by foreigners? The current Government policy is directed to 
ensure jobs ﬁrst of all for the local people, in particular un-
employed and after that to think about immigrants.
▪ The study indirectly suggests that, while migration can partly 
offset slower growing or declining Bulgaria’s populations, it 
cannot provide by itself a solution to the budgetary implications 
of ageing populations.
▪ Because of a lack of immigration policy until now in Bulgaria 
and the increasing  importance of this issue for the country in its 
capacity of an external boarder of the EU the main points con-
cerning the state policy are still ahead. Having in mind the rich 
experience with immigrants of some developed European and 
located in other areas in the world countries Bulgaria should 
avoid the negative and develop positive practices adequate for 
its speciﬁcity. First of all Bulgaria should not wait long until
the immigrants ﬂows create tensions at the local labour market.
Secondly, as an EU member Bulgaria should take part in the 
creation of a common for the Union migration policy, which at 
present is one of the most intensive developing spheres of the 
European integration.    
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In the last decade, politicians, economists and journalists started 
to give high priority to international migration. Very different driv-
ing forces, such as natural disasters, civil and ethnic wars, as well 
as widespread impacts of globalization, growing income differences 
and better prospects in several high income or rapidly developing 
countries have nourished this process. Moreover, the enlargement 
of the European Union (EU) increased the importance of this issue, 
both as a promise of free movement of labour from the new member 
countries and a fear mainly manifested in the EU-15 from „mas-
sive migration from the East”. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the 
emerging discussion, sometimes on well-founded professional level, 
sometimes in the context of political demagogy, was focused on the 
impact of migration on potential host countries. Much less, if any, 
attention was given to the simultaneous (or longer term) impact of 
migration on the socio-economic development and prospects in the 
sending countries. This article wants to contribute to a more bal-
anced view of migration by concentrating on the sending countries, 
with special reference to the practical experience and medium-term 
considerations of the new member countries that joined the EU in 
2004 and 2007, respectively. 
The paper is structured in the following way. We start offering 
a short overview over some basic recent trends in global migra-
tion to be followed by the current situation concerning the opening 
up of the national labour markets in the enlarged EU. Afterwards, 
several parts address the key areas of  the economic impact of mi-
gration on the sending countries. Three basic issues will be dealt 
with: the impact on the labour market, brain drain and financial 
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consequences (with special reference to the remittances).1 Some 
remarks on regional, social and demographic consequences will 
complement the overall picture. In the concluding part, potential 
policy responses on how advantages could be enhanced and losses 
could be minimized from the point of view of the sending countries 
will be dealt with.
1. Key international deﬁnitions and trends of migration
International literature considers migrants who, whether legally 
or illegally cross national borders and remain outside their countries 
of birth or citizenship for a longer period (generally for at least a year, 
even if they used to return once or several times to their home coun-
try during this period).2 The reason for leaving the native country 
are manyfold and helps classify different statuses of migrant people. 
First, clear difference has to be made between refugees (asylum seek-
ers) who are regularly forced to live the given country and migrants 
who usually move out of the country as a result taking this decision 
voluntarily.3 Second, migration takes two basic forms: emigration 
which refers to those people who opted for leaving the home coun-
try in favour of continue their life in another country, and migration 
which is considered to be temporary. The duration can be shorter or 
longer (from a few months to many years), and, in several cases, may 
end up in emigration (or not returning to the home country and get-
ting new citizenship). Finally, commuting, as a special form of mi-
gration has to be mentioned. In this case, people are working abroad 
but practically living at home. This form of life can be developed 
within certain distance from the external border of the given country 
and generally requires well-functioning physical infrastructure. The 
shorter the distance and the better the infrastructure, it is more prob-
able that people are commuting each day (or at least each week). Un-
derstandably, this form of moving out and back is not included in the 
ofﬁcial ﬁgures on international migration. There is a clear geographic
orientation connected with different forms of migration. Overseas 
1 Professional literature has created the terminology of „3 R’s” to characterize the fundamental impacts 
of migration for the sending countries (recruitment, remittances and returns) (Martin, 2005). This paper 
follows a partly different pattern of identying the key impacts.
2 See: Martin (2005), p. 89.
3 Internally displaced persons (IDP), a large part of refugees are not considered migrants, since they keep 
on living in the same country (or in its predecessor, as in the case of former Yugoslavia).
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countries, mainly the USA but also Canada and Australia belong to 
the main target countries of emigration, while temporary migration, 
at least in Europe is concentrated on the continent. In turn, com-
muting only affects neighbouring countries (e.g. Austria/Hungary or 
Austria/Slovakia, Germany/Poland or Germany/Czech Republic, Ro-
mania/Hungary or Ukraine/Poland, etc.).
Temporary migration generally has two basic motives. The lion’s 
share is linked to clear economic motives, such as employment opportu-
nities, higher income, better living standard, more qualiﬁed job, better
access to modern technology. At the same time, social factors may also 
generate migration, particularly in the form of bringing together family 
members, or by inviting friends to start working in the host country. 
Also, before strengthening the rules of immigration, some countries had 
registered limited migration waves based on social considerations (high-
er social welfare payments without necessarily seeking for job).4 
In general, migration is the joint result of push and pull factors (prob-
lems experienced in the native country that are expected to be solved or 
mitigated by moving to potential host countries). Low income, low eco-
nomic growth, low level of social welfare, high level of unemployment, 
uncertain economic prospects, lack of opportunity to make use of the 
acquired skills on the one hand, and the opposite attributes on the other 
can be listed among the main push and pull factors.5
Migration trends have been substantially generated and inﬂuenced
by globalization. The latter has had different speeds of liberalization on 
the fundamental production factors. Free ﬂow of commodities is facing
much less barriers than in the past, particularly due to free trade zones 
and other bi- or multilateral trade pacts. Evidently, the EU is the major 
player in this ﬁeld, as well as one of the key actors of global trade (and
partly service) liberalization in the framework of the WTO. Also liber-
alization of trade in services made signiﬁcant progress, both within the
WTO, but more importantly, and despite still existing provisional barri-
ers, mainly linked to the free circulation of labour, as a consequence of the 
internal market development (deepening) and enlargement (widening) of 
the European integration. Nevertheless, the highest level of global liber-
alization has been achieved in the circulation of capital. In consequence, 
a growing and striking gap emerged between the free ﬂow of capital and 
4 Migration for purposes of (higher) education is not taken into account in our categorization.
5 Non-economic factors used to be an important push factor (political instability, wars, ethnic conﬂicts,
etc.), but they are not considered in an economy-focused survey.
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the restricted free ﬂow of labour in international economic cooperation
and interdependence. While capital is, in effect, 100 per cent liberalized, 
labour ﬂows are subject to serious barriers. To be sure, part of them
originates in the economic, political and mainly psychological-emotional 
constraints in the potential sending countries. However, another and not 
less meaningful role is played by the administrative barriers imposed by 
potential host (target) countries in general, and, despite institutionalized 
membership of the Central, Eastern and Southestern European states, by 
selected EU member countries.
In the global context, international migration amounts to about 200 
mn persons, or roughly 3 per cent of the world population. Even modest 
estimates forecast a doubling of this ﬁgure in the next ten years. Due to
the increase of the world population by 1 bn to about 7.5 bn persons by 
the mid of the next decade, international migration is expected to reach a 
level of 450 mn persons, or about 250 mn more than at about 2005.
For a long period, cross-border economic migration was considered 
to be a one-way ﬂow from less developed countries towards developed
economies. In this game, the United States were the outstanding host 
country, with massive immigration ﬂows from Latin America and the
Caribbean, Europe (for about two centuries now) and, most recently and 
massively, from Asia. Australia, with the same territory as the USA, but 
just with 25 mn population has been emerging as a new target country, 
with serious qualiﬁcation conditions. The third big target region is com-
posed of the oil-rich Middle East countries that have attracted millions of 
Asians, however not as potential residents, but as temporary (or longer-
term) guest workers. Finally, Europe has always been an emigration and 
immigration continent. Today, emigration is less in focus of attention, 
although it should have been noticed that almost half a million highly 
educated and mobile young persons have left Europe mainly for the USA 
in the last decade, in search of better living conditions and less state 
bureaucracy.6 Instead, fears of massive migration started to dominate 
Western European (EU-15) politics and communication in the last de-
cade. Estimates produced by well-known research institutes proved to be 
erroneous at least in three major ﬁelds. First, the number of migrants pre-
dicted turned out much higher (and, as a result, generating unnecessary 
6 One of the key elements of the successful implementation of the renewed Lisbon Agenda should certainly 
address part of this „European community”, not just to return to Europe but to create efﬁcient and globally
competitive networks with European companies.
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and unjustiﬁed fears, concerns and even hostility) than the real num-
ber of immigration after the 2004 and the 2007 enlargement of the EU. 
Although estimates started to become less irrealistic as the moment of 
enlargement approached, most forecasts remained highly overshooting 
the real migration ﬁgures.7 Second, during the ﬁrst wave of enlargement
(big-bang enlargement) almost everybody was concentrating on the al-
leged job threat coming from „Polish plumberers”, a much higher wave 
of migration from Bulgaria and particularly Romania, non-members in 
2004, remained practically unnoticed. In fact, even today, there may be 
more Romanians (2.5 to 3 mn) working in the EU-27 than Poles. Also, 
the Bulgarian ﬁgure of about 700.000 is higher than that of other new EU
members as compared to the total working population. Third, and most 
importantly, the fundamental „migration threat” to the (enlarged) EU is 
certainly not coming from the „East”, but by the South, particularly from 
Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa.
There are some additional new features of international migration 
to be mentioned. On the one hand, South-South migration became an 
almost as important channel than migration to high income OECD coun-
tries. According to World Bank ﬁgures, 41 % of the migrants (almost
80 mn persons) are involved in this migration ﬂow, while high income
OECD countries account for 47, and high income non-OECD countries 
for 12 % of global labour movements (Ratha, 2006).8 On the other hand, 
migration ﬂows have shifted in recent years with changing poles of at-
traction for labour migration. Between 1970 and 2000, Asia’s share de-
creased from more than one-third to one-fourth of global migrant stock. 
Similar tendencies can be registered in Africa and Latin America. In-
stead, sharp increase is reported in North America, (Western) Europe 
and, as a consequence of the dissolution of the federation, in the former 
Soviet Union (in the latter case, most of the migration is linked to the 
redeﬁnition of state borders).9
According to OECD reports, foreign-born population accounted for 
9 per cent of the total population of OECD countries (above the age of 15). 
The highest rates are registered in Luxembourg (37 %), Australia (27 %) 
7 The ﬁrst assessment dated in 1992 predicted a potential migration of 3 mn persons, while a decade later
an European Commission study set the potential at 2.5 % of the EU-8 population (excluding Cyprus, Malta, 
Bulgaria and Romania), or about 1.5 mn in a ﬁfteen-year period (World Bank, 2006).
8 Some of the main bilateral channels include Bangladesh to India, India to the United Arab Emirates, 
Afghanistan to Iran, India and Egypt to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan to India, Malaysia to Singapore, etc. 
Additional big ﬂows can be attributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union that caused substantial two-way
migration ﬂows between Russia and the Ukraine and Russia and Kazakhstan ((Ratha, 2006).
9 http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/pid/254
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and Switzerland (25 %). Nevertheless, also the USA (14.5 %) and major 
European countries are slightly higher than the above average (Germany 
with 12.7, France with 11.7 and the United Kingdom with 9.4 per cent).10 
However, and despite the relatively large immigration from the new mem-
ber countries of the EU in recent years, „wider Europe” (including South-
eastern Europe, Ukraine and Turkey) represents 20 % of the total, as com-
pared to 21 % from Africa, 8 % from Latin America, less than 6 per cent 
from Asia and less than 2 % from the Middle East, as compared to 44 % 
coming from different EU member countries (excepting Bulgaria and Ro-
mania still belonging in the referred estimate to „wider Europe”).11 It has 
to be added that intra-EU migration includes a large number of welfare-
driven migrants (large numbers of British, German, Scandinavian people 
living in Mediterranean sun-belt areas after their retirement).
2. EU enlargement and national labour market liberalization
The opening up of the labour market of the EU-15 to new members of 
2004 and 2007 constituted one of the toughest chapters in the negotiations 
process on accession. Based on justiﬁed or unjustiﬁed fears and as a result
of different national labour market policies as well as the priorities of pub-
lic opinion, the EU-15 decided to introduce a 7 year transitional period for 
the complete opening of the enlarged market for one of the four freedoms 
of the single market (free circulation of labour). However, the decision has 
been left with the individual countries, since labour market policies are 
still largely at the competence of the member countries and not on „su-
pranational level”. The United Kingdom, Sweden and Ireland decided to 
immediately eliminate previous obstacles to the free ﬂow of labour, while
several other countries, not least due to the positive experience in the 
ﬁrst two years of enlargement (2004-2006) and the generally favourable
impact on the British (and Irish) economy, followed suit in 2006-2007. At 
the moment, only Austria and Germany have serious barriers (and partly 
France), all other countries have taken a generally liberal position.
In the ﬁrst almost for years of membership, the new members have
demonstrated a rather differenciated behaviour concerning labour market 
integration. Some of them remained very reluctant or immobile, and the 
outﬂow of people was rather modest (Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary,
10 The Financial Times, February 21, 2008.
11 Katseli – Lucas- Xenogiani (2006a)
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partly Estonia). In turn, some others, mainly Poland and two Baltic coun-
tries, Latvia and Lithuania revealed very high migration trends (partly also 
Slovakia, mainly within its geographic promixity, Austria, Czech Repub-
lic and Hungary). Between 2004 and 2006 Latvia lost 3.3 and Lithuania 
2.4 % of its working age population. Not only the high ﬁgure is astonishing
(or shocking) but the very fact that both countries used to be considered as 
Chinese-like high growth economies. In such a case, one would expect that 
just the younger, skilled and mobile part of the society stays at home due 
to the bright prospects of which these people are expected to be already 
and become even more the beneﬁciaries during their life cycle. Less sur-
prising was the massive emigration from Poland, partly due to high level 
unemployment before membership (near 20 per cent according to ofﬁcial
ﬁgures), and partly driven by the outstanding mobility of Polish people as
compared to other Central European societies (mainly the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovenia).12 In 2006, 230,000 Slovak citizens were employed 
abroad, or about 10 per cent of the employed labour stock. More impor-
tantly, one-third of the young people ﬁnishing tertiary education looks for
– temporary – employment opportunities abroad.13
Based on preliminary observation, liberalization of the national la-
bour markets in the second wave in 2006 as well as further enlargement 
by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 did not produce dramatic changes com-
parable to 2004. This situation can be explained by the massive move of 
migrants from both new members well before their accession and the 
relatively lower level of attractiveness and size of the member countries 
that recently liberalized their labour market rules. Also, the volume of 
potential migrants has diminished, since most of them could ﬁnd a job
(legal or illegal) in selected EU countries previously. 
One additional remark on the labour market policies of the new 
member countries: in 2004, most of them applied the same rules of the 
game as their EU-15 counterpart countries. They opened up their labour 
market to the citizens of those countries that behaved in the same way 
with their citizens, and kept them closed or under control with those who 
applied the same rules. In 2007, most new member countries abolished 
any kind of restriction concerning the inﬂow of Bulgarian and Romanian
12 However, it has to be noted that part of the registered Polish migrant labour in the United Kingdom had 
been living and working there illegally before 2004. The liberalization of the British labour market gave 
them a chance to let themselves register and get rid of the previous illegal status.
13 Most Slovak migrant workers are employed in the Czech Republic (91,000) followed by the United 
Kingdom (56,000), Ireland (24,000) and Hungary (20,000). Napi Gazdaság, December 06, 2007.
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labour, while two EU-15 members only followed the same practice (Fin-
land and Sweden). Hungary was the only exception, for it opened up its 
labour market only partially (in 2007 in 219 different activity areas, and 
as of 2008 in all areas but for skilled workers only). The United King-
dom, that played a pioneering role in 2004, started to introduce some re-
strictions to the migrants potentially coming from the two new member 
countries of 2007. It has to be noted that Bulgaria disregarded the reci-
procity principle and did not introduce any barriers to the labour coming 
from other EU member countries, emphasizing that, „in our interpreta-
tion, the free ﬂow of labour is a fundamental right of EU citizens”.14
3. Migration and its consequences on the sending country’s 
labour market
Depending on the initial situation and the internal ﬂexibility of the
national labour market of migrant countries, the results from migration 
may be different. In addition, differences in short- and longer term pros-
pects have to be taken into account. The most positive short-term impact 
is decreasing unemployment, as it can be experienced in all large sending 
countries such as Poland, Slovakia, but also Bulgaria and Romania. If mi-
gration includes mainly otherwise unemployed people, also the budgetary 
impacts are positive (less unemployment beneﬁt to be paid). Moreover,
neither the favourable socio-political impact should be ignored, since high 
unemployment is generally accompanied by higher social tensions and, as 
a consequence, by higher budgetary expenditure on social stability (par-
ticularly in regions with very high share of unemployed people).
If, however, the sending country does not reveal high level of unem-
ployment (i.e. does not dispose of substantial surplus labour) or migration 
mainly affects employed people in the domestic economy, the outcome is 
likely to be less favourable. In this case, unemployment may not be reduced 
essentially, and unemployment beneﬁts have to be kept paying, while, on
the other hand, regular taxpayers will be lost for the budget. More impor-
tantly, in both cases lost employed (and mainly skilled) labour has to be 
substituted. In this context, the outcome very much depends on the labour 
market substitutability, both in numerical and in qualitative terms. If the 
domestic labour market is ﬂexible and available manpower is mobile, po-
14 According to the spokesman of the Permanent Representation of Bulgaria to the EU in an interview with 
EU-Observer. Bruxinfo, January 17, 2008.
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tential labour shortages can be prevented or quickly overcome. In addition, 
at least in the theoretical approach, after a short decrease of output, labour 
shortage may force the sending country’s economy to increase productiv-
ity, start sectoral restructuring and invest more in education, training and 
skill-creation (although in the latter, investments do not mature in the short 
term and temporary skill shortage may easily appear). 
In fact, a substantial part of low-skilled workers from underdevel-
oped regions of a country who used to commute in the framework of the 
national labour market, have seized the opportunity of seeking for job in 
other European countries. To this extent, their migration did not create 
adverse consequences. Also, there have been examples that decreasing 
labour available in agriculture led to technological change in production 
by initiating investments in the mechanization of this sector. The gains 
can, however easily be converted into loss, if large number of migrants 
happens to emerge among young, relatively well-educated and mobile 
persons with stable or improving employment prospects at home. The 
problem may be aggravated if the internal mobility of labour is low, and 
surplus labour in one region or sector is not ready to ﬂow to other regions
or sectors, either due to the lack of skill, the slight difference between so-
cial and unemployment beneﬁts (plus temporary job opportunities with-
out paying taxes) on the one hand, and the salary offered (in many cases 
minimum wage or near to this level). Additional factor that tends to foster 
immobility is the structure of the housing market (both the broad practice 
of private property of the house or apartment and the lack of competitive 
rental opportunities near to the geographic location of the available job). 
If large part of the mobile people from a depressed region leaves the coun-
try, intra-country regional differences are likely to widen and catching-up 
chances will be reduced (or at least substantially delayed).
Some of the new member countries have already started to experi-
ence the negative side of migration. On the one hand, several sectors are 
facing serious labour shortage, such as agriculture, retail trade, personal 
and social service activities and not least the construction sector. The 
situation in the latter is particularly contradictory, since while a large 
part of skilled or semi-skilled migrants originate in this sector, part of 
the remittances are expected to ﬂow into the construction industry and
the housing market. According to Polish data, there have been registered 
600.000 vacancies or 12 per cent of the employees by the private sector, 
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mainly in agricultural and construction industry.15 Although unemploy-
ment is still about 11 per cent, but is characterized by structural rigidi-
ties, so that most of this potential source cannot be used in order to ﬁll
vacancies by domestic labour. As a result, importing labour from other 
(mainly non-EU) countries seems to be the „solution”. Romanian ﬁgures
inform about 15 per cent labour shortage in the construction sector, the 
textile industry (one of the leading export sectors with substantial in-
volvement of foreign capital), hotels and restaurants.16 Around 200.000 
Romanian construction workers have comfortable workplace in Spain 
and Italy, with wages around Euro 800 to 1,000, several times the Roma-
nian wage level17 (despite its rapid increase in the last period).
Another adverse effect is that labour shortage has become rapidly 
accompanied by higher wages mostly but not exclusively in the shortage 
sectors, since wage increases used to have a „demonstration effect” and, 
with some delay, they reach the wage level and structure of other sectors 
without serious labour shortage as well. In the last years, annual wage 
increase amounted to 30 per cent in Latvia and at least 20 per cent in 
Romania. In 2007 alone, wages in the construction industry grew by 20 
per cent in Poland, 25 per cent in Romania and 35 per cent in Latvia. Pol-
ish companies struggling to attract labour to their activities in or around 
Warsaw had to increase not only salaries (to about Euro 700 a month) 
but offer free-of-charge transportation or even accommodation – but ap-
parently without success.18 Converging wages have started to generate 
two-way labour ﬂows between the new member countries. While, over
one decade, Hungary used to attract hundred thousands of Romanians 
(mostly of Hungarian nationality), rapidly increasing salaries and sig-
niﬁcant skilled labour shortage in the dynamically emerging Western
Romanian region (Timisoara, Arad, Oradea), near to the Southeastern 
border of Hungary, has initiated a return ﬂow of labour. Skilled Hungar-
ians without job in an otherwise less developed or depressed region of 
the country are now commuting to Romanian workplaces.
Additional negative impact of rapid wage increase (generally decou-
pled from productivity increase) can be observed in the growing inﬂation-
ary pressure as observed in the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Poland. This may seriously hinder the implementation of the national con-
15 Világgazdaság, January 25, 2008.
16 Napi Gazdaság, December 06, 2007.
17 Nicolae – Radu (2007), p. 52.
18 Napi Gazdaság, December 06, 2007.
163
vergence plans and fulﬁll the conditions to introduce the Euro,19 particu-
larly in countries with early euro adoption plans and/or applying currency 
board systems (Baltics and Bulgaria). It is evident, that rapid wage conver-
gence towards countries with higher wages cannot be considered as a sign 
of real convergence, and even less, of convergence in competitiveness.
4. Brain drain vs. brain gain
International literature emphasizes both effects of migration. While, 
in the short term, the negative consequences tend to prevail (brain drain), 
in the longer term migration is expected to generate positive impacts as 
well. Some experts argue that longer term gains may be higher than the 
beneﬁts attributed to the removal of trade barriers.
However, overall experience provides much less argument in favour 
of a positive assessment. Being massive migration from less to more de-
veloped (from lower to higher income) countries a relatively new phe-
nomenon, the short term impacts are already clearly felt, while the po-
tential and anticipated positive developments are mainly still expected to 
materialize. 
The direct negative impact consists in losing highly educated people 
in the sending countries. It is several times proved that free ﬂow of labour
between differently developed countries (and overall socio-economic 
and institutional environment20) creates signiﬁcant pull effects on young,
skilled and not only physically but also structurally mobile people. This 
loss can be identiﬁed in various ﬁelds.
First, the emigration of skilled persons lowers the human resource 
potential of the sending country. In very serious cases, this loss can reach 
the level of critical mass that is THE key precondition of sustainable 
modernization. If a country loses most of its human capital in the period 
of globalization characterized by the unquestionable upgrading of the 
human factor in creating a competitive „knowledge economy and soci-
ety”, no matter how much external (and internal) ﬁnancial resources are
available, the modernization and catching up process is unlikely to start 
and even less, to become lasting.21
19 The World Bank (2006), p. 23.
20 As an example, see the constant pull effect of the USA on Western European highly-skilled young 
people, without major income difference but with a much more liberal and less bureaucratic regulatory 
framework in the former.
21  Several less developed countries may have reached this critical mass. In addition, some European coun-
tries experiencing massive migration may also soon ﬁnd themselves in this “endangered” group of countries
if the current volume and speed of migration tend to continue (ﬁrst of all Western Balkan countries).
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Second, since human factor is the most important source of eco-
nomic growth, growth rates (and investment rates) are expected to be 
lower than in case of remaining at home and contributing to the value 
production in the native country.
Third, the sending country loses part or the totality of its long-term 
investment in human resource-building. Young and skilled people used 
to beneﬁt from taxpayer’s money during many years of education in the
native country. In turn, this investment will generate additional growth 
in the new target country and not at home.22
Fourth, current budgetary revenues fall, since migrants do not contrib-
ute to native country’s budget. Both social security and consumption-related 
taxes (VAT) are paid in the host countries. (Obviously, this impact, although 
in different dimensions, is generated by all migrants that used to be em-
ployed in the sending country before going abroad.)
Fifth, migration is likely to affect different sectors of the economy dif-
ferently. Some sectors may be struggling with increasing labour shortage, 
while some others cannot absorb the available labour force. This imbalance 
is more inﬂuenced by market-based supply-demand conditions than by dif-
ferent skill levels. Particularly strained situations have emerged in some 
sending countries in such sectors as agriculture, construction industry, 
health care, university education or selected high-tech sectors, with very 
different skill and educational requirements.
Sixth, an indirect loss difﬁcult to be quantiﬁed may arise from the fact
that the emigration of highly skilled people is supposed to lower the overall 
level of the efﬁciency of democratic structures, particularly in newly-born
democracies. A society increasingly consisting of less educated and elder-
ly people can be easier manipulated by populists and autocratic political 
leaders due to the weaker counterweight represented by responsible and 
inﬂuential intellectuals (highly-skilled persons).
It has to be added that the size of brain drain is highly varying ac-
cording to the skill level of persons who migrate. Massive migration of 
unemployed and unskilled persons does have an impact on the labour 
market, the demographic and regional structure of the population but 
its impact on brain drain is negligible. The higher the education level, 
22 For example, in international sports in general, and in soccer, in particular, there are very strict 
conditions of buying and selling talented players. Internationally known leading clubs used to attrract such 
young people regularly. However, they have to pay a substantial amount of money to the former club that 
made a lot of investment (both in ﬁnancial, educational and other terms) into the talented sportsman/woman.
Such rules, unfortunately, are almost completely absent in the much wider migration of skilled labour.
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the higher used to be the brain drain factor. Even in this case, some 
distinction has to be made. Investment in higher education in ﬁnancial
terms is very heterogenenous. Medical sciences and part of engineering 
require huge amounts of educational investment on each student, while 
current (not necessarily long-term and not-quantiﬁable) investments in
university students in social sciences used to be much lower. In addition, 
investment gains or losses can be identiﬁed on the peersonal level of mi-
grants as well. Those who change their domestic workplace for a foreign 
one, but remain in the same skill category (unskilled remain unskilled, 
skilled in one area can continue as skilled persons in the same area, 
highly-skilled are employed in highly-skilled or even higher-skilled ac-
tivities) do not experience any loss of their educational investment (paid 
both by taxpayers of the native country and by the respective persons 
themselves). However, there is widespread evidence, that a large number 
of young post-university (or, geneerally, post-education) migrants accept 
jobs that have nothing to do with their previous education.(and level of 
skill acquired in a given ﬁeld). As a result, previous investments will be
either substantially downgraded or completely lost. Young and skilled 
Central, Eastern and Southeastern European migrants often  earn more 
money by being employed in activities that do not need any special skill 
or can easily be learnt at the expense of giving up several years of invest-
ment in a different area of education (childcare, care of adult persons, 
gastronomy, different personal services). In consequence, the original 
investment in skill creation will most likely disappear, since after a „pro-
fessional interruption” of several years, the previously acquired knowl-
edge can hardly be used or revitalized. Let alone, that the personal em-
ployment record is unlikely to convince a „head hunter” that still young 
people with convenient educational background but without practicing 
these skills for several years would be the right choice to be suggested to 
a potential employer. Thus, the „way of life thinking” that higher income 
by „temporarily” giving up the acquired skill input generally ends up 
in the complete waste of time, money and energy and can easily lead to 
personal (and even social) frustration. There are very few examples that 
would prove the success of such a „strategy”. Needless to say, that in our 
accelerated world driven by unprecedented technological (and manage-
rial) innovation, once acquired skills tend to be rapidly depreciated even 
if somebody is working in his/her area of skill but is not open to further 
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training and upgrading of the acquired „educational input”.
Finally, it has to be noted that the immigration policies of several 
high-income countries have been encouraging the process of educational 
investment losses of the sending countries. This development can be iden-
tiﬁed in two different ways. First, by offering unskilled or low-skilled ar-
eas of activities, where the host countries have usually registered labour 
shortage, to foreigners who, given the signiﬁcant income difference, in
many cases are ready to accept such an offer despite their higher level 
of education. Second, the share of skilled or highly-skilled people among 
the migrants tends to be higher than in the host country population. For 
example, the share of persons with tertiary education is 20 per cent among 
the native population but about 35 per cent among immigrants in the Un-
tied Kingdom. Similar ﬁgures for Ireland are a bit higher than 20 per cent
as against more than 40 per cent. Even in some new member countries, as 
Hungary, immigrants are more qualiﬁed than the average educational level
of the host country.23 This phenomenon is partly the result of very selective 
immigration policies of major host countries (Australia, Canada, but also 
the USA and the United Kingdom).24 Partly it is connected with the higher 
mobility of higher skilled people coming from the sending countries.
At least according to migration theory, brain drain has to or can be 
accompanied by brain gain for the sending country. Evidently, the tra-
ditional form not addressed in this paper is high-school or post-doctoral 
education abroad. This is a special case of migration, since young and 
talented persons acquire additional skills and knowledge in developed 
countries. Such investment is either paid by the host country (fellow-
ships) or by the students (or their parents) in he home country. Thus, the 
„ﬁnancial sheet” is much more balanced than in the classic brain drain
case as illustrated above. The expectation is that after ﬁnishing education
and training these young and already highly-skilled people are return-
ing to their native country and start contributing to higher growth and 
competitiveness in the economic area, as well as to strengthening insti-
tutions, changing social behaviour, fostering democracy, etc. However, 
the overall experience is that most of them are not ready to return, and 
by far not due to much lower salaries but mainly because of the general 
23 Almost one-third of the foreign persons coming from ex-Soviet republics, about one-sixth of those ar-
rived from Romania, Slovakia or ex-Yugoslavia, and about one-fourth of those originating in Germany who 
are living and working in Hungary have ﬁnished tertiary education. Világgazdaság, February 22, 2008.
24 As of  2008, the United Kingdom has introduced a points-based immigration system to attract highly 
skilled migrants from all parts of the world. The Financial Times, November 20, 2007.
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socio-political and mental environment that is feared to seriously con-
strain their activities, both in professional and in personal context.25 As 
an alternative, they try to remain in the „protected” educational frame-
work as long as possible (a very special and not necessarily positive form 
of „life-long learning”), or open up themselves to the downgrading spi-
ral by accepting still high-income jobs than at home by giving up their 
previous educational input partially or even totally. In fact, few of them 
return after ﬁnishing education. To be honest, young people are always
much more open or exposed to non-professional external impacts that 
may substantially shape their future life (marriage, children, networks). 
This fact is further diminishing the share of returnees. 
From the point of view of our paper, it is much more interesting to 
what extent migrants may beneﬁt from their (temporary) stay abroad.
There is widespread consensus that temporary migration may contribute 
to higher skill due to the higher level of technological development in the 
new workplace. Not less importantly, it provides an outstanding opportu-
nity to learn or improve language skills. In addition, it is an outstanding 
chance to create networks for future career. In general terms, experience 
with a new environment can have an inspiring impact with longer term 
beneﬁts of understanding others, remain open to new ideas and learn
the basic elements of „adequate labour”.26 Not less importantly, a more 
objective comparison of the political, economic and social conditions 
between the target and the sending country is made possible. Part of the 
migrant workers, voluntarily or unnoticed, become important direct or 
indirect actors of shaping the future of their native country.27
No doubt that working abroad may have widespread positive im-
pacts on the medium- and longer-term development of the sending coun-
try. However, the size of this inﬂuence as well as its time horizon are by
far not predictable.
 25 The author’s personal experience from 15 years of teaching at two post-gradual isntitutions of the College 
of Europe (Bruges and Warsaw) is that part of the young graduates would like to return to their native country 
irrespective of the much lower salary level. The main constraining factor several times indicated by the students 
is the deeply-rooted bureaucracy that, despite (or just because of?) their competitive knowledge (and partly also 
network) would place them at the bottomline of professional career in all areas of public administration.
26 Labour shortage is by far not only due to the lack of skilled labour. Much more important is the lack of 
“adequately skilled labour”. In fact, skill can be acquired, even in post-education special training (generally 
carried out by large multinational companies in in-door programs). However, the “adequacy” includes such 
features as physical, skill-related and time-related ﬂexibility, tolerance, endurance, innovative spirit, coopera-
tive behaviour, etc. The development of most of these features do not form part of formal education. They have 
to be obtained either in the family or small communities in which citizens are growing up. In many countries, 
one of the big “educational gap” can precisely be attributed to the missing of this “background education”.
27 One of the most recent positive impact could be registered during the Polish elections in 2007. Votes in favour 
of change were almost unanimously cast by Polish citizens working in the United Kingdom and Ireland, who had a 
ﬁrst-hand experience with modern democracy as compared to the Kaczynskis-led „travel to the past”.
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First, it is expected that, after a certain time, temporary migrants 
will return to their native country and will bring with themselves a lot of 
experience, higher skill, new social patterns and, not least, a lot of money 
to be invested. In fact, the supply side of the balance may seem correct. 
But what about the demand side, namely the native environment that is 
waiting for the returnees? The main questions of adequacy or non-ad-
equacy are the following:
▪ how appropriate are the newly acquired skills to the home envi-
ronment,
▪ how productively can new skills be utilized after return,
▪ how large is the return rate of the highly skilled people.28
As in the case of technology transfer or, most recently, EU ﬁnancial
transfers, the key question is related to the absorption capacity of the home 
country. To be sure, it is by far not an economic or an institutional issue 
(as many times emphasized by EU bureaucrats), but to a large extent the 
result of socio-political behaviour and deeply-rooted historical heritage.
In addition, the contribution of returned people does not only de-
pend on the host environment, but also on the primary intention of the 
returnees. Why are they returning? Would they start a new venture 
based on experience, money and network? If yes, what kind of a busi-
ness (consumption-led family undertaking, new small business activity, 
participation in the already existing or emerging transnational subcon-
tracting network in the native country, contributing to large-scale invest-
ments of macroeconomic importance, etc.)? Finally, what is the role of 
age in which migrants are willing and ready to return? Do they return for 
work or for enjoying the last part of their life at home, most probably at 
lower living costs to be paid by higher income or savings made abroad? 
The last question is particularly important in the context of the general 
assumption that if risk-taking persons are more inclined to migrate, re-
turning migrants should also be more risk-taking than the average of 
the population. Even more, they generally dispose of ﬁnancial resources
that should further encourage risk-taking investment activities. Yes, in 
principle. But risk-taking supported by some amount of money has two 
important „regulatory” elements. On the one hand, it is the age of the 
returnees. The later they return, the higher is the likelihood that the basic 
behaviour will not be directed towards business ventures but towards 
quiet life. On the other hand, risk-taking cannot be delinked from the 
28 Katseli – Lucas- Xenogiani (2006a), pp. 38-39.
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risk-level of the given economic and socio-political environment. The 
higher the unpredictability and intransparency of the latter is the lower is 
the level of risk-taking activities.
Second, high hopes are connected to technology transfer inspired by 
migrants. In fact, it certainly happens, although many times „under the 
carpet” and not in the form of visible transfers but in „soft” areas that, at 
at the end of the day, inﬂuence the technological absorption capacity of
a country, such as personal experience and skill, managerial knowledge, 
networks, personal attitude to some key issues, etc.). However, the harsh 
reality is that technology-related brain drain is much more sizeable than 
brain gain. This development is clearly indicated by the fact that coun-
tries with large emigration are increasingly facing labour shortage in 
high-tech areas, with negative implication on foreign direct investment 
in general and technology transfer in particular.
Third, network building used to be mentioned as a potential source 
of brain gain. Here, virtuous and vicious circles can be distinguished.29 
To a large extent, the success or failure of network-building depends on 
the home country environment. Several ten thousands of Indian IT pro-
fessionals who left India for foreign job, could create substantial back-
ward-linkages by creating new industries, a lot of jobs and improved 
IT-related services in India, and, most importantly, have contributed to 
growing international competitiveness of this key sector. In turn, African 
doctors emigrated to various European countries were unable to improve 
the health care system in rural (or even in urban) areas of Africa.
In sum, theoretically given brain gain can only be exploited if the native 
country is able to create the desirable environment (absorption capacity). 
Even in this case, the cost-beneﬁt balance is generally negative to sending
countries, particularly in the ﬁrst stage (decade?) or migration. Longer-
term and partial compensation largely depends ont he native country’s 
(re)migration policies to be addressed in the last chapter of this paper.
5. Financial impacts (current account, trade, FDI)
There is widespread agreement that the most important and almost 
immediately favourable impact of migration is manifested in the sub-
stantial and rapidly increasing volume of remittances for countries suf-
fering from huge current account deﬁcit, mainly due to highly unbal-
29 Martin (2005), p. 96.
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anced trade ﬂows.30 It is not unlikely that trade and capital ﬂows will
become connected with migration, but such an interlinkage (interface) 
needs several years, even under the best circumstances (highly skilled 
and mobile migrants immediately ﬁnding market channels and invest-
ment opportunities upon arrival in the host country). One can only agree 
that migrants, particularly if organized in well-functioning diaspora, 
may have a two-way impact on trade ﬂows. First, and from the very be-
ginning, migrants, once visiting relatives at home, contribute to the free-
of-charge marketing of foreign products that will create a steady demand 
in some part of the population and, as a consequence, leads to regular 
imports of the respective commodities (or services). Second, but with a 
substantial time lag, in much lower volume (and total price) and more 
restricted in commercial circulation, also selected goods of the home 
(sending) country are likely to reach the host country market as a result 
of efﬁcient intermediation between businessmen (traders) of the native
country and the migrants working in the host country. However, all three 
factors of difference have to be considered. The process does not start 
as a two-way process, even in the two-way ﬂow there remain substantial
differences in value of imports versus exports, and, not less importantly, 
imported goods get a stable part of the offer of large retail networks, 
while exported goods generally remain „special products” sold in (fre-
quently migrants-managed) small shops only. 
Obviously, migration may increase trade through different channels 
(preferences, access to information, trade interemdiation, participation 
in business networks)31. However, it should not be forgotten that, despite 
two-way ﬂows, the „interdependence” remains highly unbalanced, lead-
ing more to the further deterioration than any kind of improvement of the 
dramatic trade deﬁcit.
More sizeable and quicker positive impacts can be attached to the reori-
entation of business decisions by large multinational (but also of small and 
medium-sized) companies in favour of the given migrant-emitting coun-
try. Obviously, the supposed high level of ﬂexibility of the labour market,
lower social tensions due to emigration, still available skilled and ﬂexible
workforce in the domestic economy (partly as a consequence of positive 
experience with migrants) and, not less importantly, successful lobbying 
of migrants in the host country may contribute to higher volumes of FDI 
30 Beside remittances, direct capital imports, at least temporarily, started to improve the balance-of-pay-
ment situation of several Eastern and Southeastern European countries in the last years.
31 Katseli – Lucas- Xenogiani (2006b), p. 22.
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inﬂow. However, also the counteracting factors have to be considered. In
the ﬁrst place, potential investors may be ﬁrst confronted by the lack of
skilled labour (a few years following massive emigration). Afterwards, it 
will be recognized that the given market is already ﬂooded with imported
goods, why should a new production location be established. Since free 
trade is the rule of the game (not only in the enlarged EU but also in EU-
Western Balkan relations), tariff walls in order to enter the given domestic 
market do not have to overcome. It is much more comfortable to keep on 
supplying the market from non-domestic (external) output.
It is not ruled out that migrants are able to generate investments in 
their native country, and to a macroeconomically relevant extent, How-
ever, the time factor again intervenes. Competitive large-scale invest-
ments require at least a decade (provided a lot of fortune can be seized in 
the accelerated global development), so that this expectation will remain 
to be proved after having collected a lot of experience with the ﬁrst de-
cade of impact of migrants on the sending countries.
As compared to potential and long-term trade and investment im-
pacts with measurable consequences on the balance of current account 
and payments, in most countries’ experience the outstanding role has 
been played by remittances by migrants to their family and relatives in 
the sending country.
According to World Bank ﬁgures, ofﬁcially recorded remittances
only grew from USD 58 bn in 1995 to USD 188 bn in 2005 (as regis-
tered in the banking sector alone). At the same time, ofﬁcial development
aid (ODA), starting from the same level (USD 59 bn) less than doubled 
(USD 106 bn), and the distance in favour of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) decreased substantially in one decade.32 Based on more recent ﬁg-
ures, migrants’ remittances in 2007 have been expected to reach USD 
318 bn (including non-bank transfers)33 or at least three times of ODA 
volumes. Between 2002 and 2007 global remittance ﬂows increased by
87 %, but at an outstanding rate of 107 % into developing countries. By 
far the largest increase was experienced by the emerging new migrant 
region of Eastern Europe and Central Asia (by 175 %), followed by Latin 
America and Sub-Saharan Africa (115, vs. 116 %, respectively).34 It is 
well known that the volume of remittances tends to be growing if a given 
32 FDI inﬂow grew from USD 107 bn to USD 237 bn between 1995 and 2005. For more detail see: Ratha
(2006), pp. 10-11.
33 International calculations put ofﬁcial and registered bank transfers at two-thirds of total remittances,
while one-third is considered to reach the beneﬁciaries by non-bank channels (mainly pocket-to-pocket).
34 Ratha, Dilip – Mohapatra, Sanket – Vijayalakshhmi, K. M. -  Xu, Zhimei (2007), p. 1 and 2.
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region suffers a natural catastrophe or a civil/ethnic war. Although this 
volume cannot be taken for granted for a long period, i.e. the process 
contains a high level of volatility, there has been a clear and positive cor-
relation between enhanced volume of remittances and the (consequences 
of) Western Balkan wars, particularly for Serbia.
Top recipients are three emerging developing countries, such as India, 
China and Mexico, followed by the Philippines and some large EUmem-
ber countries (France, Spain, Belgium, United Kingdom and Germany). 
Much more telling are ﬁgures that compare annual remittances to the
given country’s GDP. In this context, several Eastern and Southeastern 
European countries can be found in the top list led by Moldova (32 per 
cent of GDP), some ex-Soviet republics (Tajikistan, Kirgistan) and not 
less importantly, several Western Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia, 
Serbia), all of them well ofer 10 per cent of GDP. In addition, as a result 
of massive migration in the last ﬁve years, the role of remittances to
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland but also to Latvia and Lithuania indicate a 
rapid increase both as a share of ﬁnancing current account deﬁcit and as
a contributing factor to GDP.
There is no doubt that the most visible, almost immediate and posi-
tive impacts of migration can be manifested in the size and role of re-
mittances for the sending country economy. Below, we provide a short 
summary of the main positive impacts.
(a) Most importantly in macroeconomic terms, remittances have 
allowed the smooth (or less smooth, but manageable) ﬁnanc-
ing of the huge current account deﬁcit. All migrant countries of
Eastern and Southeastern Europe are struggling with huge trade 
deﬁcit, both the result of low level of international competitive-
ness, lack of export-oriented FDI and, of course, also of high-
level consumption of imported goods (partly due to the lack of 
domestic production at all, disregarding quality differences). In 
this situation, remittances can be considered as the basic factor 
of „salvation” (together with tourism in very few countries). 
(b) Remittances have certainly contributed to the reduction of abso-
lute (even if not relative) poverty,35 and, in this way, to the easing of 
fundamental social tensions in recipient countries heavily depen-
dent on such ﬁnancial sources. In turn, their impact on more equi-
35 According to a World Bank survey, cross-country evidence reveals that a 10 % increase in per capita 
remittances generates a 3.5 % decline of poverty (as measured in the share of poor people) (Ratha, 2006).
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table income distribution can, however, be seriously challenged.
(c) In principle, continuous and more or less stable monthly amount 
of remittances are expected to strengthen savings attitude and a 
shift of the disposable money towards investments in education, 
health and insurance. However, there is no linear correlation 
between ﬁnancial resources and expected attitude. Most impor-
tantly, the lion’s share of beneﬁciaries live in deep poverty and
need remittances to ﬁnance daily needs of survival (food main-
ly). Middle-income countries with high remittances may behave 
differently. However, the overall experience is that most of the 
money coming from migrants has been used to ﬁnance short-
term consumption. In many cases, the biggest barrier to shift 
towards savings and responsible investments in the own and the 
family’s future consist in deeply-rooted (or recently accommo-
dated) consumption patterns and „distorted” (?) mentality.
(d) Probably the most promising impact of remittances could be the 
generation of new ventures and the ﬁnancing of sustainable mac-
roeconomic development. Such activities are clear in the private (or 
dual-economy) sphere, such as construction, car purchase and IT 
technologies. However, it seems likely that most of these purchases 
are primarily linked to private consumption and only marginally to 
real investments. As of today, the multiplier impact of remittances 
on economic growth, structural change, enhanced competitiveness 
cannot be identiﬁed. More important seemed to be the crowding-out
impact of increasing imports on domestic producers and suppliers.
(e) Rapidly increasing amounts of remittances have had an impor-
tant inﬂuence on the everyday practice of the banking sector.
High to discriminatory transfer fees have diverted large remit-
tance sums into the intransparent ﬁeld (non-bank-transfers).
However, most recently, a ﬁerce competition is about to emerge
among banks to handle remittance issues.
(f) High level of remittances and its role in the stability (sustain-
ability) of the current account position can contribute to gener-
ating additional FDI ﬂows (if other conditions of the potential
host country are given). Moreover, it can improve the country’s 
ﬁnancial situation and, thus, ensure better access to internation-
al capital markets.
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Turning to the negative impacts of high inﬂow of migrants’ remit-
tances, the following observations have to be made.
(a) On the macroeconomic level, high volumes of remittances are like-
ly to generate inﬂationary pressure and nourish the appreciation
trend of the national currency. Partricularly the latter is deepening 
the process of increasing trade deﬁcit, since appreciated curren-
cies used to constrain exports and to increase imports. As import 
propensity in the families beneﬁtting from remittances is, from
the very beginning, high, currency appreciation gives additional 
impetus to consumption of imported goods (and services). The ad-
verse trend of appreciation can only be counteracted in countries 
with autonomous and ﬂexible exchange rate policies. (Countries
with currency board, as the Baltics or Bulgaria are, at present, ex-
cluded from making use of this „ﬂexibility instrument”.)
(b) Most probably the biggest negative impact of remittances can be 
identiﬁed not only in economic, but mainly in social and men-
tality-related ﬁelds. First, continuous (say, monthly) transfer of
a certain amount of money can easily create „transfer depen-
dency”, as many times experienced with EU farmers enjoying 
direct payments. As a result, such a situation leads to rent-seek-
ing mentality of a growing share of the population, with clear 
negative consequences on the labour market in general, and 
domestic labour mobility, in particular. This attitude is particu-
larly widespread in the ex-Yugoslav republics and Albania, with 
extremely high level of unemployment. To be sure, war-ridden 
economies burdened with the disruption of a large (?) domestic 
market are not surprised by having high level unemployment. 
However, some country’s ofﬁcial unemployment ﬁgures (real
ﬁgures would be higher) are deﬁnitely connected with the nega-
tive, i.e. „labour-prohibitive” mentality of many potential par-
ticipants on the labour market.
(c) Also, remittances help non-domestic (and certainly not develop-
ment-related) patterns of consumption to be further strengthened. 
Most of the countries beneﬁtting from remittances tend to have
high import-driven consumption. Visits by migrants, almost al-
ways carrying out pocket-to-pocket ﬁnancial transrers add to this
trend. Not less importantly, migrants coming back for holiday 
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season or family events, propagate Western (European) products, 
as a gift. Sooner or later, particularly in economies with weak 
background of domestic supply, such attitudes start creating an 
import-led consumption and mentality. In this was, current quan-
titative dependency may easily shift into qualitative dependency.
(d) The impact of remittances may easily become the hotbed of social 
conﬂicts. Since not all families (persons) beneﬁt from the posi-
tive impact of remittances (let alone equally), migrants can easily 
contribute to the split of the given society to remittance-keeping 
and remittance-not-keeping people. No question, the former will 
enjoy a much better position, at least as private consumption is 
concerned. Simultaneously, those citizens and parts of the soci-
ety that do not enjoy the beneﬁcial impact of remittances, will
feel increasingly outcrowded of the given society and becoming 
gradually marginalized. In sum, remittances have been likely 
contributing to the alleviation of poverty, but, at least as of today, 
they have been unable to reducing the income gap between differ-
ent parts of the society. This split has been accentuated by the fact 
that monthly remittances may be higher than average (let alone 
minimum) wages. In this case, social conﬂict may be sharpened
between two persons (and, more importantly, between beneﬁcia-
ries and non-beneﬁciaries of ﬁnancial transfers): one living from
remittances at least at the level of average wage, and the other 
trying to survive from his/her monthly salary (average or less).
(e) At least as of today, most of the remittances have been used for 
private consumption. Badly needed investments have not been 
started to be (co)ﬁnanced by private money earned by migrants.
Housing construction, car purchase or the establishment of small 
ventures (restaurants, car repair posts, retail trade shops, etc.) may 
be important for (future) personal well-being, but they do hardly 
contribute to sustainable macroeconomic development and, even 
less, to international competitiveness of the respective economy.
(f) Longer term experience with remittances can be characterized 
by high level of volatility (both in positive and negative sense) 
and by decreasing volumes over time. The monthly (or annual) 
transfer largely depends on the wage earned in the host coun-
try. If the latter is entering a recessionary phase, remittances 
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may be reduced, since many migrants may loose their job and 
become unable to provide money to family members or rela-
tives at home. Another „crash” may be produced by exchange 
rate changes. The rapid and constant devaluation of the US dol-
lar has already been creating a difﬁcult situation for migrant
remittances (ﬁrst of all, from countries using the US dollar as
their basic ofﬁcial foreign exchange deposit).36 Another element 
of volatility is linked to the changing attitude of the migrant. 
The more they are young mobile and without family, the high-
er is the propensity to establish future life in the host country, 
through marriage (either by host country citizen or by bringing 
somebody from the sending country), the purchasing of a new 
house/apartment and, as a result, the complex restructuring of 
salary distribution. In this case, as proved by many examples, 
propensity to remittances will be gradually decreasing, and new 
priorities linked to long-term stay in the host country will be-
come dominating future decisions.
(g) Last but not least, we do not have clear evidence of the interre-
lation between remittances and money laundering (although, 
at least partially, such an interconnection may already have 
materialized).
There is no doubt that remittances, as the primary and short-term pos-
itive impact on (e)migration had been playing a crucial role in the overall 
favourable assessment of the process of migration in several Central, East-
ern and Southeastern European countries. However, mixed experience is 
already observable, while affected governments are only slowly getting 
aware of the by far not only positive consequences of massive migration. 
I would not like to question the positive impacts of migration. However, 
in order to enhance the role of the positive elements, and, not less impor-
tantly, prevent extremely costly backlashes, sending country governments 
must develop a comprehensive program with the highest and quickest pos-
sible spill-over effect on sustainable economic growth and social consen-
sus (being sometimes conﬂicting aims, at least in the short run).
36 This is certainly not a big problem as long remittances are spent in  the “dollar-area” (see Mexicans and 
other Central and South Americans). The additional cost appears in the higher inﬂation rate (many times
delayed). Much more important impact on the future volume of remittances may have the US recession, in 
which millions of employees may loose their job who belonged to the hard core of  “transfer payers”. In more 
detail see: The Financial Times, October 30, 2007.
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6. Regional impacts
Migration geneerally has different impacts on selected regions of the 
given country. Unemployment-driven migration used to affect more re-
gions with high level of unemployment, while brain-drain-related migra-
tion is concentrated in higher developed parts (with universities) of the 
country. In addition, ﬁrst-wave migration may generate second-wave mi-
gration from the same region, based on family networks. In this way, mi-
gration impacts on the given region may be easily aggravated. Experience 
of sending countries shows rather different patterns of regional migration. 
From some countries, migration has been mainly nourished by the capital 
city or urban areas (Philippines), while other emigration countries were 
characterized by large-scale rural migration (Pakistan). The European 
picture is mixed. Rural migration was predominant for Albania, while 
two-thirds of migrants from Moldova came from urban areas.37
Regional impacts of migration have important consequences on the 
sending country. First, they may generate intra-country migration ﬂows
from surplus labour towards regions suffering labour shortage due to 
migration. However, this situation can only occur if the domestic labour 
market is ﬂexible and labour ﬂows are not hindered by a number of fac-
tors (supply-demand structure of the labour market, investment and job 
opportunities, ﬂexible housing market, availability of skill, etc.). Sec-
ond, regional differences may increase or, just the opposite, iron out pre-
vious wage differences. In inﬂexible labour markets wage differences
tend to increase, since more developed parts of the country struggling 
with labour shortage are forced to increase salaries. On the contrary, 
less developed regions, even if facing shortage of labour, will not be 
able to attract additional (local) labour despite higher wage offers. Thus, 
wage differences among regions of the same country are supposed to 
become larger. In consequence, not only depressed but evidently „dead” 
regions may emerge, with no opportunity to work, with high level of 
unemployed people or, even worse, just immobile elderly population. 
In an extreme case, as experienced in some regions of the Southeast-
ern European sending countries, several villages and other settlements 
may become completely depopulated, abandoned and exposed to rob-
beryand free looting. Increased migration from desperate rural areas 
to urban centres in some European countries have contributed to such 
37  Katseli – Lucas – Xenogiani (2006a), p. 32.
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a development in the last decade. Needless to say that such a process is 
fully against the cohesion policy of the EU to be ﬁnanced by substantial
ﬁnancial transfers from the common budget.
7. Demography and social issues
One of the long-term and lasting impact of migration on the send-
ing countries can be identiﬁed in the demographic trends, particularly if
natural population growth is stagnating or even negative. In fact, this is 
the case for most European sending countries. In this context, (massive) 
emigration has several adverse consequences. First, it lowers the number 
of people living in the native country (without considering potential im-
migiration). Second, and more importantly, it changes the age structure 
of the native population, both as a result of less young people available 
at home and as a consequence of the general demographic trend of rapid 
ageing (the age structure would be shifted towards elder people even 
without migration). Third, by modifying not only the age but also the 
gender structure of the society, it lowers the fertility rate, since one par-
ent is missing. Fourth, it aggravates regional imbalances. Fifth, it cre-
ates growing skill shortage. As a result of these factors, the tax-paying 
capacity of the society is declining, while the needs to ﬁnance the previ-
ous social security and pension system, let alone newly appearing huge 
regional disparities, are rapidly increasing. Thus, a huge pressure will be 
(or has already been) created in order to start fundamental and painful 
reforms of the „premature welfare state” in countries with low(er) level 
of economic development and with the daunting task of concentrating on 
catching-up to developed fellow EU members.
Not less burning issues become manifest in the social consequences 
of migration. As previously mentioned, remittances from working abroad 
may alleviate poverty and social problems for part of the population at 
home. However, at the same time, they create new tensions and social 
injustice, including irresponsible spending (consumer) habits. Much less 
attention has been devoted to the unfavourable longer-term social, edu-
cational and psychological impacts of migration. In fact, a large number 
of families have become split, mainly with the father/husband working 
abroad and the family remaining at home. As a result, the children will 
be educated in divided or „mutilated” family environment (single par-
ent households). The situation is likely to become more distorted if both 
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parents are employed abroad and the children are taken care by grand-
parents. As of today, and in Europe, we do not have sufﬁcient evidence to
what extent the new environment is affecting the educational and health 
patterns of the growing-on new generation. In principle, remittances 
may contribute to better ﬁnancing of education and health. However, this
is generally not the case, mainly due to the consumption pattern of the 
families living from remittances. In addition, children living in single-
household families left behind in depressed regions do hardly have equal 
chances of access to education and health care similar to urban areas.38
8. Government policy responses
As a result of large-scale emigration from selected Central, Eastern 
and Southeastern European countries in the last decade, the contradict-
ing effects have already become widely felt. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that more and more governments started to evaluate the current situation 
and shape longer-term strategies on migration. As of today, there is no 
comprehensive, let alone success-proven initiatve. However, some basic 
elements can be identiﬁed. In this concluding chapter the most important
considerations, efforts and instruments will be summarized.
First and despite mixed experience, all new member countries con-
tinue to emphasize the importance of free circulation of labour in the en-
larged EU. Full liberalization is scheduled in 2011 for the new members 
that joined in 2004 and by 2014 for Bulgaria and Romania. Future mem-
bers have to calculate with similar or even stricter transitional regulations
Second: some half-hearted initiatives have been taken in order to 
keep mainly highly-skilled people and workers employed in shortage ar-
eas at home. Such efforts, however, for several reasons, can hardly work 
efﬁciently and with broad impacts. On the one hand, the most important
regulator remains the market. Massive migration has already pushed up 
wages at a much higher rate than supported by productivity increase. Still, 
even higher and dynamically increasing wages were unable to dissuade 
people from migration, since the wage gap between the native and the po-
tential target country remains very signiﬁcant. However, higher local and
regional wages seem to have started a higher level of labour mobility, not 
least across national borders within the well deﬁned geographic extension
of cross-border areas (e.g. skilled Southeastern Hungarians working in 
38 For more evidence, see socio-economic analyses on Mexico or the Philippines. Katseli - Lucas – 
Xenogiani (2006b), p. 21.
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Western Romania). Neither high growth rates were able to let local people 
reconsider to give up their original migration plans. Concerning highly 
skilled people, three additional policy instruments may be applied. On the 
one hand, if allowed by the budgetary situation, wages in public admin-
istration could be substantially increased (near to the wage level for simi-
larly qualiﬁed people employed in the private sector). On the other hand,
private contribution to tertiary education would at least be able to distrib-
ute the investment costs and lower the size of „transfer payments” in the 
framework of brain drain from „input” to „output” countries. Obviously, 
this scheme would not change the fundamental pattern of transfers, but 
would increase the personal contribution and create a socially less unjust 
situation and transfer. Thirdly, young citizens with ﬁnished tertiary edu-
cation ﬁnanced by the central budget (e.g. by the taxpayers of the country)
may be committed to keep on working at home at least in the ﬁrst years
after having ﬁnished studying or, in case of migrating, pay back the costs
of their education. Although this approach seems to be socially just, but 
can more encourage than discourage migration of highly skilled young 
persons (even illegally). In the best case, it could postpone but not prevent 
emigration.39 Moreover, it could force mobile people with fresh diploma 
to stay home just in the ﬁrst and most productive years of further knowl-
edge-building, with the danger of depreciating the investment made in 
their education over years. After a few years when commitments will be 
lifted, their level of knowledge may be less suitable for working abroad 
than it used to be immediately after ﬁnishing tertiary education.
Third: active government policies have to focus more on immigra-
tion in order to substitute for the native emgirants. This process had been 
happening for decades between highly developed European countries and 
their colonial or geographic background, and can now be repeated by the 
less developed member countries characterized by high level of migration. 
Certainly, such a situation tempts to end up in a „beggar-your-neighbour-
policy” with serious consequences for several countries involved and not 
without potential regional conﬂicts. However, there is no feasible initiative
to counteract or contain the emergence and spread of such a pattern of 
„international division of labour”. Poles, Romanians and Bulgarians have 
been migrating to Western Europe and are now interested in attracting la-
bour from their even less developed neighbouring countries, such as Mol-
dova, Ukraine, Macedonia, or even Turkey and Russia. Most probably, 
39 Martin (2005), p. 96.
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more active immigration policies do not have a viable alternative for sev-
eral new members. However, the process is not free from dangers and new 
conﬂicts. First, not all countries are in a position to replace their migrants
by immigrants from the country next door. The labour supply chain may 
be broken or interrupted at some point (e.g. in the Ukraine, a country that 
is in high need to import labour, but from where). Second, a far-sighted 
and future-oriented immigration policy should not have a geographic but 
a skill-driven approach, by placing migration and labour market (as well 
as social) policies into the evolving global framework. Third, massive im-
migration into the new member countries is likely to face strong social 
(and populist political) opposition, since, for historical reasons, the social 
inclusion capacity is low to extremely low or sheerly non-existent.40 It is 
telling that the share of foreign-born population in several Western Euro-
pean countries amounts to 10 per cent or higher, the same ﬁgure hardly
exceeds 1 per cent in most new member countries of the EU.
Fourth: a deﬁnitely more active government support is required
concerning the utilization of huge amounts of remittances. The basic 
principle that remittances are not taxed, may be correct, but by far not 
sufﬁcient. Less developed countries with huge investment needs in busi-
ness, physical and human infrastructure and social services should make 
much better use of billions of dollars or euros of remittances than just 
to ﬁnance personal consumption or family-related investments (cars,
housing, computers) without any (meaningful) impact on sustainable 
macroeconomic growth and socio-economic modernization. In addition, 
long-term savings should also be encouraged in order to ﬁnance educa-
tion and better health care of children as well as partially ﬁnancing the
needs of better life after the working years. A two-way approach can be 
applied. On the one hand, existing barriers in the way of investments and 
savings have to be abolished. On the other hand, remittances directed to 
investments may be given special incentives.41 With regard to Europe, 
the EU should seriously consider plans to coﬁnance migrant remittances
if they are channelled into well-designed and promising „modernization 
40 This behaviour can largely be explained by the historical development and experience of Central, 
Eastern and Southeastern European countries (despite the completely different pattern developed in the late 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy). In turn, the largest immigration countries of Europe can rely on their colonial 
past and a much more tolerant domestic population, even if the level of tolerance started to decline in most 
of them in recent years.
41 For instance, Morocco should encourage rural investments, but they are likely to happen only after cre-
ating clear property rights. In lack of them, people prefer to invest in housing than in irrigation. As a positive 
initiative, the Indian government offers special incentives to people of Indian origin (PIO) to invest in the 
country. The Economist (2008), p. 12.
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funds”. (Not less importantly, such an approach could become part of a 
new Western Balkan strategy of Brussels.)
Fifth: efforts can be undertaken in order to bring back part of the 
young, skilled and risk-taking people from abroad. However, once design-
ing such instruments, policy-makers have to keep in mind that special 
privileges generally are not able to compensate for adverse socio-economic 
environment and lack of business conﬁdence. In turn, given a favourable
overall framework, they may generate new sources of sustainable economic 
growth. Some experts suggest the establishment of dual nationality/citizen-
ship status as an attractive means for bringing migrant people back home.
Sixth: network-building promises a number of advantages. Although 
its main aim does not consist in bringing back migrants in physical terms. 
Instead, it focuses on sharing the success of migrants with the native 
country, far beyond personal remittances. After a certain time, migrants 
in developed countries may be able to generate additional trade and in-
vestment ﬂows, encourage tourism, improve the ﬁnancial credibility of
the home country. Not less importantly, diasporas can successfully con-
tribute to the positive image-building of their fatherland. As proved by 
experience, in many cases diasporas can have a certain bargaining power 
in shaping the relations between their host and native country, both in 
political, cultural and economic terms.
Seventh: countries with high level of emigration should strengthen 
their (coordinated) efforts in the international arena. Two ﬁelds can be
mentioned, with potential longer-term results. One aims at the better reg-
ulation of migration ﬂows on the international and the regional levels and
at avoiding or at least lessening the negative impact of host-country-driv-
en and highly selective migration. Another, at the moment certainly not 
very promising effort could address the issue of the migration of skilled 
labour in order to reimburse at least part of the heavy investment costs 
channelled into the domestic education of many young, highly-skilled 
and talented native citizens who had been regularly and to a larger and 
larger extent sucked out of the less developed countries. In both cases, 
either new international platforms are required or some of the current 
ones should take up and incorporate the above topics into their agenda 
(for instance the World Trade Organization that has been dealing with 
a large number of trade-related issues, including intellectual property 
rights, certainly not a topic alien to costs of education).
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Introduction
Similarly to other post-communist countries of Central Europe, 
Hungary has turned from a sending country into a destination and 
transit country for migrants since almost two decades. Partly as a 
consequence of these developments and also within the context of 
a rapidly ageing population, the issue of migration in general and 
labour migration in particular has recently entered into the centre 
of public attention. The collapse of the communist regime towards 
the late 80s, early 90s, with liberalizing people’s movement (open-
ing the borders) meant a turning point also as regards East-West 
migration within Europe. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that this marks a new phase in the history of migration within the 
region (Wallace and Stola, 2001, p. 14.). 
The case of Hungary well illustrates the conclusions drawn by 
S. Sassen: “migrations do not simply happen. They are produced. 
And migrations do not involve just any possible combination of 
countries. They are patterned. Further, immigrant employment is 
patterned as well; immigrants rarely have the same occupational 
and industrial distribution as nationals in receiving countries.” (S. 
Sassen, 1999, p. 155., emphases are mine - KF) The fact that almost 
about three million ethnic Hungarians live in neighboring countries 
has a decisive inf luence on the pattern of immigration. In addition, 
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the emerging conf licts in some of these countries (especially in the 
former Yugoslavia) also gave rise to waves of immigration during 
the 1990s (partly in the form of inf low of refugees). The data (to 
be shown in the paper) clearly ref lect these.  
The paper is to provide a brief overview on the causes, facts, 
trends of migratory movements with special emphasis on labour 
migration and illegal foreign employment. The first section out-
lines the most important immigration tendencies in general and 
some factors shaping labour migration.  The second section aims at 
identifying the main trends of the inf low of illegal foreign workers. 
In view of its effects on both the labour market and the economy 
in general, this phenomenon requires special attention in order to 
respond adequately for the challenges it could pose. Therefore, its 
extent and main features need thorough investigation. The third 
section is to conclude.
I. Immigration trends in Hungary
The data on immigration in Hungary clearly show that it is closely 
connected to labour migration1. This is the reason why after outlining the 
general tendencies, a separate part is to deal with the presence of foreign 
labour in the country. 
I. 1. Immigration in general
According to latest data on legal migrants (January 2007), 166 
thousand foreigners with valid residence permission lived in the 
country, which is by 6.2%, i.e. 9.5 thousand more than in the previ-
ous year. As can be seen from the table below, since 2004 there has 
been a tendency of a slight increase in the number of foreigners (in 
2004, when joining the EU, their rise was more pronounced, be-
ing more than 10%). The share of foreign citizens within the whole 
population stands at around 1,6%. This could be considered as quite 
low in European comparison (especially if only the ‘old’ members 
i.e. the EU15 are regarded) and not high even in the Central and 
East-European region (for example, both in the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia foreign citizens’ share exceed 2%).  
1 Besides other data, this is evident for example from those of the Ofﬁce of Immigration and Nationality
(„Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal”): it was employment which was indicated as an objective of resi-
dence in more than half of all the applications for new or prolonged residence permits between 2002 and 2005.
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As the table below (Table 1.) shows, the overwhelming majority came from 
Europe (more than 80%), mainly from Romania (more than 40% of the total), 
Ukraine (usually around 10%) and Serbia (between 10 and 5%). Out of the 
EU15, Germany as a relatively important country of origin could be mentioned. 
Table 1. Number of migrants in Hungary between 2002 and 2007 (stock)
Country/continent 
of origin 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Europe (total) 97 640 98 230 110 915 122 261 130 535 140 827
Romania 44 977 47 281 55 676 67 529 66 183 66 951
Serbia 11 975 11 693 12 367 13 643 12 111 8 459
Ukraine 9 835 9 853 13 096  13 933 15 337 15 866
Germany 7 676  7 100 7 393  6 908 10 504 15 037 
Slovakia 2 213 1 536  2 472 1 225  3 597 4 276 
Asia (total) 14 401 13 480 14 715 15 121 18 543 19 733 
Out of this: China 6 840 6 420 6 790  6 856  8 584  8 979
America (total) 2 557  2 434  2 535 2 667  2 989  3 075 
Out this: USA 1 688  1 614 1 703  1 679 1 929  1 931 
Africa 1 318 1 281 1 455  1 556 1 800  1 783 
Grand total 116 429  115 888  130 109  142 153 154 430 166 030 
  Source: Central Statistical Ofﬁce, Budapest
Table 1 suggests a fairly stable picture over the last 6 years both as to 
the major sending countries and their citizens’ share in the total number 
of immigrants to Hungary. There is relatively high ﬂuctuation only in
the case of Serbia, but this could be explained by changes in statistical 
calculations2, by naturalizations (the share of which in total was slightly 
higher than later, being around 17% in 2002-2003 as against 7.5% in 
2006), and perhaps some return migration. 
Both the aforementioned slight increase in the stock of immigrants 
and also the ﬂow data show that Hungary has become a destination or
transit country. As a result of an inﬂow of more than 12 thousand in each
year since the early 90s and lower outﬂow3, net migration is positive (ac-
cording to Eurostat data, it stood at 1.7 per thousand population in 20054). 
2 Until 2003 citizens  of the republics of the former Yugoslavia were counted together (not only those 
of Serbia, but e.g. also those of Croatia). 
3 Although it has to be admitted that due to lack of registration of those who leave the country, the 
outf low data are not very reliable (only estimates could be made).
4 Quoted by: Fóti, 2007. p. 51.
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I. 2. Some trends in labour migration
Most of the migrants arrive with the aim of working in Hungary, and 
this is reﬂected by the dominance of working age young persons among
them: 58% are between 20 and 39 years old (Source: Central Statistical 
Ofﬁce5). In addition, the fact that the annual number of work permits are 
growing (between 1996 and 2005 it more than doubled) and it exceeds the 
yearly inﬂow of migrants (whereas the latter is stagnant) also indicates
that employment plays an increasingly important role within migratory 
movements directed towards Hungary (and of course, it demonstrates 
signiﬁcance of temporary migration as against of permanent one).
As regards the sending countries, it shows a heterogeneous picture, 
although the neighboring countries dominate. Workers from more than 
110 countries arrive to take up a job in Hungary, and foreign employment 
has been continuously increasing since the second half of the 90s. (Source: 
Public Employment Service). As a consequence of its liberalization in the 
wake of the accession to the European Union in May 2004, the data do not 
cover citizens of those countries, which became exempt of work permits. 
Due to increasing number of these countries, the statistics, based on work 
permits, could cover less and less workers arriving from other members 
of the EU6.  This is already clear from the table below (Table 2.), and also 
from those data which show the number of those work permits and other 
permission forms (registration, “green card” certiﬁcates and permissions
for agriculture seasonal work7) which were valid at certain point of time, 
usually on the last day of the year. (In the years 2004, 2005 and 2006, the 
number of work permits stood at 55 136, 46 391, 45 865, respectively.) 
5 Population Movement, 2006, Statistical mirror http://portal.ksh.hu/pls/ksh/docs/hun/xftp/ido-
szaki/nepmozg/nepmoz06.pdf (access: February 16, 2008).
6 When joining the EU, Hungary (similarly to Poland) insisted on reciprocity as regards restric-
tions concerning the movements of workers. As a result, due to their liberal approach to the inf low of 
East-European labor force since the accession, citizens of the UK, Ireland and Sweden were exempted 
of work permits in Hungary, whereas the same applies to Spain, Portugal, Greece and Finland since 
May 2006, to Italy since November 2006 and the Netherlands since May 2007. As regards the other 
New Members having joined at the same time, for them the Accession Treaty makes it possible to 
register them for administrative purposes. This opportunity is, as table 2. shows, mainly seized by 
workers from Slovakia. In cases of Bulgaria and Romania, the Hungarian government issued a decree 
in December 2006, which lists more than 200 occupations where work permits can be granted with 
simplified procedure, without examining the labor market situation. In addition, according to the 
general rule within the EU, (ÁFSZ, 2007.) those EU nationals who have worked in Hungary for more 
than 12 months are not required to have work permits even if they came from a country with which 
there is no reciprocity or the movement of their nationals are otherwise restricted. These are called 
„green card certificates”. 
7 This form is used mainly by Romanians and to some extent agricultural workers from Ukraine. 
In 2006 for Romanians 1897 such permission were issues, whereas for Ukrainians only 284, and the 
total stood at 2 216.  
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Table 2. Number of work permits, registrations and “green card” certiﬁcates,
issued between 2004 and 2006
Country/
C o u n t r y -
group
2004 2005
(Jan. 1 - Dec. 31)
2006
(Jan. 1 – Dec. 31)J a n 1 . -
Dec.31.
May 31 - 
Dec.31
Permits Registr. “Green card” Permits
R e g -
istr.
“Green
Card
P e r -
mits
R e g -
istr.
“Green
card”
EU15 1 834 0 284 1 981 2 328 1 918 3 274
Out of them: 
Germany 848 133 868 1 145 714 20
10 New Mem-
bers (joined 
in
2004)
2 511 14 242 0 0 18 896 0 0 16 123 0
Out of them: 
Slovakia 2 305 13 168 17 983 15 262
Other Euro-
pean 55 599 11 1 46 873 8 2 45 134 5 1
Out of them:
 Romania 42 879 6 1 35 547 3 1 33 136 3
 Ukraine 10 455 5 8 854 2 8 911 1
Other coun-
tries outside 
Europe
4 751 0 0 4 470 1 1 5 453 0 0
Out of this: 
China 1 114 1 216 1 470
Grand total 64 695 14 253 285 53 324 18 907 331 52 505 16 132 275
Source: ÁFSZ, 2007. (Public Employment Service, Budapest, Hungary)
According to the latest available data for 2007, which show ﬁgures
in the ﬁrst three quarters of the year, the decrease in work permits and
other forms continued also this year: if all the forms are considered 
together, the number dropped by 25.2% (compared to the same period 
of 2006, source: ÁFSZ, 2007.). It seems as if the number of Romanian 
workers had also dropped to some extent most recently (in 2007). Al-
though the time that passed is too short for a well founded explanation, 
this might be due to recent growth in the Romanian economy (obvi-
ously partly as a result of the accession to the EU).  Although the next 
table (Table 4) contains only estimate for 2007, it shows at least some 
signs of catching up process in the case of Romania.
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Table 3. GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in Hungary and the major 
East-European, CIS and Asian source countries of migrants to Hungary  be-
tween 2000 and 2007 (USD)
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Hungary 13 212 14 110 15 021 16 032 17 331 18 674 20 047 21 040*
Romania 5 974 6 496 6 974 7 521 8 424 9 081 10 125 11 080*
Serbia 4 198 4 514 4 789 5 026 5 620 6 155* 6 701* 7 265*
Slovak Republ. 11 393 12 033 12 737 13 538 14 671 16 049 17 913 20 002*
China 3 913 4 310 4 753 5 308 5 977 6 771 7 722 8 788*
Ukraine 4 130 4 661 5 036 5 680 6 597 7 046 7 832 8 624*
Source: World Economic Outlook Database for October 2007
Note: It is not the IMF which primary source information, but the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, or the Penn World Tables.
*Estimates
As can be seen from Table 3, in 2000 GDP per capita in Romania (in 
purchasing power parity) stood at only about 45% of the Hungarian level, 
in 2006 it was more than half of it (about 51%). In cases of most other send-
ing countries (with the exception of Slovakia) it is clear that income level 
differentials play a major role in motivation behind coming to Hungary. 
For example, in the case of Serbia, the lower income level (about one third 
of the Hungarian one) seems to be persistent which is also reﬂected in
wage differentials (for example, in 2003 the average gross monthly wage 
stood at one third of the same Hungarian ﬁgure – source: WIIW, 2004. p.
33.). It is obvious that for the workers from Slovakia income differentials 
per se do not play a major role nowadays. Reasons for their presence in the 
labour market of Hungary lie rather in the fact that many of them ethnic 
Hungarians who live along the border areas, quite close to Hungary, where 
unemployment tends to be quite high, whereas the neighboring Hungarian 
areas are developing partly as a result of increasing activity of multination-
als there, and even some skill shortages are emerging.
As mentioned, share of migrants in the population is not high in 
Hungary. Data of Table 2 shows that if work permits and other forms 
for permissions to enter the Hungarian labour market are considered, 
their number is not very signiﬁcant, either. Since, as mentioned, statis-
tics, based on permissions could cover less and less foreign employees 
and even in the past these data covered only a part of them (because not 
all foreign workers were required permission), it is worth to look at other 
data on their presence, and their status. 
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Table 4. Foreign workers’ share in employment and unemployment between 
1995 and 2005 (%)
Year Their share in employment
Their share among unemployed
Registered Labour Force Survey
1995 2.0 14.9 17.7
1996 1.9 14.5 17.3
1997 1.9 14.7 19.6
1998 1.9 17.0 21.9
1999 2.0 18.4 26.5
2000 2.2 21.8 32.3
2001 2.3 25.0 38.8
2002 2.6 29.1 42.1
2003 2.7 30.0 43.9
2004 3.3 33.8 50.2
2005 3.3 31.0 41.8
Source: Central Statistical Ofﬁce, Budapest, Hungary
Date of Table 4 conﬁrm the increasing presence of foreigners in the
Hungarian labour market.  Relating to this, their share among the reg-
istered unemployed has been also on the rise, but it is even more re-
markable that their proportion in the LSF unemployed has become quite 
signiﬁcant, from 17.7% to more than 40%. This shows their vulnerable
position and it can also be assumed that many of them are illegally em-
ployed. This is the topic we turn to next.  
II. Main features of illegal foreign employment
II. 1. On the hidden economy in Hungary
There have been various estimates for the size of hidden economy in 
Hungary (especially in the early 90s, when, according to some “guessti-
mates” it stood at as high as 30% of the GDP). Although its share since 
the economic and political changes might have decreased, due to still 
quite heavy tax burden on labour (high income taxes plus social security 
contributions), it can be assumed that unregistered employment, includ-
ing applying foreign labour illegally, is widespread8. According to a re-
cent survey among managers in the business sector, for example, 46% of 
8 An indirect indicator for this could be that in Hungary the ofﬁcial employment rate stands at a very low
level, even in East-European standards (about 57%). Neither the unemployment beneﬁt, nor the social as-
sistance system is generous. The widespread resort to illegal or semi-legal work could be an answer to the 
question of income substitution. 
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them said that hidden economy is present in the area where their ﬁrms
are functioning. Among these managers, 39% mentioned undeclared 
employment as one of the forms of hidden economy, and an additional 
7% said some manipulation with wage payment. (Ecostat, 2007).   
II.2. Illegal foreign employment 9
In order of its magnitude, the number of illegally employed foreign 
workers is estimated at 50,000 to 200,000. (According to experts’ esti-
mates, their share could range from 5% of undeclared employment in 
general, to 10% of the whole employment.) As regards the estimated 
absolute numbers, this cannot be regarded as particularly high, but the 
share of the informal economy is considerable (experts still put this be-
tween 20 to 30% of the GDP). In addition, those sectors, where illegal 
foreign work is concentrated, the share of illegally employed migrants 
could reach as high as around 5 to 10%. The most affected sectors are: 
construction, agriculture, commerce and petty trading. 
As far as trends of illegal foreign employment are concerned, their 
number increased quite considerably in the early 90s, which, due to the 
political changes and more openness, is understandable. It is difﬁcult to es-
tablish a clear-cut trend for the last couple of years, but it seems that there 
will not be a deﬁnite increase. It is true, though, that between 2000 and
2005 the number of legal migrants has doubled. It may well be that work 
of many illegal immigrants could be legalized during this period because, 
as mentioned, the system of work permissions became more liberalized, at 
the time of the accession, the limit was raised to 86 thousand work permits 
(but, as seen above, their number has always been lower than this limit).
If the working time is considered, according to a survey conducted in 
2000 estimated that around 30% of illegal work is done by foreigners, and 
because, according to the respondents, share of undeclared employment is 
around 10-30%, corresponding to about 300 thousand full-time workers, this 
means that the work, carried out by illegal foreign employees, corresponds 
to the work of several ten thousands of full-time workers. In addition, bear-
ing in mind that their turnover is high, illegal foreign work affects even more 
persons (Juhász et al.). People from the neighboring countries mostly arrive 
as tourists, because it is simple for them to return to their home countries, 
many of them actually commute on a weekly or monthly basis.
9 The data and some features quoted in this part are drawn from a survey conducted by Juhász et al. (see 
details: Juhász et al., 2006.)
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The main features of illegal work performed by foreign employees, 
as well as their composition have changed quite considerably over the 
last period (i.e. more than a decade). This clearly reﬂects those mainly
economic and social changes through which the country has underwent. 
Among the reasons the following ones could be highlighted:
▪ legal and legislative changes (partly within the context of join-
ing the EU); 
▪ the EU-membership itself, 
▪ changing economic climate and structure in Hungary; 
▪ transforming global environment (including economic adjustment 
of the neighboring counties and other countries of the region);
▪ emerging network and accumulated experience of migrants
The employment of illegal foreign employment in the construction 
industry is an interesting case in point not only because of its large extent 
(which is well known), but also due to the changes there. Unlike in many 
other sectors, here the number of illegal foreign workers is supposed to 
have increased over the last couple of years (according to experts quoted 
in a survey by Juhász et al., 2006.). The reason is that investments have 
generally risen and the other important factor is the shortage of skilled 
workers precisely with those skills (among others), which the building 
industry requires. The shortage is mainly due to the fact that training of 
qualiﬁcations for construction industry is hardly offered in the vocational
training institutions (about 1% of all the other qualiﬁcations offered are
adequate for the building industry). Presumably, the other reason for the 
shortage is the fact that the best skilled workers in building do work in 
Germany (within this context, it would be interesting to investigate fea-
tures and size of this “chain migration” in order to see to what an extent 
this phenomenon contributes to the current shortage of skilled labour). 
As mentioned, composition of migrants has also changed. Although 
data about illegal migrants are not reliable, some conclusions could be 
drawn, for example from changes in migrants’ age pattern in general be-
cause this reﬂects different types of migration. The data clearly show that
whereas in the second half of the 80s most migrants came for a longer 
period, so family uniﬁcation came to the fore, and as a result many young
women came to join their husbands, at the very end of the decade the aver-
age age of men also declined supposedly because young people, feeling a 
decay in the socialist system and due to gradual liberalization of travel in 
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some neighboring countries, increasingly arrived, and many of them came 
illegally. As a result of changes and the ensuing more liberalization, con-
solidated circumstances contributed to an increase in average age as well as 
to a shift towards migration of a more temporary nature. Relating to this, in 
the mid-90s there are less children among migrants, a fact which also rose 
the migrants’ average age. Another factor is that at the beginning of the 
changes (or even before) many ethnic Hungarians came with a clear aim of 
permanent residence in Hungary, whereas later this was less the case (con-
nected with the aforementioned shift towards temporary migration).
Among the motives of illegal labour migrants in Hungary as a desti-
nation country, mainly those well-known factors dominate, which usually 
prevail also in other host countries. They are as follows: escape from pover-
ty, extremely low wages if there is any job available, long-term unemploy-
ment, lack of alternatives and perspectives for ﬁnding a job, etc. It should
be added that out of the two main sending countries in Romania the average 
wage is about half of the Hungarian one, and in Ukraine it stands at about 
one third or just of a quarter, compared to the average Hungarian wage. 
Therefore, it is understandable that, as revealed by some surveys carried out 
in the early years of the new Millennium, most of the migrants themselves 
identiﬁed their main motive for taking up (illegal) employment as seeking
a better paid job. Of course, due to the large number of ethnic Hungarians 
coming from the two main sending countries, knowledge of the language 
plays also an important role. Geographical location (small distance) is on 
the third place among those motives which have of highest signiﬁcance.
The survey also revealed that nowadays those who arrive from the Trans-
Carpathian region of Ukraine and Transylvania from Romania, rarely plan 
long-term residence. At the same time, those who want to stay but have no 
residence permit as yet, are usually unwilling to take up illegal employment 
(they do that only if they have no other alternative) because they are aware 
that they would risk the possibility of obtaining a residence permit.
The presence of illegally employed foreign workers raises a number 
of dilemmas. The phenomenon itself clearly shows that there is a demand 
for such migrants. According to the Hungarian experiences, pointed out by 
various surveys, skill structure of the illegal migrants basically matches to 
the existing demand (even if there are some controversies, i.e. over-, or un-
der-qualiﬁcation). These facts point to the direction of long-term presence
of illegal foreign work. As regards policy implications, one previous survey 
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pointed out: “By way of illustration, it is generally agreed that there should, 
in general, be much simpler procedures and tax rules for seasonal casual 
workers employed on a daily basis. Foreign workers should be permitted to 
perform seasonal work because, in the peak season, the additional supply of 
workers compensates for the shortage of labour, without reducing domestic 
employment opportunities… With simpler and more ﬂexible rules, particu-
larly in certain sectors, a considerable proportion of illegal foreign labour 
could be channeled into legal forms of work” (Juhász et al., 1999) 
At the same time, it is clear that illegal foreign employment has many 
harmful effects. For example, in the construction industry, where the il-
legal foreign employment is signiﬁcant, as a consequence of widespread
ignorance of the most elementary safety measures, workers are heavily 
exposed to accidents (often serious ones), which even according to sta-
tistics, frequently occur (in Hungary, accidents at work are triple of those 
in Austria). So it is clear that in some areas efﬁcient measures are needed
aiming at combating illegal migration, but they should be introduced 
rather within a broader context: a generally better law enforcement and 
more efﬁcient and frequent labour inspection than purely administra-
tive, exclusively prohibitive measures. (For example, violation of safety 
at work rules should be always very seriously sanctioned.)
It should be emphasized, however, that the policy against illegal for-
eign employment has many challenges to face. For example, as a con-
sequence of the large role micro-ﬁrms play in it, an efﬁcient system re-
quires considerable human and other resources in order to spot the large 
number of individual cases.
In Hungary, an integration policy for migrants is being elaborated, 
which could have important implications also for the illegally employed 
foreign workers. Within the context of the integration strategy, the experi-
ences of some receiving countries in general and that of the United States in 
particular could be especially valuable (primarily as regards long-term stay 
of migrants and its consequences, e.g. family reunion and its impacts).
Conclusions
The paper was concerned with major immigration trends into 
Hungary, with special regard to labour migration and illegal foreign 
employment. As could be seen, migrants arriving to Hungary are 
mostly ethnic Hungarians with the same language and culture. This 
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is the reason why their integration does not pose a challenge for the 
country. At the same time, even the ofﬁcial data on their employment
and unemployment show that many of those who work in the country 
are in a vulnerable position. This is especially true for those foreign 
workers who are employed illegally. 
Unemployment is on the rise and the employment level is still 
very low in Hungary. Within this context, role of foreign labour seems 
to be a topical issue, even if their presence is not particularly high. Ev-
idence suggests that they rather ﬁll in certain labour market „niches”,
or shortage, than compete with the domestic workforce. 
Legislation and legal rules governing migration have been built up 
in Hungary. There are, however some problems (akin to those of also 
other countries). For example, although in the wake of the accession to 
the EU liberalizing measures were introduced, some dysfunctions, too 
restrictive rules, complicated bureaucratic procedures seem to make 
legal employment difﬁcult and fuel the illegal foreign work. In addi-
tion, within a broader context, lack of some important legal institu-
tions, weak law enforcement, „holes” in regulation, lack of effective 
control and sanctions all contribute to considerable hidden economy. 
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1. Introduction
Political and economic changes in the last 15-20 years have created new 
migration challenges for emerging Central and Eastern European countries. 
After some periods characterized by intense emigration, Hungary has be-
come a ‘receiving’ or ‘transit’ country in international migration. Hungary 
is an attractive target country especially for ethnic Hungarians born in the 
neighboring countries, so immigration policy dilemmas are usually con-
nected to issues of governments’ transnational ethnic politics (Kováts et al., 
2003).1 Since the largest Hungarian minority lives there, regarding inward 
migration, Romania is the most important relation for Hungary. 
Before collapse of socialist regimes, movement of Hungarians from 
Romania to Hungary was motivated mainly by political reasons. Never-
theless, during the 1990s, in parallel with the different path of economic 
transformation of the two countries, economic considerations became 
more relevant. The recent macroeconomic and regional development of 
Hungary and Romania, as well as changes in regulatory framework after 
the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 have again brought new condi-
tions for bilateral labour migration.
The objective of this paper is to highlight the main trends and driv-
ing forces of labour migration between Hungary and Romania. Section 2 
gives a short historical overview, which is essential to understand Hungary’s 
changing role in international migration as well as the main motives of mi-
grants coming from Romania to Hungary. Section 3 describes some general 
characteristics of the Hungarian labour market, pointing out that demand 
for foreign workers depends strongly on economic and labour market devel-
1 For analysis of political aspects and nature of public debates on migration between Hungary and its 
neighboring countries, see Melegh (2005) and Fox (2007)
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opments, and needs are concentrated in certain industries and in the more 
developed regions within the country. Section 4 presents how the employ-
ment of Romanian citizens has developed in Hungary and what economic 
factors and changes in regulation have affected the trends described. Section 
5 shows that the direction of cross-border labour migration (i.e. commut-
ing along the Hungarian-Romanian border) differs from that of observed 
at macro-level. Section 6 concludes with some lessons for other emerging 
countries planning to elaborate immigration policy in order to strengthen 
their competitiveness in the new European economic environment.
2. Historical context
Migration trends has always been playing an important role in demo-
graphic development of Hungary. Looking back to the 20th century, signiﬁcant
migration losses can be observed in certain periods, mainly as a consequence 
of unfortunate political events. Emigration of people born in Hungary was 
extremely high after the World War II and Revolution of 1956, but these times 
losses were offset by high level of natural population increase. Nevertheless, 
the size of Hungarian population has been decreasing since the beginning of 
1980s, resulting in unfavorable social and economic processes. This decline 
can be explained mainly by much lower number of births, but in the 1980s, 
in parallel with ‘softening’ of the state socialist regime, another signiﬁcant
outﬂow of people to the West emerged (Hablicsek and Tóth, 2002). Political 
changes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) started at the end of the 1980s, 
however, modiﬁed the country’s position in international migration. Hungary
was one of the few countries of CEE where the change of political regime was 
peaceful, meanwhile the outset of transition was accompanied with severe 
conﬂicts in two of its neighboring states. The revolution broken out in 1989 in
Romania and civil war started in 1991 in Yugoslavia forced many people to 
leave their homes. This period Hungary was one of the most important host 
countries for emigrants born in Romania and the former Yugoslavia. A part 
of the refugees later returned home or moved to another country, but data of 
population census carried out in 2001 indicates that net migration of some 
200 thousand took place in the 1990s (see Figure 1). Migration data compiled 
by the World Bank2 indicates that, among the Eastern European countries 
of the EU, net migration was positive during the transition period (between 
1990 and 2004) only in the case of the Czech Republic and Hungary. 
2 Mansoor and Bryce (2007), pp. 115-116
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Figure 1: Natural population change and net migration in Hungary, 
1901-2001 (persons)
Note: data refer to the current territory of Hungary
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce (population censuses)
The enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007 have again created 
new conditions for Hungary’s participation in international migration. 
On the one hand, contrary to prior expectations and comparing to less 
developed new member states, outﬂow of Hungarian workers has been
not signiﬁcant after 1 May 2004.3 However, propensity to emigrate has 
been growing in certain types of occupations (e.g. doctors, nurses, engi-
neers, scholars). On the other hand, Hungary has become more attractive 
for immigrants as a ‘target’ and, mainly after joining the Schengen Area 
in December 2007, as a ‘transit’ country.
It is quite difﬁcult to deﬁne the current size of Hungary’s immigrant
population exactly. In the latest population census carried out in 2001, 
about 300 thousand residents, representing 3 per cent of total population, 
declared that they had not been born in Hungary. This proportion is low 
by international comparison, which can be explained mainly by some im-
portant characteristics diagnosed by Sik (2007). First, Hungary is an ethni-
cally homogeneous country. Second, Hungarian society is one of the least 
3 For regional comparison see Tirpak (2007)
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tolerant and most xenophobic society in Europe. Third, the Hungarian 
language is very difﬁcult to learn, acting as a ‘natural barrier’ to the im-
migration of non-Hungarians. These factors explain to a large extent why 
most of the immigrants arrive from the neighboring countries where nu-
merous ethnic Hungarians live. Census data also indicate that about half of 
foreign-born population, 144 thousand people immigrated from Romania. 
On 1 January 2006, foreign citizens accounted for 1,5 per cent of Hunga-
ry’s total population. The share of Romanian citizens is still the highest (43 
per cent) but it has decreased slightly between 1996 and 2006. In parallel, 
the number of foreign citizens coming from other neighboring countries 
(Ukraine, Slovakia) and China has increased considerably (see Figure 2). 
It must be added, however, that 72 thousand foreign (of which 45 thousand 
Romanian) citizens were naturalized during the years 1996-2005.4 
Figure 2: Number of foreign citizens residing in Hungary by citizenship (country)
1996 and 2006 (thousands)
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce (Demographic Yearbooks)
So, it is evident that regarding inward migration, Romania is the 
most important relation for Hungary. The intense migration relationship 
between the two countries can be traced back to historical events. The 
current Hungarian-Romanian border is not a historical, natural, cultural 
or ethnic border (Hunya and Telegdy, 2003), it was created by the Trianon 
4 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce (Demographic Yearbooks)
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Treaty ending the World War I. More than one third of the territory of 
the former Kingdom of Hungary was assigned to Romania by the peace 
treaty, resulting that some 1,7 million Hungarians found themselves be-
yond the new border. During the World War II, the population exchange 
agreement between the two countries again led to signiﬁcant migration
movements. In the communist era, emigration possibilities were rather 
limited in both countries. Before 1989, emigration from Romania was 
mainly based on ethnicity, economically motivated migration gained im-
portance only in the 1990s. Emigration of ethnic Hungarians from Ro-
mania accelerated in the second half of the 1980s. Most of them, usually 
illegally, moved to Hungary (Horváth, 2007; UNDP, 2007, pp. 93-113). 
The ‘Global Migrant Origin Database’ – developed by Migration 
DRC and based on data of 2000 round of population censuses – reveals 
that during the 1990s Hungary was one of the most preferred countries 
for emigrants born in Romania.5 However, it must be also noted that in 
the last decade visa requirements imposed by the old EU member states 
were still signiﬁcant barriers to Romanian citizens’ economic emigra-
tion to Western European countries. They can travel freely within the 
Schengen Area from 20026, which has contributed to more signiﬁcant
outﬂow of employees7, and resulted that other countries than Hungary 
(Italy, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom) have already become much 
more popular destinations for emigrants born in Romania. 
3. Demand for foreigners in the Hungarian labour market
The case of Hungary supports the hypothesis that demand for foreign 
labour is strongly correlated with a country’s general economic and labour 
market developments. The number of work permits issued to them could 
be used to estimate the size of legal employment of foreigners in Hungary. 
Analyzing these data, it can be seen that demand for foreign workers de-
creased sharply in the period of transformational recession accompanied by 
massive unemployment (1990-1993). During the years of macroeconomic 
stabilization (1994-1996), it stagnated at a relatively low level. Then, in par-
allel with dynamic economic growth, number of work permits issued to 
foreign citizens was increasing considerably, resulting that share of foreign 
5 Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty: Global Migrant Origin Data-
base (Updated March 2007; Version 4) http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_mi-
grant_origin_database.html
6 The reciprocal visa requirement between Hungary and Romania was phased out in April 2003
7 According to ofﬁcial estimates, about 2 million Romanian citizens, representing about 10 per cent of the
country’s inhabitants, are now employed abroad in non-seasonal activities.
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workers in total employment increased from 0.5 to 1.5 per cent between 
1996 and 2003. Data for the years 2004-2006, however, are not completely 
comparable with previous periods, because new regulations have come into 
effect in 2004. Until the EU accession, all foreign citizens (regardless of 
their origin) needed work permit to get a job in Hungary. Since 1 May 
2004, citizens of EU15 may obtain a ‘green card certiﬁcate’ entitling them
to undertake any job in Hungary without work permission, but there is no 
obligation at all for people coming from a country that has already opened 
its labour market for Hungarians. Employers of citizens of the other new 
member states (with the exception of Cyprus and Malta) have to report, but 
only for registration purposes (HPES, 2007). If we add the numbers of work 
permits, registrations and green cards, it can be observed that level of for-
eign employment reached its peak in 2004, representing 2 per cent of total 
employment, but since then it shows a downward trend (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Number of foreign citizens having work permit in Hungary, 1989-2006
Notes:
▪ number of work permits issued to foreign citizens during each year
▪ data refer to the years 2004-2006 include not only the number of work permits but also the 
number of ‘registrations’ and ‘green card certiﬁcates’
Source: Hungarian Public Employment Service; author’s calculations
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It is also important to examine the current labour market situation 
and developments in order to judge the employment opportunities of 
foreign workers and prospects for potential migrants (Fóti, 2007). As 
Table 1 shows, the employment rate of population aged 15-64 is much 
lower in Hungary than that of in EU15, and lags signiﬁcantly behind the
70 per cent target set by EU’s Lisbon Strategy. Disaggregating data for 
the main age groups, younger and older population are characterized 
by extremely low level of employment. The main reason for the poor 
performance of these age groups is their low level of activity. Expan-
sion of upper and tertiary education resulted that most of the young-
sters enter labour market later, and usually do not take a part time job 
during their studies. In the case of older people, low retirement age 
and deteriorating health status are the main factors, but their educa-
tion attainment, skills and experiences have also been devalued since 
the beginning of the economic transformation. Labour market indica-
tors also reveal that in Hungary it is very difﬁcult to ﬁnd a permanent
(and legal) job for people with only a primary or less education. The 
unemployment rate of unskilled workers is two times higher than that 
of workers having at least upper secondary education. These problems 
are greater for the most disadvantaged groups of the Hungarian soci-
ety, mainly for Roma population, disabled persons and people living 
in underdeveloped regions. The level of unemployment in Hungary is 
still below the EU15-average (although recently has been increasing), 
and can be deﬁned as ‘structural unemployment’, i.e. more and more
companies in certain sectors and regions face the problems caused by 
labour shortage. Annually 40-50 thousand vacancies are registered8, 
enterprises mostly need workers with vocational qualiﬁcations. Tak-
ing these characteristics of the Hungarian labour market into account, 
two conclusions can be drawn. First, demand for foreign labour is con-
centrated in certain economic sectors and regions. Second, Hungarian 
companies facing labour shortage need young, skilled (or semi-skilled) 
foreign workers with a good health status.
8 See Fazekas et al. (2007), p. 211 
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Table 1: Employment, activity and unemployment rates in Hungary and EU15,
by age groups and educational attainment (percentages), 2005
Employment rate Activity rate Unemployment rate
Hungary EU15 Hungary EU15 Hungary EU15
Selected age groups
   15 to 24 21.8 39.9 27.1 47.9 19.4 16.9
   25 to 54 73.7 77.7 78.8 83.9 6.4 7.4
   55 to 64 33.0 44.4 34.9 47.5 3.9 6.5
   Total (15 to 64) 56.9 65.2 61.4 71.1 7.2 8.4
Educational attainment*
   Less than upper secondary 38.1 57.8 43.5 63.5 12.4 9.1
   Upper secondary 70.4 75.5 74.9 80.2 6.0 5.9
   Tertiary 83.0 84.5 85.0 88.3 2.3 4.3
* Persons aged 25-64
Source: OECD: Employment Outlook 2007 (Statistical Annex)
4. The main characteristics of labour migration between 
Hungary and Romania
The regular reports of the Hungarian Public Employment Service 
show that 80-90 per cent of labour migrants were born in the neighboring 
countries, majority of them in Romania. The number Romanian citizens 
almost quadrupled between 1996 and 2003, so their share in total foreign 
employment increased from 45 to 60 per cent by 2003. Meanwhile, labour 
inﬂows from Ukraine and Slovakia also grew rapidly (HPES, 2007). 
The distribution of foreign workers by country of origin has been 
modiﬁed signiﬁcantly by the recent modiﬁcation of regulations concerning
foreign employment. The most spectacular change was that the number of 
workers coming from Slovakia has been more than doubled after EU-ac-
cession. Slovakian citizens do not need work permit (obtaining of which is 
quite slow and bureaucratic), they have only simple registration obligation 
since 1 May 2004. Presumably, this facility has signiﬁcantly contributed
to legalize a part of employment of cross-border commuters.9 Number of 
work permits issued to Romanian citizens, however, declined by more than 
10 per cent since 1 May 2004. In 2007, after the EU-accession of Romania 
and Bulgaria, the Hungarian government announced a list of more than 
200 professions where work permits would be issued to Romanian and Bul-
garian citizens without examining the labour market situation. This partial 
9 Some multinational companies (e.g. Nokia, Suzuki) located in regions directly bordering Slovakia de-
clared that they tried to solve the problems caused by lack of manual workers in Hungary with recruitment 
from southern part of Slovakia.
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liberalization, however, has not resulted in a massive inﬂow of labour mi-
grants from Romania to Hungary, even the number of work permits issued 
to them has declined in the ﬁrst three quarters of 2007 (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Work permits, registrations and green cards issued to foreign citizens 
in Hungary, by country of origin, valid at 30 April 2004, 31 December 2006 and 
30 September 2007
Country of origin
Valid at 
30 April 
2004
Valid at
31 December 2006
Valid at
30 September 2007
Work 
permit
Work 
permit
Regist-
ration
Green 
card Total
Work 
permit
Regist-
ration
Green 
card Total
Romania 32229 29353 5 2 29360 24115 8 4360 28483
Slovak Republic 7003 0 16659 0 16659 0 17278 0 17278
Ukraine 8670 7670 6 0 7676 8546 7 0 8553
EU15 2244 1596 7 707 2310 1258 7 784 2049
Serbia and Mont. 1134 1658 3 0 1661 2075 3 0 2078
China 791 1240 0 0 1240 1545 0 0 1545
Other countries 3639 4471 1238 11 5720 5524 1324 36 6884
Total 55710 45988 17918 720 64626 43063 18627 5180 66870
Source: Hungarian Public Employment Service
This may indicate that some Romanian citizens, instead of Hungary, 
have chosen other countries, which have fully liberalized their employ-
ment on 1 January 2007. This decreasing trend will probably not contin-
ue, because from 1 January 2008, as in the case of workers coming from 
Slovakia, Romanian citizens are also be subject only to registration.
Comparing to the distribution of all employees, workers coming 
from Romania are over-represented in the economic sectors where il-
legal employment is typically concentrated. Using data for 2003, it can 
be seen that more than one-third of the Romanian citizens works in con-
struction, which is considered as the ‘blackest’ sector. Their presence 
is also signiﬁcant in manufacturing, trade, catering and agriculture. It
is interesting that a relatively high proportion of Romanian citizens are 
employed as sportsman, artist etc (see Table 3). Although ofﬁcial data
are not available, it can be assumed that the number of foreign (among 
them Romanian) employees working in hospitals has recently been in-
creasing, supplying the shortage in certain ﬁelds of health care, caused
by a signiﬁcant outﬂow of doctors and nurses from Hungary to Western
Europe accelerated from 2004.
206
Table 3: Employment of Romanian citizens and all employees in Hungary, 
by economic sector of the employer, 2003
Economic sector
Romanian citizens All employees
Persons % %
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 2428 8.8 4.4
Mining and quarrying 20 0.1 0.4
Manufacturing 5282 19.1 25.2
Electricity, gas, steam and water supply 409 1.5 1.9
Construction 9976 36.1 7.0
Trade and repair; hotel and restaurants 4464 16.2 16.8
Transport, storage and communication 228 0.8 7.8
Financial intermediation 531 1.9 1.9
Education 388 1.4 9.4
Health and social work 983 3.6 7.3
Others and unknown 2900 10.5 17.9
   of which: sports, culture etc.      2900      10.5 ..
Total 27609 100.0 100.0
.. not available
Source: Laky (2004), p. 80; Fazekas et al. (2007), p. 173; author’s calculations
As already mentioned above, most of the Hungarian companies need 
workers having at least vocational education, so it is unfavorable that 
two-thirds of Romanian labour migrants employed in Hungary possess 
only primary (or less) education (see Sik, 2005). Consequently, most of 
them are employed in low-paid jobs. 
Let’s turn the main economic factors driving labour migration from 
Romania to Hungary (see Table 4). The economic development gap 
(measured by the difference of GDP per capita) between the two coun-
tries has narrowed signiﬁcantly, by some 10 percentage points in the pe-
riod 1999-2006, but it is still considerable. As one of the main push-pull 
factors, wage differences are also decreasing but have remained signiﬁ-
cant. Taking also the different rates of taxation on wages as well as the 
relative price levels into account, average earnings in Hungary are about 
two times higher than in Romania. Nevertheless, the massive wage out-
ﬂow has continued in Romania, while in Hungary real wages have been
falling in 2007, which could also result that some Romanian citizens 
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returned home or moved on to one of the Western European countries. 
Current levels of employment and unemployment do not show much dif-
ference. In recent years, however, employment rate has been increasing 
slightly in the case of Hungary, but it has been declining (indicating ‘job-
less growth’) in Romania.10\
Table 4: Comparison of economic development level and some labour market 
indicators of Hungary and Romania, 1999 and 2006
Indicator
Hungary Romania
1999 2006 1999 2006
GDP per capita in PPS, EU27=100.0 53.8 65.3 26.1 37.6
Employment rate (population aged 15-64), % 55.6 57.3 63.2 58.8
Unemployment rate (active population aged 15-74), % 6.9 7.5 6.6 7.3
Long-term unemployment rate, %* 3.3 3.4 2.9 4.2
Average gross earnings, EUR / month** 314.2 653.4 .. 309.4
Price level for GDP, EU27=100.0 46.2 58.2 32.2 50.9
Minimum wage, EUR / month .. 247.0 .. 90.2
.. not available
* Long-term unemployed (12 months or over) as a percentage of total active population
** In industry and services; of full-time employees in enterprises with 10 or more employees
Source: Eurostat
Despite the differences described, economic factors do not give suf-
ﬁcient explanation regarding driving forces of labour migration between
Romania and Hungary. Mainly geographical and cultural proximity en-
sure ‘comparative advantage’ for Hungary against Western European 
countries with higher standard of living. First, it is easier to maintain 
relations with families, friends left behind. Second, as Section 1 already 
pointed out, the overwhelming majority of labour migrants coming from 
Romania are ethnic Hungarians. So, common language, traditions and 
culture help them to be integrated into the Hungarian society more easily 
than it would be the case in another country. 
10 In the period of 2002-2006, the official unemployment rate of Hungary has increased, while that 
of Romania has been reduced significantly. The latter can be explained to a large extent by a direct 
impact of huge emigration started after the abolition of Schengen visa requirements for Romanian 
citizens (UNDP, 2007, p. 97).
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5. Regional dimensions: labour ﬂows along the Hungarian-
Romanian border
In Hungary, demand for foreign labour is highly concentrated spa-
tially. Some 60 per cent of the foreign citizens are employed in the most 
developed Central Hungarian region including Budapest. The share of 
the Eastern Hungarian counties (NUTS III regions) directly bordering 
Romania is only 5 per cent (see Table 5). Data on regional distribution 
of workers coming from Romania are not available, but (because of 
their high proportion in foreign employment) similar conclusions can be 
drawn for their location choice.
Table 5: Work permits issued to foreign citizens in Hungary, by location (NUTS 
II regions) of the employer, (valid at 31st of December), 2006
Region (of which capital / county) Number % of total
Central Hungary 39500 61.1
    of which: Budapest       27938         43.2
Central Transdanubia 14312 22.2
Western Transdanubia   2960   4.6
Southern Transdanubia    963   1.5
Northern Hungary  2186   3.4
Northern Great Plain  1262   2.0
     of which: Hajdú-Bihar          282          0.4
     of which: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg          625          1.0
Southern Great Plain  3417   5.3
     of which: Békés          323          0.5
     of which: Csongrád        1877          2.9
Total 64600 100.0
Note: Data include not only the number of work permits but also the number of ‘registrations’ 
and ‘green card certiﬁcates’
Source: Hungarian Public Employment Service
Mainly economic reasons are responsible for this territorial dispro-
portion. GDP per capita in Central Hungary is almost 50 per cent higher 
than those of the border regions (Northern Great Plain and Southern 
Great Plain). Furthermore, the unemployment rate is 3-4 times higher in 
these underdeveloped regions than that of Central Hungary where many 
companies complain about problems caused by labour shortage.11 
11 For regional economic data see Fazekas et al. (2007), pp. 215-222
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Taking a closer look at the Hungarian-Romanian border region, de-
ﬁned as four Eastern Hungarian and four Western Romanian counties,
one can ﬁnd that a less developed region of a more developed country
meets a more developed part of a less developed country (Hunya and 
Telegdy, 2003). Moreover, economic development level of the Romanian 
Arad and Timis counties has already become higher than that of the Hun-
garian Békés and Szabolcs counties (see Table 6). Territorial differences 
of two sides of the border can be mainly explained by their inherited eco-
nomic structure and attractiveness for foreign direct investments (FDIs). 
Economy of the larger part of Eastern Hungary is still dominated by ag-
riculture and food industry, little industrial production with higher value 
added is concentrated in county seats and some major towns. It seems 
that recent years, in contrast to expectations, most of FDIs have ‘skipped 
over’ Eastern Hungary and brought additional sources for catching-up of 
Western Romanian border region.
Table 6: Comparison of economic development and unemployment rates of 
Hungarian and Romanian border counties (NUTS III regions)
County
GDP per capita (at current market 
prices) in PPP, EU27=100.0
Unemployment rate 
(15 years and over), %
1998 2004 2005
Békés 37.0 39.1 8.4
Csongrád 47.7 49.5 7.5
Hajdú-Bihar 40.4 48.7 8.4
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 30.4 35.8 10.3
(Hungary) (53.5) (64.0) (7.2)
Arad 35.9 40.0 6.6
Bihor 29.6 36.9 4.7
Satu Mare 18.6 29.5 11.6
Timis 30.7 47.1 2.3
(Romania) (27.6) (34.0) (7.2)
Source: Eurostat
 
The different economic path of Eastern Hungarian and Western 
Romanian parts may affect the regional labour market development 
as well. Unlike in the case of the Hungarian-Austrian and Hungar-
ian-Slovakian borders, where commuters usually work in a more de-
veloped country, it seems that labour ﬂows begins to follow the op-
posite direction along the Hungarian-Romanian border than generally 
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expected. The more dynamic economic growth of Western Romania 
has resulted that unemployment has considerably decreased there (see 
Table 6), meanwhile wage differences have been equalized between the 
two parts of the border. Although there are no ofﬁcial data indicating
this phenomenon, there are some multinational companies located in 
the most industrialized Arad and Timis countries known, which faces 
labour shortage in Western Romania and has started to recruit work-
ers from some Eastern Hungarian border settlements characterized by 
extremely high level of unemployment.
6. Conclusions
In Hungary, ageing population and growing structural unemploy-
ment are the most important factors that require paying more attention 
to challenges related to international migration. Because of historical 
and cultural reasons described above, the neighboring countries, acting 
as ‘hinterlands’, are the main sources of immigration to Hungary. Con-
sequently, public and political debates on immigration issues are usually 
connected to dilemmas of transnational ethnic politics, in which there 
is no political consensus among the Hungarian parties. Obviously, not 
demographic and economic concerns, but considerations determined 
by distorted public attitude dominate political debates. This conﬂict
is also reﬂected in the current development strategy of Hungary. In
the Social Renewal Operational Programme (2007-2013), ‘economic 
migration – especially of Hungarians living across the border – may be 
conducive to meeting the economy’s labour needs’ is considered as one 
of the ‘opportunities’ of SWOT analysis. On the other hand, ‘the lower 
wages in the neighbouring countries and higher willingness of mobil-
ity might cause growing migration pressure’ is deﬁned as a ‘threat’
to human development of the country (Government of the Republic of 
Hungary, 2007, pp. 55-56).        
What lessons can be drawn from the case study of migration be-
tween Hungary and Romania for other emerging countries in CEE try-
ing to attract more immigrants? First, only the geographical, historical 
and cultural proximity could compensate the more attractive ‘pull fac-
tors’ offered by the Western European countries. Furthermore, consid-
ering the current level of development of societies in CEE, successful 
integration of people with totally different cultural backgrounds seems 
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to be not realistic. Second, the majority of workers migrating to CEE 
countries do not have any qualiﬁcation, so they are usually employed in
low-skilled and low-paid, mainly illegal jobs. So, in parallel with open-
ing of the labour market, more efforts should be made to combat illegal 
employment. Third, detailed and regular labour market analysis, identi-
fying industries and regions where companies have demand for foreign 
employees, are essential before making of decisions on liberalization 
steps. Fourth, a more expansive income policy is needed to stop mass 
emigration and promote economic immigration. 
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Introduction
On January 1, 2007, Bulgaria became a member state of the European 
Union (EU), and among other effects, its borders have been opened to the 
migration experienced by several other countries as they joined the EU. 
Traditionally a country of emigration, Bulgaria anticipates becoming a 
country of net immigration in the future as the country becomes increas-
ingly attractive to those of Bulgarian origin from Southeast Europe as 
well as to citizens of the Middle East and North Africa.  As it foresees the 
immigration of newcomers, it is also aware of the rising “brain drain” as 
educated and skilled Bulgarians ﬁnd opportunities to move more freely to
occupations outside the country. It is laudable, then, that the nation is tak-
ing steps to address these inevitabilities by seeking to explore the means to 
(a) ensure that Bulgaria is attractive enough to keep skilled Bulgarians at 
home, (b) prepare for the settlement of recognized refugees and foreigners 
with immigration permits, and (c) be cognizant of the likelihood of a grow-
ing population of undocumented workers in the labour force. This project 
is concerned with the integration of documented immigrants to the host 
country, hence, this paper focuses speciﬁcally on relevant United States’(U.
S.) immigration and immigrant policies and associated programs.
Immigration policies, (the laws that determine who is eligible to en-
ter the country) and immigrant policies (laws and programs that reﬂect
how immigrants are received once they are in the country) should be 
differentiated. In the U.S., the former are federally regulated and apply 
across the nation, while the latter are highly dependent on state and local 
programs and local public perceptions,  and they can show a great deal of 
variability. Several immigrant policies are instrumental in determining 
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how well human capital is nurtured and developed. The readiness of a re-
ceiving country to accept immigrants in general, or an immigrant group 
in particular is, itself, a complex matter. When immigration is viewed 
as inextricably bound to a nation’s political, economic, and social well 
being as well as its future security interests, it is likely to be welcomed. 
Policies that allow immigration are coupled with those that permit the 
expulsion or deportation of foreign nationals.  
Discussions of terminology regarding migration in Bulgaria differ-
entiated between documented migrants and those who did not have the 
appropriate documentation to be in the country.  Of the latter group, four 
different categories emerged: Undocumented immigrants, illegal immi-
grants with valid documents, immigrants without any documents, and 
“misdocumented” immigrants (Inotai, 2007).  Immigration terminology 
in the U.S. groups entrants into two general categories: documented im-
migrants (voluntary and involuntary) and undocumented, unauthorized, 
or illegal immigrants.  Voluntary documented immigrants are those who 
have entered the United States on their own volition after applying for, 
and being granted, the appropriate visas for entry.  Involuntary docu-
mented immigrants are refugees so recognized by the United Nations 
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) under the 1951 U.N. Con-
vention, who were outside their country of origin and are resettled in 
the United States. Unauthorized immigrants are usually voluntary, un-
less they are victims of human trafﬁcking. These are people who are in
the U.S. without governmental approval and are sometimes described as 
economic refugees, but are not so recognized by the UNHCR. Although 
undocumented immigrants lack the legal documentation to be residing 
in the U.S., they may have entered the country legally or illegally, and, 
in the former instance, fail to leave the country when the term of their 
visa expires.  A third category of immigrants are “asylees” who are un-
documented individuals (who either entered legally or illegally), but who 
apply for refugee status once they are on U.S. territory. 
This paper seeks to provide a broad-brush picture of immigration in the 
U.S. in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st Century, including immigration and immi-
grant policies, an immigrant proﬁle, and the role of human and social capital
in immigrant integration. Following this, the paper will attempt to make 
some comparisons between the U.S. and Bulgaria based on discussions at 
the four-day December 2007 workshop and ﬁeld study visits organized by
the Economic Policy Institute through the German Marshall Fund.
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Immigration and Immigrant Policies
Immigrant adaptation in a new country reﬂects the interplay of the
reasons for departure from the homeland, the experience of migration, 
the tangible and intangible resources for functioning in unfamiliar envi-
ronments, and the effects of the receptiveness of the host country (both 
politically and socially) to immigrant presence (Figure 1). Thus the bal-
ance of human capital brought by immigrants and social capital available 
to them, either through their own networks or the socio-politico-eco-
nomic milieu of the host country, determines adaptation and contribu-
tion to the destination country.  
Thus, although one may be interested in emigrating from one’s home-
land, the move is highly contingent on the receptiveness of the potential 
host nation to immigrants in general, and immigrants from speciﬁc coun-
tries in particular. Furthermore, the level of receptivity is inﬂuenced by
perceptions regarding the costs and beneﬁts of immigration to the host
country, and most immediately, in the economic realm.  It is clear that 
most nations that ﬁnd their populations are declining tend to have more
liberal immigration policies (Canada, Sweden) than may others, although 
Japan is an outlier in this regard.  However, political and security concerns 
also inﬂuence immigration, and since 2001 and the terror attacks in New
York and Washington, D.C., immigration standards and controls have been 
heightened in the U.S.  These attacks have inﬂuenced U.S. attitudes toward
human rights and are reﬂected in the decline in the number of refugees
admitted into the country. Admissions that had reached 90,000 annually 
dropped to 25,000 in 2001 and annual refugee ceilings, set by the President 
in conjunction with Congress, have never reached those levels since. Fam-
ily reuniﬁcation is a major and concurrent theme, along with economic,
political, and human rights, that underlie U.S. immigration policies.  
U.S. immigration history, since the mid-18th century, has been af-
fected by legislation that has substantially colored the face of immigration 
in the last two and a half centuries. However, the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1965 liberalized immigration and repealed legal discrimina-
tion, and though modiﬁed in minor ways in the last 40 years, it continues
to guide U.S. immigration. Below are brief sketches of some additional 
immigration-related legislation or action that, since the beginning of the 
liberalization period, have affected diverse populations in a variety of 
ways, from entry into the U.S. itself to access to fundamental rights.  
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Figure 1. MODEL / FRAMEWORK FOR THE IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE
From: Segal, U. A.  (2002). A framework for immigration: Asians in the United States, New 
York: Columbia University Press,  p. 4.
218
1980: The Refugee Act removed refugees as a preference catego-
ry.  
1986: The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) legalized 
undocumented immigrants but made it unlawful to hire un-
documented workers.  
1990: The Immigration Act of 1990 increased the annual ceiling 
for immigrants to 700,000.  
1996: Welfare Reform ended many cash and medical assistance 
programs for most legal immigrants.
1996: The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsi-
bility Act (IIRIRA) expanded enforcement operations of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, particularly at the 
border.
2001: The USA Patriot Act gives federal ofﬁcials greater power to
track those suspected of terrorist activities.
2007:  Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 that at-
tempts to curtail and address the presence of undocumented 
immigrants.
The numbers of immigrants admitted legally are: (a) ﬁxed by law;
(b) limited only by demands for those considered eligible; and (c) re-
stricted by processing constraints (Gordon, 2005). The 2008 ﬁscal year
limits are in the categories below:1
Family Sponsored Immigrants (480,000 annual numbers)
1. Unmarried sons and daughters of citizens (23,400 annually)
2. Spouses and unmarried sons and unmarried daughters of per-
manent resident aliens (114,200)
3. Married sons and married daughters of citizens (23,000)
4. Adult brothers and sisters of citizens (65,000)
Employment-Based Immigrants (140,000 annually)
1. Priority workers (40,000)
a. Aliens with extraordinary ability
b. Professors and researchers
c. Certain multinational executives and managers
2. Members of the professions holding advanced degrees (40,000)
1 U.S. Department of State. February 4, 2008, http://travel.state.gov/visa/visa_1750.html 
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3. Skilled workers, professionals, and other workers (40,000)
4. Special immigrants, usually refugees adjusting their status 
(10,000)
5. Employment creators, “investors” (10,000)
Diversity (55,000 annually, effective 1995)
Non-preferential immigrants ineligible under the other categories
A substantial number of legal immigrants include those not subject 
to these numerical limits—relatives of U.S. citizens and children born 
abroad to permanent residents. In 2006, this number was approximate-
ly 691,000 (Jefferys, 2007). An interesting addition to the immigration 
quotas is the “investor program” that issues approximately 10,000 visas 
annually to those who are willing to invest one million dollars in urban 
areas or $500,000 in rural areas of the U.S.
In addition to new arrivals to the U.S., each year a number of indi-
viduals already in the country, either as refugees, students, or visitors, 
apply for adjustment of status to permanent residency. In 2006, the U.S. 
admitted 447,016 “new arrivals” and permitted another 819,248 “status 
adjustments” for a total of close to 1.3 million immigrants. The majority 
is of working age (between ages 16 and 54 years and is 55.5% female and 
married (57.7%). In 2006, approximately 50% assumed residence in the 
states of California, New York, or Florida, and 66% originated in either 
Asia or North America (Jefferys, 2007).
Immigrant Policies
Several national and state policies have elements of speciﬁc rele-
vance to immigrants and their integration into the U.S. society. Health 
policies and programs, for example, require that all patients have access 
to an interpreter. Education policies require that all children in the U.S. 
between the ages of six and sixteen years receive school education, and 
schools are expected to provide ESL (English as a second language) or 
ELL (English language learner) programs to help non-English speak-
ing children acquire the necessary language skills to perform adequately 
in the school system. Social Welfare policies allow access to welfare 
beneﬁts after a ﬁve-year residence, including access to Social Security
and Medicare and Medicaid. The Refugee Act aims to provide refugees 
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housing, cash, medical, employment, and language assistance to become 
self-sufﬁcient in the shortest time possible.
In addition to providing new arrivals with economic subsidies, hous-
ing and health care, community-based educational programs and train-
ing can provide the components for new immigrants to move away from 
dependency on society’s support. Hence, knowledge about prevention 
of disease, ability to function through society’s institutional structures, 
and earning capacity in the legitimate economy of the country will en-
hance the likelihood of self-sufﬁciency. Social and mental health ser-
vices that recognize difﬁculties associated with the immigration experi-
ence can assist immigrants in their adjustment to the receiving country. 
The National Conference of State Legislatures, on its website2, provides 
information on immigrant policies, particularly those related to beneﬁts,
health care, education and housing, immigrant integration, and citizen-
ship preparedness, among other issues.
Economic Impact of Immigration 
Regardless of the process and reasons that immigrants enter the 
U.S., it is clear that for a large proportion, a primary impetus is econom-
ic opportunity. Likewise, many deliberations in the U.S. surround the 
economic impact of migration. The ongoing immigration debate juggles 
arguments regarding assets newcomers bring to the country with those 
about drains they place on the infrastructure. The country is divided on 
the current net worth of immigration in the 21st century.    
Recent foci on immigration reform and the guest worker program 
have drawn overwhelming focus toward unauthorized workers. Howev-
er, of the 37.5 million documented immigrants in the U.S. in 2005 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2006), over 33.5 million are over age 16, and the majori-
ty is in the workforce and present across the occupational structure (U.S. 
Department of Labour, 2007). While immigrants in 2004 constituted 
11% of the population, they made up 14% of the labour force and 20% of 
the low-wage earners.  Several big businesses, construction companies, 
agriculture, and employers in many service industries contend that the 
absence of immigrant workers would cause a major catastrophe in the 
U.S. economy. There continues to be a strong, steady demand for mi-
grant workers in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, and hospital-
2 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/immigpolicyoverview.htm 
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ity, and undocumented workers are estimated to ﬁll 25% of all agricul-
tural, 17% of ofﬁce and house cleaning, 14% of construction, and 12% of
food preparation jobs (Kochhar, 2005).
Immigrant Integration
Immigrant integration is highly dependent on the tandem factors of 
immigrant human capital and the host country’s social capital accessible 
to immigrants.  In the U.S., the society is increasingly aware of ethnic 
and cultural differences among immigrants, particularly those of color 
and the native-born populations.  Interest in understanding attitudes, 
values, religions, and behaviors is reﬂected in the burgeoning literature
on immigrants and refugees.  Social service agencies have often had to 
mediate between immigrants and U.S. institutions as newcomers learn to 
adapt to their new environments.  In the process, the environment itself 
is being sensitized to the diversity of the new arrivals.
Less focus has been placed on the systematic understanding of the 
socio-economic levels of these immigrant groups and their implications 
for adaptation and achievement. Based on the allocation of immigration 
visas, there have been a variety of legal immigrant streams that have en-
tered the United States in the last few decades. While earlier immigrants 
of the 1960s were, primarily of a professional stream, current streams 
are more likely to include large numbers entering through family re-
uniﬁcation processes. These individuals and groups may not have the
human capital and skills that are readily transferable into the fast-paced 
technological society.  Consequently, the promised “land of milk and 
honey” may not be so for them. Further, refugees and undocumented im-
migrants may frequently ﬁnd themselves on the fringes of society—the
former for a signiﬁcant portion of their lives, and the latter, almost for
their entire stay in the U.S.  Thus, a large segment of the immigrant 
group, particularly the newer immigrants of the last decade, is likely to 
be marginalized. Without the requisite English language competencies, 
education, and usable job skills, many hover at poverty levels.
As one looks at the immigrant experience in the United States, one 
is struck by the realization that for some, this is the “land of opportu-
nity,” but for others it is a “ﬁeld of dreams”. Many immigrants in the
beginning of the 21st century have been highly successful, while others 
have continued to struggle. With the bimodal distribution of the immi-
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grant population’s level of achievement, and the rising numbers of unmet 
health, education, and welfare needs, this can be a social, if not an eco-
nomic, drain on the country.  
Transferable Human Capital
Closely linked with one’s status in the home country is the human 
capital that may be transferable across nations. Education and vocation 
are the two primary factors that positively affect transition.  Literacy 
not only provides individuals with knowledge, but also opens a world 
of opportunity by equipping them with the tools to be lifelong learners. 
With the skills of literacy, they are able to read and better comprehend 
explanations of situations that are initially alien.  While knowledge of the 
language of the country into which individuals are entering greatly en-
hances the process of adjustment, being literate in one’s native language 
reinforces self-efﬁcacy and strengthens prospects of pursuing learning
in other languages and environments. Therefore, in general, the higher 
the level of education possessed by individuals, the greater is their ability 
to adjust outside the home country.
Along with education, a signiﬁcant element in the adjustment process
is occupation. The extent to which professions are transportable certainly 
depends on whether they are useful to the economy of the country of 
adoption. When individuals have spent their lives in agrarian communi-
ties, developing their competence in farming, transitions to fast-paced 
computerized and industrialized societies make their farming skills obso-
lete. On the other hand, practice in computer software enhances the likeli-
hood of ﬁnding a congruous niche in a technological environment.
It behooves one to bear in mind that even under the most deplorable 
circumstances, it is not the most needy, weak, and oppressed who leave 
a country of origin but those who have, at the very least, physical, emo-
tional, and psychological fortitude. Without personal strengths, individuals 
are less likely to leave their homelands, and if they do, they are less likely 
to survive.  It is essential to view immigrants through Saleebey’s (2002) 
“strengths perspective,” identifying their human capital, namely their assets 
and capabilities, to understand their responses to the process of migration.
Many new immigrants to a country arrive with little facility in the 
language of the host country, which is often the primary obstacle. With-
out language ability, seeking housing or employment, accessing health 
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care or other services, or learning a vocation become impossible.  Lan-
guage competence increases ability to negotiate through a nation’s bu-
reaucracies, and literacy, or the ability to read and write in the host lan-
guage further improves opportunities.
The stresses on immigrants and refugees in translocation are enor-
mous and well documented3. Many are associated with the traumas of 
dramatic emigration–immigration processes.  However, other stresses re-
sult from culture shock in an alien environment, where language, social 
structures, norms, expectations, and values substantially differ from those 
that have been elemental to the immigrants’ understanding of themselves. 
Here, well understood role relationships change and established patterns 
of interaction are questioned. When immigrants have the psychological 
capability of coping, they are more likely to be able to control the direc-
tion of their lives. On the other hand, they may experience post-traumatic 
stress disorder, as do many refugees. Without sufﬁcient and appropriate
social and emotional support, and perhaps therapy, many fail to ﬁnd the
immigration experience satisfactory, remaining unhappy, resenting their 
lives in the new land, and pining for their homelands (Ahearn, 2000).
Readiness of Receiving Country for Immigrants – Social Capital
The readiness of a receiving country to accept immigrants in general, 
or an immigrant group in particular is, itself, a complex matter. When im-
migration is viewed as inextricably bound to a nation’s political, economic, 
and social well being as well as its future security interests, it is likely to be 
welcomed. Nevertheless, immigration policies of many countries are tem-
poral, reﬂecting what is believed to be of beneﬁt at a particular moment.
Nations also fulﬁll international agreements in the resettlement or provi-
sion of asylum to large numbers of refugees, to facilitate government action 
and for humanitarian reasons. Policies that allow immigration are coupled 
with those that permit the expulsion or deportation of foreign nationals.  
Serageldin (1999) indicates that social capital, “the internal social 
and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern in-
teractions among people and the institutions in which they are embed-
ded” (p. i), is essential in ensuring that opportunities within a nation are 
strong and viable.  By deﬁnition, social capital requires some cooperation
among individuals and groups and is a form of public “good” or beneﬁt
3 See United Nationals High Commissioner for Refugees’ Web site: http://www.unhcr.ch/ 
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(Grootaert, 1997). Social capital is a necessity in the creation of human 
capital (Coleman, 1988) and immigrants’ adjustment is often linked to 
the social capital available to them.
Japan's Ministry of Education, the Monbusho (1997), for example, 
states that education constitutes the foundation of all social systems. Im-
migrants may, or may not, have come with an adequate education. The 
educational system and education policy of the host country must al-
low access to levels and types of education and institutions that are ap-
propriate to their needs. Adult education programs to improve literacy 
will ensure better adjustment to the new environment.  Furthermore, 
appropriate education for immigrant children must take into account dif-
ﬁculties that can occur as they enter a school system without a working
knowledge of the medium of instruction. Variations in cultural patterns 
and behavior ought to be accommodated by schools, with awareness that 
emigration, even in the best of circumstances, is traumatic.
The nation’s welfare policies should guarantee that all immigrants 
have admittance to appropriate public welfare services and subsidies and 
are connected to private welfare programs as necessary. Hence, public 
policy and law may need to be reviewed frequently to assess their ade-
quacy for all the nations’ residents and should be so modiﬁed as to remove
barriers to the administration and utilization of the services they govern.
The availability and accessibility to social capital is paramount in 
the successful settlement of immigrants in their country of adoption. The 
implementation of sustainable development projects ensuring that immi-
grants receive the social and economic tools to succeed in their new coun-
tries is essential. In addition to providing new arrivals with economic sub-
sidies, housing and health care, community-based educational programs 
and training ought to provide the components for new immigrants to move 
away from dependency on society’s support programs (Lobo & Mayadas, 
1997). Hence, knowledge about prevention of disease, ability to function 
through society’s institutional structures, and earning capacity in the le-
gitimate economy of the country will enhance the likelihood of self-sufﬁ-
ciency. Social and mental health services need to recognize the difﬁculties
associated with the immigration experience and assist immigrants in their 
adjustment to the receiving country. This may include helping immigrants 
understand the norms and expectations of the country as well as implica-
tions for their own traditions and family and community relationships.
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Bulgaria – U.S. Comparisons
Lessons from the International Workshop, Soﬁa, Bulgaria
December 10th – 13th, 2007 saw the ﬁrst International Workshop con-
ducted under the auspices of the Economic Policy Institute and funded 
by the German Marshall Fund that brought together policy-oriented 
researchers, practitioners, and governmental experts particularly con-
cerned about the impact of immigration on the Bulgarian labour market. 
This creative workshop combined policy discussions between represen-
tatives from Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, and the United States with 
two-day ﬁeld study excursions for participants. Field visits provided a
practical perspective to theoretical issues and were to three locations: (1) 
Busmantsi, a detention center for unauthorized immigrants, (2) the State 
Agency for Refugees, which helps prepare bona ﬁde refugees for settle-
ment, and (3) Svilengrad, the border check-point at the juncture of the 
borders of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.  
Our increasingly interconnected world is creating opportunities and 
havoc of unprecedented proportions as the possibility of crossing borders 
increases. Nations receiving newcomers are faced with the task of devel-
oping policies and programs to accommodate migrants, particularly in 
the face of the rising displacement of large groups of people. Countries 
losing citizens must adapt to the drains on their workforces. Movements 
of people also provide unanticipated opportunities to nations that accept 
newcomers, many of whom may bring substantial human, social, and 
ﬁnancial capital, but host countries must mobilize their institutions to
harness and effectively utilize this capital.
With European Union access, Bulgaria ﬁnds that it is now, simulta-
neously, a country of emigration, of immigration, and of transit (Figure 
3). With ease of mobility through the EU, Bulgarians may leave in great-
er numbers to seek enhanced opportunities in the Western European na-
tions of the EU. On the other hand, it ﬁnds that it is more attractive for
asylum seekers and those seeking economic opportunities from countries 
of the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, people of Bulgarian 
origin from Southeast European nations, particularly from Macedonia, 
the Ukraine, and Moldova, have begun applying for Bulgarian citizen-
ship in much greater numbers since Bulgarian EU accession.
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FIGURE 3. MAP OF BULGARIA AND SURROUNDING AREAS
In 2007, Bulgaria estimated a population of 7.3 million (CIA, 2007), 
but experienced a migration rate of -3.71/1,000 people, and a birth rate 
(9.62/1,000) lower than the death rate (14.28/1,000), resulting in an overall 
-0.837% net decline in the population (CIA, 2008).  Workshop participants 
indicated a substantial change in the labour market through population age-
ing, depopulation, and declining, and with emigration high and increasing.
Focus of the workshop was to identify how best to ﬁll labour shortages
in the Bulgarian workplace or labour market through immigrant employ-
ment, with recognition that immigrant integration must go hand-in-hand 
with employment strategies. At the end of 2006, in anticipation of EU ac-
cession, the Bulgarian government established a new law regarding the 
entry and stay of persons from EU nations. Thus it is easier for EU citizens 
to be granted work permits and to begin employment, yet there are stron-
ger and more restrictive policies for other nationals. The aim of immigra-
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tion and immigrant policies, however, may be to identify areas of labour 
shortage, and either recruit immigrants with the requisite skills or provide 
training to immigrants who do not have transferable or usable skills.
Immigrants entering Bulgaria, as in most instances, come because, 
for them, the beneﬁts outweigh the costs, however those are measured.
Socio-economic opportunities, family reuniﬁcation, and escape from
unacceptable conditions in the country of origin may all fuel migra-
tion. Those who come with transferable human capital and are able to 
enhance their careers in Bulgaria may need support for social and cul-
tural integration. Those who are provided with visas and work permits, 
perhaps for family reuniﬁcation or for humanitarian reasons, but who
are without transferable skills may require training for economic inte-
gration. Awareness of the mental health, familial, and job-related issues 
facing immigrants is essential in helping enhance human capital by as-
sisting them to identify, develop, and access the skills they need to cope 
with their unique situations.  
The ﬁeld visits to Busmantsi, the State Agency for Refugees, and
Svilengrad provided a fairly complete picture of the process of screen-
ing and integration. Border control at Svilengrad appears to be fairly 
effective in admitting only those lawfully permitted to enter Bulgar-
ia, however, individuals and families do enter illegally both there and 
across other Bulgarian borders. In addition, some may have permission 
to enter the country, but may have no work permit and may be working 
illegally.  When apprehended, they are taken to Busmantsi, from where 
they are either repatriated or begin the process of applying for refugee 
status. If refugee status is granted, they receive services from the State 
Agency for Refugees, where they are offered employment training, edu-
cation, and integration efforts to enhance contribution to the Bulgarian 
economy and society.
Numbers assisted through the integration efforts are still relatively 
small (34 people in 2005, and 32 in 2006), but the assistance is generous. If 
they complete the program, they are fully eligible for housing assistance, 
welfare, and health beneﬁts. They receive six month language education
and two months of cultural and vocational training. The latter is available 
also through the Labour Bureau. Nevertheless, refugees are still at high 
risk for unemployment because of poor work experience, xenophobia, re-
ligious discrimination, and poor awareness of their own rights. 
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The U.S. model
It is apparent that the more different things appear, they more they 
are fundamentally similar. When immigrants enter with the requisite 
education, skills, language, and other resources, the receiving country 
usually beneﬁts economically and usually does not expend much effort
in social integration. On the other hand, when entrants are resource poor, 
the necessity of institutionalizing the availability of social capital be-
comes essential. Legal immigrants in the U.S. are eligible for means-
tested monthly resources such as food stamps (which can be exchanged 
for food in grocery stores), Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(which provides ﬁnancial assistance for a lifetime maximum period of
ﬁve years), Medicaid (which is health insurance for those of low income),
and Supplementary Security Income (for those with disabilities). By law, 
medical providers must have translators available to patients who are 
not English speakers. A variety of  programs, both governmental and 
non-governmental, teach English language classes free of charge and 
several non-governmental organizations offer other forms of assistance, 
such as citizenship preparation classes, employment training, cultural 
education, and ﬁnancial management assistance, among others. Federal
funding frequently supports these non-governmental organizations in 
delivering services.
Along with preparing immigrants to enter the workforce and suc-
cessfully negotiate it, increasingly, immigrant integration organizations, 
advocacy groups, and institutions of higher education are working with 
the general public and potential employers to combat xenophobia and 
encourage the employment of immigrants. This is a slow and erratic pro-
cess, as is evident in current immigration debates in the U.S.  Even the 
presidential election campaigns, in this 2008, are focusing heavily on 
immigration and immigration reform. Unfortunately, in the U.S., cur-
rently “immigration” seems to have become synonymous with unauthor-
ized immigration. But even in the instance of illegal workers, the U.S. 
has conﬂicting opinions. Estimates range from 7 million to 20 million
unauthorized immigrants (Figure 4).  
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FIGURE 4. UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANT NUMBERS4
Caulﬁeld (2006) indicates in his survey of approximately 800 build-
ing contractors, one half admitted to having some undocumented work-
ers, and several indicated that hiring all native-born workers makes the 
companies less competitive. Others suggested that there were not enough 
legitimate workers available for the positions, and if the illegal immigrant 
workforce was reduced, their companies would not be able to maintain 
production at their current levels. As such, perhaps the proposed guest 
worker program or a path to legalization may be options, or alternatively, 
high penalties for hiring undocumented workers or high incentives for 
hiring natives may be essential.  
However, this seems to be a dilemma that most nations face. When 
opportunities are available, and options for legal access are limited, then 
both employers who need workers and unauthorized immigrants who 
need jobs and (or) are willing to work for lower wages than natives, the 
host nation must seek a workable solution. As undocumented workers are 
still relatively few in number in Bulgaria, given the need for additional 
participants in its workforce, proactive measures that maximize immi-
grant training and integration into the country may be in order. As Ms. 
Trifonova indicated at the workshop, quoting controversial immigration 
expert Georje Borjas of spoke of the German experience saying, “…we 
wanted workers and we got people instead.”  Hence, even if the workers 
are able to deliver the product, they bring with them a diversity for which 
the host country may not be prepared or willing to accept.
4 Reproduced with permission from the May 16, 2006 issue of The Christian Science Monitor, (www.
csmonitor.com)
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Zohlberg (2006) and Fry (2007) propose that the politics of immi-
gration and immigrant policies revolve around two continua of consid-
eration (Figure 2), and that individuals are either welcomed or evicted 
based on their perceived value.  Thus, individual immigrants or immi-
grant groups may fall anywhere within the four quadrants. So, for exam-
ple, low skilled unauthorized workers may be perceived by some to be in 
Quadrant III, and lead them to advocate for inclusion, while others may 
feel they are a drain on the economy and place them in Quadrant IV and 
seek to deport them. Likewise, highly skilled professionals of a diverse 
cultural background may be valued by some (Quadrant I) or disliked for 
their cultural differences (Quadrant III). Unskilled refugees, perhaps, 
may be viewed as a drain on resources, but acceptance places the receiv-
ing nation on the world’s humanitarian spectrum (Quadrant II).
FIGURE 2. CONTINUA OF INTEREST
Immigrant Perceptions
Several studies have examined immigration, immigrant adjustment, 
host country experience, sending nation losses, and other immigration 
issues. A recent study in several counties in the state of Missouri, in the 
mid-western area of the U.S., however, provided an interesting perspec-
tive of immigrants’ perceived needs. The area is believed to be by market-
ers a “magic region” that reﬂects the norms of nationwide experiences.
The qualitative Mertz and De Voe (2007) study that interviewed immi-
grants from a diversity of backgrounds and included refugees, asylees, 
and documented and unauthorized immigrants, indicated the following:
▪ Many immigrants are successful economically and socially and 
ﬂourish in the U.S.
▪ Others experience difﬁculties because of forced displacement,
socio-economic, language barriers, and legal status
▪ Several governmental, non-governmental, and ethnic programs pro-
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vide high quality services for resettlement, language, and health care
▪ Some face major difﬁculties, such as:
- Language acquisition
- Cultural ﬂuency and exchange
- Insufﬁcient health care access
- Poor access to child care
- Inefﬁciency of public transportation
- Language, education, and non-transferability of credentials 
force immigrants into lower level occupations
Immigrant Education 
The connection between an immigrant’s personal resources and immi-
gration policy is evidenced in the issue of education. It is clear, for instance, 
that much of immigrant adaptation and integration into the host country is 
associated with education. Education can assist immigrants in making a 
successful transition into the country and can assist with reaching self-suf-
ﬁciency. Academic education for skill development is essential, including
adult education and vocational training.  However, skill development may be 
obstructed by lack of language competence and cultural ﬂuency. Therefore,
essential ingredients in adequate education that will permit advancement in 
career and economic opportunity are language acquisition and credential 
transfer. These elements should be considered, then, in the development of 
policies and programs to assist with immigrant education. 
Field trips in Bulgaria
The ﬁeld trips in Bulgaria during the course of the four day inter-
national workshop revealed that, on paper, there is a systematic process 
for detaining and processing unauthorized persons.  However, as in most 
newly established processes, backlogs and other constraints, frequently 
interfere with efﬁcient outcomes. The refugee agency indicates a strong
assistance program to integrate newcomers into the workforce, begin-
ning with Bulgarian language education, vocational training skills, and 
governmental allowances and subsidies to newcomers. However, since 
2005, it has annually served less than 35 individuals, which is a small 
proportion of those being granted refugee status. It is unclear to what 
extent other entrants are being integrated into the economy, where they 
are working, and the ease with which they are adapting.  
232
The largest minority groups in Bulgaria are the Turks (9%) and the 
Roma (4%) (CIA, 2007), but increasingly, as Iraqi refugees make their way 
across the border without documentation, Bulgaria is faced with detaining 
and processing them. Bulgaria also struggles with determining whether 
these entrants are using Bulgaria as a transit to Western Europe, and if so, 
what does it mean for its own economy if it invests rehabilitation monies 
for these refugees? If they will remain, how will they be integrated into the 
fabric of the nation, and how will policy makers work with programs of 
resettlement and education to help the nation view them as a resource? 
Closing Thoughts
It is safe to say that the ﬂow of immigrants can strain the receiving coun-
try’s support service systems. It behooves policy makers and service provid-
ers to be cognizant of the experience of immigrants so that they can appropri-
ately meet their voiced, or unvoiced, needs and ensure that the nation’s social 
capital is available to this group in enhancing its human capital. Bulgaria 
recognizes that migration across its borders will persist with improvements in 
transportation and with further emerging reasons for relocating.  
Underlying difﬁculties in working with immigrants and refugees is a far
reaching xenophobia—both of the immigrants and by them. It is difﬁcult to
assess who should be responsible for crossing this bridge – is it the host or 
is it the self-invited newcomer? Should the host country accommodate im-
migrants and refugees or should immigrants and refugees adapt to the host 
country? However, in admitting immigrants, countries make a commitment 
to them. Unless a country is willing to help them through the transitional pe-
riod of adjustment, their unmet economic, social, health, and mental health 
needs can, in both the short and the long term, drain a nation’s resources. On 
the other hand, early attention to these very immigrants may accelerate their 
entry as contributors to the society. (Mayadas & Elliott, 2003)   
For immigrants, as for all people, much is dependent on the personal 
resources they possess. Even more than this, however, is the readiness of 
the receiving country to accept immigrants and their Bulgarian-born de-
scendents. Immigration policies may reﬂect the interests of the nation in
allowing entry to certain groups of people, however, it is the opportunities 
and obstacles that immigrants and their offspring encounter on a daily basis 
that affect the ease of adjustment and mutual acceptance. Immigrants and 
the host nation must make a conscious level to adapt to each other—it is 
neither the exclusive responsibility of the host nation nor of the immigrant. 
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“Последици от членството 
на България в Европейския съюз 
върху имиграционните тенденции и 
политиките за интеграция 
на имигранти 
на българския пазар на труда”
През декември 2007 Институтът за Икономическа Политика ус-
пешно приключи първия етап от проекта “Последици от членството 
на България в Европейския съюз върху имиграционните тенденции 
и политиките за интеграция на имигранти на българския пазар на 
труда”. Инициатива се организирана с подкрепата на Германския 
Маршал Фонд на Съединените Щати в рамките на “Програмата за 
имиграция и интеграция”.
Партньорски организации по проекта на Института за Ико-
номическа Политика са Съветът за обучение в социалната сфера 
(CSWE), Институтът Катрин А. Кендъл, Александрия, Виржиния 
(САЩ) и Институтът за световна икономика към Унгарската ака-
демия на науките, Будапеща.  
Проектът има за цел да предизвиква задълбочен дебат и да ак-
тивизира обществената ангажираност в областта на интеграцията на 
имигрантите и бежанците и българското общество. Също така, срав-
нявайки възприетите, вече изпитани и успешно работещи имигрант-
ски модели в Унгария и САЩ, Институтът за икономическа политика 
се стреми да придаде особено значение на съществуващите политики 
по отношение на имигрантите в България и да допринесе за по-висо-
ки равнища на заетост, професионално и езиково обучение и преква-
лификация на имигрантите. 
В частност, в рамките на проекта се изследват най-актуалните 
въпроси, свързани с имиграцията и интеграцията на чужди граж-
дани на пазара на труда в България и възможността, при правил-
но управление на споменатите процеси, пристигналите в България 
чужденци да допринесат за икономическото развитие на страната и 
за запълването на някои дефицитни области на пазара на труда, въз-
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никнали в резултат на демографското развитие и емиграционните 
процеси през последните години. 
С цел практическо наблюдение на изследваните въпроси, за-
познаване с актуалната ситуация с имиграцията в България и като 
продължение на експертните срещи в София Институтът за Ико-
номическа Политика организира две пътувания в страната като 
съществена част от първия етап на проекта.  
Като част от първото пътуване на 11 декември 2007 експер-
тите, участващи в трансатлантическата инициатива, посетиха 
Специалния дом за временно настаняване на чужденци в Бусман-
ци и се срещнаха с неговия директор Данаил Димов. По време 
на срещата бе представена нова и малко известна в публичното 
пространство информация, както за дейността на Дома, така и за 
случаите на нелегална имиграция в България. 
Домът в Бусманци е открит през юни 2006 година, за да пос-
рещне нарастващия брой нелегални имигранти в страната. Взи-
майки под внимание тази тенденция, българските власти пред-
виждат откриването на втори подобен център непосредствено до 
българско-турската граница в близост до гр. Свиленград.
След посещението в Специалния дом за временно настанява-
не на чужденци, експертната група посети Държавната агенция 
за бежанци в София. Експертите в Интеграционния център към 
Агенцията представиха програмите, които разработват и прила-
гат за бежанците в България и споделиха конкретни резултати и 
добри практики при осъществяването им. Участниците в работна-
та среща имаха също така възможността да проследят протичащи 
в момента на посещението им езикови и професионални курсове 
за бежанците, както и занимания, организирани за техните деца 
от служители в Агенцията. 
На 12 декември 2007 участниците в трансатлантическата 
инициатива посетиха Свиленград. Посещението на Гранично 
полицейско управление в гр. Свиленград включваше среща с 
неговите ръководни органи, които запознаха участниците с ра-
ботата си и изнесоха актуални данни за опитите за нелегалната 
имиграция в страната през поверения им пограничния район. 
Според статистика на Граничната полиция в града, броят на не-
легалните имигранти, заловени при опит се да влезнат в страна-
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та е претърпял сериозно увеличение от 97 през 2006 до 767 към 
12 декември 2007. 
В заключение към проведената дискусия участниците просле-
диха как протича контрола за нелегални имигранти на ГКПП Ка-
питан Андреево и посетиха Центъра за чужденци в гр. Любимец 
и строящия се такъв в с. Пъстрогор. 
След провеждането на две пътувания, на 13 декември 2007 го-
дина в София се проведе заключителна среща на експертите по 
проекта. По време на дискусията, ръководена от проф. Андраш 
Инотай, бяха обобщени впечатленията на участниците и бяха за-
дадени насоките за изследователски дейности по проекта.
В рамките на проекта е изготвена и настоящата публикация, 
която съдържа изследванията на всички участници. В заключи-
телната си глава на български език изданието съдържа полити-
чески предложения, основаващи се както на опита на българските 
участници в проекта, така и на добрите практики, разкрити в из-
следванията на експертите от Унгария и САЩ.  
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Политически предложения, 
изготвени от експертите по проекта 
“Последици от членството на 
България в Европейския съюз 
върху имиграционните тенденции и 
политиките за интеграция 
на имигранти 
на българския пазар на труда”
Тази част от проекта цели да представи в най-общи линии 
заключенията и препоръките на участващите в проекта експерти, 
намерили място в изследванията им, публикуван на английски 
език в настоящата публикация. Препоръките се отнасят не само 
до актуални проблеми на имигрантските общности в България и 
достъпа им до пазара на труда, но и до възможните ефекти от при-
лагането на успешна имиграционна и интеграционна политика от 
страна на българската държава:
▪ Формирането и провеждането на миграционната политика 
на България следва да се обвързва с националния интерес 
на страната и да е съобразено с произтичащите от пълноп-
равното членство в ЕС ангажименти в тази област; 
▪ Имиграционната политика на РБългария трябва да пред-
ставлява цялостна концепция за бъдещето развитие на 
страната, която да се прилага в подкрепа на развитието на 
икономиката, но която отчита икономическото и социални 
интереси на всички български граждани;  
▪ Организациите на имигрантите в България трябва активно 
да участват в процесите на взимане на решение касаещи 
както самите тях, така и бъдещата имиграционна политика 
на РБългария, тъй като с опита си могат да допринесат за 
подобряване на ефективността на съответните български 
институции и прилаганите от тях политики;
▪ Към различните имигрантски общности, които са/ ще се 
239
появят в страната на по-късен етап трябва да се прилагат 
различни подходи, отчитащи техните икономически, соци-
ални, културни и т.н. характеристики;
▪ Имигрантските общности трябва да имат достъп до програ-
мите и средствата, предвидени за другите етнически малцин-
ства в България като размера им трябва да  е съобразен с броя 
и географското разпределение на имигрантите в страната;
▪ Проблемите на имигрантските общности не засягат само 
централното управление, но налагат и участието на мест-
ните власти и гражданското общество в районите, където 
тяхната численост е по-значима.
▪ Специално внимание трябва да се обърне на включването 
в рамките на националните образователни инициативи на 
частните училищата, които се спонсорират от имигрантс-
ките общности и се посещават предимно от техните деца;
▪ По отношение на бежанците са нужни действия насочени 
към осигуряване на условия за пълноценното им социално 
включване чрез повишаване на пригодността им за заетост. 
Насърчаването на достъпа им до заетост чрез обучение и 
повишаване на професионалната им квалификация ще на-
мали държавните разходи за издръжката им в страната;
▪ Работодателите трябва да бъдат насърчавани да разкриват 
работни места за придобиване на квалификация, чрез ста-
жуване и чиракуване за срок не по-малък от 6 месеца и пос-
ледващо наемане на работа на бежанците в България;
 ▪ В тази връзка е възможно въвеждането на финансови сти-
мули, както и на данъчни облекчения за работодателите, 
които осигуряват заетост на бежанци;
▪ Необходимо е преразглеждане на десет процентната квота 
за чужденци в българските фирми, тъй като това изключ-
ва възможността на малките и средните предприятия да се 
възползват от чуждестранен опит и по този начин стиму-
лира наемането без трудов договор. В тази връзка изклю-
чително важна е ролята на частния сектор като инициатор 
на подобни промени; 
▪ Към имиграцията в България трябва да се приложи проак-
тивен подход, целящ компенсирането на негативните де-
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мографски тенденции в страната по възможно най-благоп-
риятен за България начин;
▪ Преди да се прибегне към имиграция, българската държава 
трябва да насочи усилията си към създаване на условия за 
привличане и завръщане на част от българските граждани 
напуснали страната през последните близо две десетилетия;
▪ Единствено привличането на хора с български произход е 
реалистичен подход при привличането на чуждестранни 
работници в страната вземайки предвид равнището на въз-
награжденията в България в сравнение с другите страни 
членки на ЕС;
▪ Интеграцията би била по-лесна и по-ефективна ако при 
контролирана имиграционна политика в страната се прив-
личат хора с български произход отколкото хора с различни 
етнически и културни корени с цел избягване на проблеми 
с бъдещите имигрантски поколения, каквито са налице в 
някой западноевропейски държави;
▪ За да се избегне наплива от ниско образовани чуждестран-
ни работници е нужно изработването на политика съобра-
зена с нуждите на работна ръка по сектори и региони;
▪ Привличането на чуждестранни граждани в страната изис-
ква разработването на цялостна политика, която не прик-
лючва с пристигането им в страната; 
▪ От огромна важност за провеждането на успешна имигра-
ционна и интеграционна политика е наличието на добри 
взаимоотношения между съответните държавни институ-
ции от една страна и неправителствения сектор и медиите 
от друга, тъй като само по този начин българското общес-
тво ще бъде по-подготвено за осъзнаване и приемане на 
предизвикателствата на глобалните миграционни процеси 
и преимуществата на една съвременна и премерена мигра-
ционна политика, каквато България трябва да разработва и 
провежда последователно.
